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This work considers data about the intentional nature of human cognition,
and traces their consequences for debates in the philosophy and epistemol-
ogy of logic, and metaphysics. The first part of this work, comprising its
first three chapters, investigates the prospect of revising logic in light of de re
intentionality, that is, more precisely, in light of the fact that via their cogni-
tive abilities agents can relate to objects that do not exist. We will consider
two candidate systems for logical revision, expressions of two forms of log-
ical revisionism, and eventually motivate, from anti-exceptionalist grounds,
our preference for one of them. We will start in Ch. 1 by illustrating the
anti-exceptionalist methodological framework assumed in this work. Subse-
quently, in Ch. 2, we will discuss four classically valid principles inadequate
to the data of de re intentionality, reject possible attempts, by proponents
of so-called realist abstractionist theories of fiction, to deny those data, and
present the system P of positive free logic. We will then go on, in Ch. 3, to
illustrate the noneist programme of logical revision and a system, N R, imple-
menting its principles. We will thus argue from anti-exceptionalist grounds
that rational theory choice is exercised by choosing N R. The rest of the chap-
ter is dedicated to defend a realist account about the ontological dependency
of the non-existent on the existent. Ch.4 and Ch. 5 are dedicated to refute at-
tempts, by Timothy Williamson, to reduce disagreements about non-existent
objects to cases of merely verbal disagreements. In Ch.4, we take issue with
arguments to the extent that logical disputes about ‘exists’ are genuine only
if the parties use it in deductively ways. In Ch. 5 we address his scepticism
towards the dispute, about merely possible objects, between actualism and
possibilism, and find it unwarranted.
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Detailed Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Methodology, Meta-Methodology, and Theory Choice
This work is divided into two parts. In the first part, comprising the present
chapter and the subsequent two, we investigate the prospect of revising logic
in light of intentionality, which is, roughly, the capacity of cognition of being
directed towards an object of some kind. We take as correct the view that,
through her cognitive abilities, an agent can be related in many ways to many
kinds of objects. Some of which exist, some of which do not. To hold this
view, however, is to contradict some principles of classical logic (C) on its
standard Quinean interpretation. This had better be revised, and replaced by
a logic which delivers correct data. We will present four candidates for this
task throughout the next two chapters, and make a suggestion as to which
one to choose by the end of Chapter 3. To orient our logic choice, however, a
theory of logical methodology is needed.
This is what the present chapter is about. We first present the method-
ological framework assumed throughout this work, which is often known as
anti-exceptionalism about logic. We then argue that a theory of logical method-
ology needs to be accompanied by a meta-methodological account of the
proper subject matter of logic, what logic is about. We then contrast two
meta-methodological approaches. One takes logic as a theory of the maxi-
mally general features of reality (Williamson (2017; 2018b)), the second as a
theory of correct reasoning (Priest (2014; 2016a)). We motivate our preference
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for the latter meta-methodology: Williamson, we argue, proposes an idiosyn-
cratic account of logical theorising. We then conclude by distinguishing four
possible attitudes towards the phenomenon of classical recapture, a system’s
capacity to include C as a proper sub-system. Our interest is in the so-called
default classicality position, according to which C is in some sense correct to
reason about standard cases, and so its recapture is an important result. From
a similar point of view, we finally note, the process of logical revision must
attribute a certain weight to the so-called Maxim of Minimal Mutilation: re-
vision of a theory ought to be carried out by doing the least damage to the
theory as possible. So in particular for C.
Chapter 2: Revising Logic in Light of De Re Intentionality
In this chapter, our concern is threefold. First of all, we draw a distinction
between two possible parsing theories which C has been equipped with to
account for the vernacular predicate ‘exists’. On one of them, ‘exists’ is anal-
ysed in terms of a second-order predicate (Frege (1879; 1884), Russell (1919)),
denoting a property, not of individuals, but of concepts (Frege) or propo-
sitional functions (Russell). Our interest, however, is in what we call the
Quinean parsing theory parsing theory of C (Quine (1948)). On this account,
‘exists’ is interpreted as a blanket property of individuals, defined in terms of
∃ and identity. We then single out four principles relevant for our discussion,
which C on the Quinean parsing theory licenses as valid. Taken together,
they yield the following picture: properties and relations as such are exis-
tence entailing, and denying the existence of an arbitrary thing results in a
contradiction.
We then look closely at how of intentionality calls into question the ade-
quacy of those principles. First of all, we distinguish between de re intentional
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contexts, where the content of an intentional state is an object, and de dicto in-
tentional contexts, where it is a proposition. As it happens, we are often de
re intentionally related to objects, such as purely fictional or mythological
characters, which do not exist. The four principles of C on the Quinean pars-
ing theory appear to have invalid substitution instances. We then consider
possible attempts to resist this conclusion by taking into account the story
provided by realist abstractionist theories of fiction (Van Inwagen (2003),
Thomasson (1998; 2003)), but find their account wanting. The phenomenon
of de re intentionality justifies the project of logical revision.
The rest of the chapter is then dedicated to illustrate the first of the two
revisionary programmes we will encounter: that of free logic. Free logicians
have accepted the Quinean parsing theory for ‘exists’, and went on to reform
logic by replacing C. Our interest in this chapter is in the so-called positive
tradition of free logic. We will thus present a system of positive free logic
(P) which avoids the inadequacies of C on the Quinean parsing theory, and
illustrate some implications associated with the project of revising logic in
favour of P .
Chapter 3: Noneism
This chapter is divided into two parts, just like two are the senses in which
noneism could be interpreted. In the first part, our concern is with noneism
qua programme of logical revision. We start by presenting the noneist ap-
proach to logical revision. Unlike the free logic tradition, which accepted the
Quinean parsing theory, noneism found it faulty. In place of it, noneists have
proposed an existentially neutral interpretation of quantification, and cap-
tured ‘exists’ by means of a monadic predicate not reducible to quantification
and identity (Sylvan (1980), Priest (2008; 2016b)). We thus present a second
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candidate system for logical revision, N R, implementing such revisionary
ideas. We show, in particular, that like P , N R too avoids the inadequacies
incurred by C on the Quinean parsing theory. Our final goal in this part of
the chapter is to determine which, between P and N R, delivers the best ac-
count of reasoning. We apply to this case the anti-exceptionalist account of
logic choice introduced in Chapter 1. We thus propose the following four
criteria to orient theory choice, ranked in decreasing order of importance or
weight: adequacy to the data, expressive power, adherence to the Maxim of
Minimal Mutilation, and conceptual simplicity. We justify this list of princi-
ples and spell out how each one will be understood. Subsequently, we will
score P and N R against each one of them. Our conclusion is that N R is our
best logic, the one it is more rational to choose. We thus turn to the second
part of this chapter.
Here, we look at noneism from a different angle, that is, qua modal theory
of intentionality. Our interest in this part of the chapter is in a certain philo-
sophical issue arising in theorisation about intentionality, and that is, the on-
tological dependency of the non-existent on the existent. To this end, as a first
task we quickly outline (what we think is the main aspect of) the account of
intentionality which noneism proposes. This is based on a view which goes
by the name of anti-literalism; the view, namely, that non-existents do not
typically have literally, or in reality, many properties they are characterised
as having. To appreciate better the position, a contrast is offered with literal-
ist theories of intentionality. We then move on to present, and criticise, one
way in which the ontological dependency of the non-existent on the existent
has been understood, specifically, Crane (2016). Crane proposes an account
of non-existent as dependent for almost the entirety of their properties, on
the representational activities of cognitive agents. We argue, however, that a
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similar idea should be resisted, and move on to see how the issue of ontolog-
ical dependency of the non-existent on the existent has been framed within
noneism.
Here, we need to distinguish between realist forms of noneism, and anti-
realist forms thereof. We will see how parties to this distinction offer dif-
ferent accounts for the baptism of purely fictional characters. In particular,
anti-realist noneism articulates a view of purely fictional character as onto-
logically dependent entities, created by the activities of authors of fiction.
Realist noneism, on the other hand, disputes that much. Due to its accepting
talk of creation for fictional characters, anti-realist noneism might be thought
of as having an initial advantage over realist noneism, grounded on its vin-
dicating ordinary beliefs. The fact that anti-realist noneism seems to have a
better claim to plausibility puts some pressure on our logic choice made in
the first part of the chapter, as N R is most naturally thought of as implement-
ing realist assumptions. We will conclude the chapter, however, by showing
that the initial advantage that anti-realist noneism might have been thought
of as having was merely illusory. Our choice of N R, made in the first part of
the chapter, was the right choice to make.
Chapter 4: From Collapse Theorems to Proof-Theoretic Argu-
ments
This chapter and the next one constitute the second part of this work. In each
one of them, we address the status of a logical dispute; specifically, whether
or not it is merely verbal. In this chapter, we consider the status of a disagree-
ment between a noneist and a proponent of C on the Quinean parsing theory;
an allist, as we will say. Are they simply talking past each other when, say,
18 Contents
they disagree about the validity of some of the principles governing ‘exists’
singled out in Chapter 2?
We will consider an argument by Williamson (1988) to the extent that
they are likely to be, in that they are likely to mean different things by ‘ex-
ists’. Their dispute would, in other words, simply turn on an equivocation
and therefore be merely verbal. The argument is based on the assumption
that two parties to a dispute over a logical principle for a certain logical ex-
pression are genuinely disagreeing if, and only, if they can characterise that
expression up to logical equivalence in terms of some shared rules of infer-
ence (we will call this the Genuineness Criterion). A noneist and an allist
disagree, among other things, about the validity of the so-called Existence
Principle (EP: from Pt, infer E!t). And, according to Williamson, two theo-
rists disagreeing over the validity of EP would fail to meet the standards for
genuine disagreement as codified by the Genuineness Criterion.
We will grant Williamson that a similar criterion could be used to iden-
tify which disagreements count as real. Still, there are three reasons why
Williamson’s discussion does not say much about the status of a disagree-
ment between a noneist and an allist. First, because in certain domains in-
cluding non-existents, some forms of noneism will rely on systems validat-
ing EP. Secondly, because we will show that it is possible for two theorists to
disagree about the validity of EP and yet satisfy the Genuineness Criterion.
Thirdly, because, on reflection, we had better not rely on the Genuineness
Criterion as a standard for genuine disagreement in logic, given that it fails
to vindicate many disagreements it would have to do justice to.
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Chapter 5: Actual Disputes, Logical Pluralism, and Bayesian-
ism
In this chapter, we consider the case of a dispute in modal logic between
proponents of so-called actualism and possibilism. Actualism is the thesis that
necessarily, every thing that could have been actual already is; possibilism,
that this is not the case. Williamson 2010; 2016b argues that this is yet an-
other example of merely verbal dispute. In this chapter, we will give three
arguments to resist Williamson’s claims.
First of all, Williamson (2013c: §7.1) appealed to a translation schema by
Correia (2007), to suggest that actualism and possibilism would be intertrans-
latable. Correia’s translation has an antecedent in a translation by Forbes
(1989), which it improved by resorting to infinitely many pairs of Vlach op-
erators. However, in the constant domain S5 framework where we assume
that the dispute between actualism and possibilism is conducted, this trans-
lation is shown to fail.
We then go on to consider Williamson’s claim that parties to the actu-
alism/possibilism distinction would be equivocating on the meaning of ‘is
actual’, and test whether this claim is actually available to him. In Chapter
4, we argued that Williamson’s Genuineness Criterion turns out to be prob-
lematic. We will, however, use it as a challenge for actualists and possibilists,
to see whether, by his own standards, their dispute is really merely verbal:
we will call this the Uniqueness Challenge. We then distinguish between
two forms of actualism (serious and frivolous), and introduce an analogous
distinction within possibilism. It turns out that serious possibilism and seri-
ous actualism can pass the Uniqueness Challenge.
Given this result, we are then interested in determining how likely it is
to suppose that an equivocation of ‘is actual’ is affecting the parties to those
20 Contents
ramifications of the debate where the Uniqueness Challenge cannot be met.
To determine this, we will propose two simple simulations, and argue from






The first three chapters of this work, together, constitute its first part. The
main thesis around which this part is centred is that some things, which for
example can be thought of, dreamed about, imagined, or sought for, do not
exist. This thesis, as is well-known, is regarded as highly unorthodox in con-
temporary philosophy, to the extent that many even consider it to be a con-
tradiction in terms. For, importantly, it runs afoul of certain principles which
classical logic, on its standard Quinean interpretation, does license as valid.
Still, philosophical orthodoxy notwithstanding, this thesis we accept. In do-
ing so, we are bound to say that if its truth is incompatible with classical
logic, then classical logic gets things wrong. As such, it ought to be revised
(in favour of a logic which gets things right). Which logic specifically, this is
an issue we will discuss throughout the next two chapters. In this chapter, we
ask: what does it mean exactly that classical logic ought to be revised? And
how can we choose rationally between different logics? To answer similar
questions, we need a theory of logical methodology. This chapter presents
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the methodological framework we will assume hereafter, which usually goes
with the name of anti-exceptionalism (about logic).
Our goal in this chapter is mainly expository. In particular, we simply
want to outline the assumptions which we will deploy in the course of the
next two chapters. In §1.2, we present the principles of anti-exceptionalism
about logic, introduce its mechanism of rational logic choice, and argue that
this needs to be accompanied by a meta-methodological account about the
subject matter of logic: what logic is taken to be about. In §1.3, we consider
two meta-methodological accounts, and motivate our preference for one of
them. Logic, on the account we favour, is seen as a theory of correct reason-
ing. In §1.4, we first consider the phenomenon of classical recapture: the fact
that a system includes classical logic as a proper subsystem. In revising clas-
sical logic, how much importance should be attributed to this phenomenon?
Here, we distinguish between four possible attitudes which non-classical lo-
gicians have expressed. One of them sees classical recapture as an important
result, ensuring that classical logic can still be retained as a special case. A
similar attitude, which we will find again in the next chapter, is emblematic
of the so-called default classicality position, according to which classical logic
needs to be revised, but is still (in some sense) correct to reason about stan-
dard contexts. In particular, we argue, from a similar viewpoint rational logic
choice should be exercised with an eye to the so-called Maxim of Minimal Mu-
tilation: revision of a theory ought to be carried out by doing the least damage
to the theory as possible. Finally, in §1.5 we will quickly sum up what has
been claimed in this chapter
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1.2 Anti-Exceptionalism About Logic
In recent years, the methodology of logic has attracted the attention of many
commentators, sparking contributions concerning a number of questions. Is
logical theorising a scientific enterprise, in the sense that it requires methods
which are continuous with those of science? If so, are they more akin to
those of natural sciences such as biology or physics, abstract sciences such
as mathematics, or social sciences such as economics? Can logic be revised?
What is the mechanism driving rational logic choice? Such questions lie at
the heart of logical methodology.
An increasingly popular approach to these issues is anti-exceptionalism
about logic1. On a rough characterisation of the view, anti-exceptionalism
about logic holds that, with respect to the series of questions just mentioned,
all those that presuppose a yes-or-no answer should be answered in the af-
firmative. Thus, logic is continuous with science, as is its methodology with
scientific method; and logic is in principle no less subject to rational revision
than scientific theories are. A further tenet shared by many (if not most) anti-
exceptionalism about logic to be noted is the denial of the view that logic is
a priori and that its truths are analytical truths2. These principles seem to be
shared, in different degrees, by all anti-exceptionalists about logic (Hjortland
(2017a, 2019), Maddy (2002), Priest (2006a, 2014, 2016a), Russell (2014, 2015),
1In the present context, the origin of the label ‘exceptionalism’ goes back to Williamson
(2007: 3), who calls philosophical exceptionalism the view that there is such a thing as a dis-
tinctively philosophical method, discontinuous with the methods of science. His (lengthy)
critique of the view can be found in a number of contributions; see (2007,2013a, 2013b, 2013c,
2016a, 2017, 2019).
2The idea goes back to Quine (1951), who is accordingly generally considered to have
laid the foundation of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The issue is discussed at length
by Read (2019). An anti-exceptionalist philosopher departing from such characterisation
of anti-exceptionalism is Priest, who informs me that he does take the view that logical truths
are analytic. The reader is however advised to consult the discussion in Priest (2016a: 359–
364) for a more detailed account of why his view might be seen as at least entailing that the
analyticity of logical truths is not an obvious truism.
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Williamson (2013c, 2017))3.
Importantly, as an integral part of the project, anti-exceptionalism about
logic is committed to providing guidance to exercise rational theory choice
in logic. From the anti-exceptionalist point of view, this is perhaps the as-
pect where the continuity of logic with the sciences is more visible. Scientific
theories, it is often said, are chosen by means of abductive considerations
(Harman (1965), Lipton (2005), Williamson (2013c: 421-429), Priest (2016a)).
One sets out a number of virtues that it is desirable for theories to exhibit;
such virtues constitute the criteria against which theories are assessed, and
the theory that scores best against such criteria, in terms of cost-benefit, is
the one our rational choice should be cast upon. Thus, roughly speaking, the
underlying reasoning for selecting a scientific theory proceeds by inference
to the best explanation. Theory choice in logic, anti-exceptionalists contend,
should be carried out just analogously.
Priest (2016a) has shown how this process of theory choice (in logic and
science in general) can be formally modelled4. Suppose we have set on a
number of criteria c1, ...cn for theory choice (some of them, we will encounter
shortly) and want to determine which, of a group of theories T1, ..., Tn, we
rationally ought to choose. First, for each criterion we can define a measure-
ment function µci attributing, to each theory Ti, a value in the closed interval
[-10,+10]. This value represents how well Ti performs with respect to ci; +10
being the best possible outcome. Thus, a theory Ti may for example score
3They are equally denied by their opponents, whom for uniformity we should call excep-
tionalists (about logic). If maintaining that logic is a priori, and that its truths are analytic, is
sufficient to count as an exceptionalist, then forms of exceptionalism about logic have been
proposed by BonJour (1997), Boghossian (2000), Wright (2004) and, historically, by Frege
(1956) and Carnap (1937).
4See also Priest (2006a: 130-141). An application of the model has been recently proposed
by Priest (2019) in the context of the debate between vacuist and non-vacuist accounts of
counterfactual conditionals - see Williamson (2018a) and Berto et al. (2018) for a defence
of each of the two positions respectively. The model, Priest contends, supports a choice in
favour of the non-vacuist account.
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very well with respect to a certain criterion (say, µcn−1(Ti) = 9.1) and quite
poorly with respect to another (say, µcn(Ti) = −3.8). There is no need to
impose that every criterion has the same importance; in fact, we might want
to weight differently distinct criteria. For this reason, each criterion ci is as-
signed a weight of importance wci ∈ [−10,+10]. At this point, we can define
the rationality index ρ(Ti) of a theory as the weighted sum of its performances
with respect to the various criteria considered:
ρ(Ti) = wc1µc1(Ti) + . . . + wcn µcn(Ti).
It follows that the theory which we rationally ought to choose is the one hav-
ing, amongst those considered, the highest rationality index. Now, assuming
that two theorists agree on what criteria theories should be scored against,
and on how much such criteria ought to be weighted, the model may deliver
a straightforward indication as to what theory we ought to choose. How-
ever, it may not - even if the theorists agreed on what criteria consider and
how much weight attribute to each of them. For, two theories may enjoy
exactly the same rationality index. In that case, the choice of a theory is inde-
terminate. And although not desirable, this might not be the worst possible
outcome.
For, consider the following case. Priest (2006a, 2014, 2016a) and Williamson
(2007, 2013b, 2013c, 2017) have both accepted a broadly anti-exceptionalist
account of logical theory choice. However, whilst the former endorses non-
classical logic (his Logic of Paradox, in particular; see Priest (2006b)), the
latter endorses classical logic.
This divergence is all the more striking if we observe that not only do
Priest and Williamson agree that a logic needs to be chosen by abductive
reasoning, they also happen to agree on what the criteria for logic choice are.
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Specifically, they both hold that strength, simplicity, elegance (or absence of
ad hoc assumptions), unifying power and adequacy to the data are criteria
against which scientific theories are assessed; as such, they should drive our
process of theory choice in logic too.
Here, on the one hand, is Priest (2016a: 348) - see also (2014: 217):
The model I will propose is one that is familiar, in many ways,
from the philosophy of science. It is applied whenever we have
to choose rationally between competing theories. Start by noting
that there are many criteria that speak in favour of a theory. The
exact list is a matter for contention [...] but standard candidates
include:




• avoidance of ad hoc elements
Here, on the other hand, is Williamson (2017: 14):
[S]cientific theory choice follows a broadly abductive methodol-
ogy. [...] Scientific theories are compared with respect to how well
they fit the evidence, of course, but also with respect to virtues
such as strength, simplicity, elegance, and unifying power. We
may speak loosely of inference to the best explanation, although
in the case of logical theorems we do not mean specifically causal
explanation, but rather a wider process of bringing our miscella-
neous information under generalizations that unify it in illumi-
nating ways.
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In sum, the fact that different logic choices are made by relying on this
common methodological background may suggest that anti-exceptionalism
does underdetermine the process of logical theory choice.
Hjortland (2017a) denied that things are this way. Rather, he argues, the
difference between Priest and Williamson is due to an underlying disagree-
ment as to what is the subject matter of logical theories: what logical theories
are theories of 5. Roughly, Williamson takes a logical theory to be primar-
ily concerned with the discovery of which unrestricted universal generalisa-
tions hold of absolutely everything in the world (2013b, 2013c, 2017). Priest
on the other hand has espoused a view of logic as being essentially a the-
ory of validity - what follows from what (2006a, 2014). The discrepancy is
further aggravated by the fact that Priest (2006a, 2014) takes logic to be an
enterprise with a normative bearing on how people ought to reason in the
vernacular; similar preoccupations are not essential to Williamson’s enter-
prise. Such differences between Williamson and Priest are significant, and
seem to imply that they would consequently weight the various criteria for
logic choice in non-equivalent ways. For example, for a theory of valid rea-
soning the criterion of adequacy to the data seems to be paramount, or in
any case more important than other criteria such as power. By contrast, for a
theory concerned with discovering what truths hold of absolutely everything
in the world, the order of importance of those two criteria would appear to
be reversed. All things considered, it would be actually rather surprising if
Priest and Williamson had expressed the same logic choice.
We agree with Hjortland’s analysis; the difference in logical theory choice
5Whilst Hjortland agrees with Priest, against Williamson, that anti-exceptionalism sup-
ports non-classical logic, he nonetheless disagrees with Priest about the fact that it supports
a specific non-classical logic. In fact, he urges that anti-exceptionalists about logic endorse
his intra-theoretic logical pluralism; see Hjortland (2013) for a presentation of the view.
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between Priest and Williamson is sufficiently explained in terms of their dif-
ferent assumptions about the subject matter of logical theories6. Rather than
bringing to light a problem that anti-exceptionalism is inherently faced with,
we take it that this is illustrative of two facts. First, that assumptions about
the subject matter of logical theories are independent from methodological
assumptions. So to speak, the former are situated one level up with respect
to the latter; this level, we call meta-methodology7. This entails that a discus-
sion over the subject matter of logical theories does not take place at the level
of logical methodology, but rather at the level of logical meta-methodology8.
Secondly, the rationality of a certain logic choice cannot be meaningfully as-
sessed unless one has also clearly identified what meta-methodological as-
sumptions underpin it. For, trying to determine what logical theory we ought
to choose, independently of what we take it to be a theory of, looks like a
pointless enterprise.
The methodology assumed in this work is broadly anti-exceptionalist, in
the sense outlined above, particularly with respect to the anti-exceptionalist
account of logical theory choice. We now turn to our meta-methodological
assumptions, which are spelled out below.
6In recent private conversation, however, Priest has expressed some scepticism towards
this analysis of his disagreement with Williamson, and informed me that even if they were
to agree on the proper subject matter of logic, they would still disagree as to what logical
laws would count as valid.
7In the philosophy of science, the expression ‘meta-methodology’ is used with a different
meaning. It roughly indicates the area of study concerned both with singling out the set
of values underlying a certain scientific methodology, such as objectivity and reproducibil-
ity, and with assessing whether a scientific methodology satisfies those values. For more
discussion, see Fox (1996) and Andersen and Hepburn (2016).
8We are not aware of any author in the literature using a similar terminology to ex-
press this point; in fact we think that the distinction between methodological and meta-
methodological questions in logic, in the sense just outlined, has gone somewhat unnoticed.
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1.3 Meta-Methodology
The Priest/Williamson case shows that, in assuming the anti-exceptionalist
methodology, we have at least two possible meta-methodological options
available, each one identifying a specific subject matter for logical theories.
Our main goal here is to describe the meta-methodology assumed throughout
this work. We will ultimately side with Priest, and spell out here our reasons
for this choice. As a first task, however, we need to characterise more pre-
cisely the meta-methodology that Priest and Williamson have espoused. This
will also help us get clearer about our reasons for taking onboard Priest’s
meta-methodology.
Let us start with Williamson. Williamson’s meta-methodology yields a
conception of logic inextricably tied to the study of the maximally general
features of reality. Traditionally, a similar area of investigation corresponds
to metaphysics, or at least part thereof. It is thus safe to conclude that, on
Williamson’s conception, metaphysics makes up for the subject matter of
logic. Williamson reiterated the point in a number of occasions (2013c, 2013b,
2017), but its clearest formulation is perhaps found in the following passage
(our italics):
Classical logic is a good theory of the most abstract and general features
of the real world. It has no transcendental justification, no proof that
ultimately no challenge to it makes sense. It needs no such justifi-
cation. Rather, classical logic is justified like other scientific theo-
ries, by the sort of abductive comparison with its rivals [...] Clas-
sical logic is simple and elegant. It is logically stronger than most
of its rivals: more informative, with more power to unify and ex-
plain general patterns. It has been tested far more intensely than
any non-classical logic, and found adequate, since it has been the
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background logic of mathematics and other sciences for millen-
nia. Attempts to show that it doesn’t fit the evidence have never
succeeded. It is one of our best scientific theories (Williamson
(2018b: 95–96)).
The relevance of this passage for our presentation of Williamson’s meta-
methodology is obvious: classical logic, Williamson’s preferred logical the-
ory, is considered to be a metaphysical theory (of the real world). Moreover,
the passage also contains an explicit formulation of the idea that, given a
similar meta-methodological assumption, the anti-exceptionalist methodol-
ogy provides support for classical logic. Articulating Williamson’s reasons
for thinking that the anti-exceptionalist methodology does provide support
for classical logic, however, would take us too far afield9. Nor is it partic-
ularly important for our goals to examine these reasons, given that, as we
said earlier, we disagree with his meta-methodological assumptions. Priest’s
meta-methodology, which we now turn to, deserves more attention.
We remarked earlier that, on Priest’s conception, logic is primarily about
validity (and cognate notions such as inference and argument). The subject
matter corresponding to a similar account of logic, accordingly, is reasoning
- human reasoning, to be sure. However, human reasoning is typically not
carried out formally, but rather informally in the vernacular. More precisely,
then, we should speak of vernacular reasoning to express Priest’s purported
subject matter of logic. In his words:
A logic with its canonical application delivers an account of or-
dinary reasoning. One should note that ordinary reasoning, even
in science and mathematics, is not carried out in a formal lan-
guage, but in the vernacular; no doubt the vernacular augmented
9Most of them can be found in his (2013b, 2017), and a critical analysis in Hjortland
(2017a).
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by many technical terms, but the vernacular none the less. (No
one reasons à la Principia Mathematica) [...] In other words, a pure
logic with its canonical application is a theory of the validity of or-
dinary arguments: what follows (deductively) from what (Priest
(2014: 215–216)).
What deserves attention here is the fact that, whilst we have said that
valid vernacular (ordinary) reasoning represents for Priest the subject matter
of logic, in the passage above vernacular reasoning is described twice as be-
ing the canonical application of a logic (not of logic). On the one hand, talk of
canonical application suggests that there are also non-canonical applications;
on the other hand, the fact that Priest does not talk of canonical application
of logic, but of a logic, suggests that we might have overlooked some im-
portant distinction. Priest, in other words, seems on to something which our
terminology does not make immediately clear.
Indeed, there is a three way distinction which Priest (2014) asks us to con-
sider, concerning different senses in which the word ‘logic’ is used. As we
will see shortly, this distinction will turn out to be particularly useful, allow-
ing us to appreciate more conspicuously the interactions between methodol-
ogy and meta-methodology in Priest and Williamson’s accounts.
First of all, when we speak of ‘a logic’ instead of ‘logic’, we typically refer
to one logical system amongst the plethora available - classical logic, intuition-
istic logic, paraconsistent logic, quantum logic and so on. A logical system is
a purely mathematical structure comprising a formal language together with
an interpretation and/or a set of rules of inference. Priest (2014: 212) calls
logica docens a similar use of the word ‘logic’ (docens, in that logical systems
are typically found in logic textbooks). When we choose a logica docens, we
do it based on two things: methodological considerations and what we take to
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be the canonical application of the logica docens in question.
A canonical application consists in what a logica docens is primarily about
(its subject matter, in our old terminology); this is what Priest (2014: 220)
calls logica ens. We need to be careful here and observe that, just as they
have a canonical applications, logical systems (or logicae docentes) can also
have non-canonical applications. Modelling electric circuits, for instance, is
a non-canonical application of classical propositional logic; database man-
agement, a non-canonical application of paraconsistent logic and so on. Al-
though these are domains logical systems can be applied to, they certainly do
not represent what logical systems are mainly designed to study. In deciding
the logica ens (viz. the canonical application) of a logica docens (viz. a logical
system), we are making a meta-methodological claim.
Finally, there is logica utens, the way in which people actually reason. An
important caveat concerning logica utens, Priest (2014: 218) notes, is that it is
concerned with prescribing how people ought to reason, as opposed to merely
describing how they do reason - the latter being the task of cognitive psychol-
ogy. The expression ‘logica utens’, in other words, pins down a normative
notion.
Once we have disambiguated between these three senses of the word
‘logic’ we can perceive more vividly that methodology and meta-methodology
pertain to different realms. Moreover, this threefold terminology allows us to
describe more precisely the way in which methodology and meta-methodology
interact with each other in the Priest/Williamson case.
Meta-methodologically, Williamson’s intended logica ens is metaphysics,
understood as the study of ‘the most abstract and general features of the real
world’. What logica docens is best suited for carrying out an investigation
into logica ens so conceived? This is a question that directly interrogates the
account of logical theory choice of the anti-exceptionalist methodology. The
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answer, for Williamson, is classical logic. Logica utens simply does not play a
particularly significant role in this picture. Now for Priest.
Meta-methodologically, his intended logica ens comprises the norms of
correct vernacular reasoning, which he describes as truths of the form ‘that
so and so follows from that such and such’ (2014: 221). What logica docens
is required here? Given the anti-exceptionalist logical theory choice, Priest
contends, the answer is his Logic of Paradox. And given the nature of the
logica ens described by Priest, it seems obvious that the correct logica docens
will also have an impact on how people ought to reason (logica utens).
With this conceptual apparatus in place, we can spell out more precisely
what it means to say that we will take onboard Priest’s meta-methodology.
To say that is to say that we agree on what domain of inquiry logica ens sin-
gles out: the norms of correct vernacular reasoning. In the remainder of this
section, we want to illustrate what we take to be a great advantage deriving
from following, as far as meta-methodology is concerned, Priest instead of
Williamson.
Let us start by describing a potential reaction which one might have against
assuming Priest’s meta-methodology. Once we have disambiguated between
theories (logical or otherwise) and what they are primarily theories of (their
canonical applications), it would seem natural to explain why a theory came
about by appealing to an antecedent interest in its canonical application.
For, what motivates the development of a theory, it may be said, is an an-
tecedent interest in its canonical application. For example, consider the the-
ory of Newtonian Dynamics and its canonical application, the dynamics of
the Earth. Presumably, what motivated Newton’s attempt to put together
a theory of Dynamics was his previously held interest in the dynamics of
the Earth. That much seems hard to deny. However, it is not at all clear
that the development of every logical theory could be easily motivated by
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an antecedent interest in the norms of correct reasoning, which on the meta-
methodological account assumed here make up for the canonical application
of logical theories. For example, what seems to have crucially motivated the
development of quantum logic was an antecedent interest, not much in the
norms of correct reasoning, but in the phenomena studied in quantum me-
chanics. Had quantum mechanics never been invented, quantum logic prob-
ably may have never come about. Hence, it would seem that the reason why
certain logical theories were developed has little to do with an antecedent
interest in what we assumed to be their canonical application. And if so,
one may doubt that Priest’s meta-methodology singles out the real canonical
application of every logical theory.
We make two comments on this point. First of all, it does not favour
Williamson’s meta-methodology. For, just as interest in the norms of correct
reasoning does not seem to have been the key factor that led to the devel-
opment of quantum logic, the same is true of metaphysics understood à la
Williamson. Proof is that systems of quantum logic were originally couched
in propositional languages, whereas Williamson’s preferred systems are at
(the very) least first-order10. It thus seems rather obvious that interest in the
discovery of which universal generalisations hold of unrestrictedly every-
thing did not act as a motivating reason for the development of quantum
logic. Thus, if this point raises an issue against Priest’s meta-methodology
it also raises an issue for Williamson’s. However, secondly, we think that in
assuming Priest’s meta-methodology we do not incur the problem described;
we would, however, had we assumed Williamson’s. So let us now elaborate
on this point.
10Systems of first-order quantum logic are a relative novelty; see for instance Dalla
Chiara, Giuntini, and Greechie (2004). It should also be added that, in modal metaphysics,
Williamson’s preferred system is actually second-order; specifically, second-order S5 with con-
stant domain. See in particular Williamson (2010) and (2013c: Ch. 7).
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According to some philosophers, there are different kinds of reasons that
can explain why an agent brought about an action, and devising a theory,
to be sure, is certainly a form of agency. Motivating reasons, namely, rea-
sons that an agent takes to speak in favour of her acting in a certain way,
certainly constitute one such kind. But another kind comprises explanatory
reasons (Alvarez (2009, 2010), Hieronymi (2011), Darwall (2003)). Roughly,
these correspond to the reasons that make an action intelligible. All these au-
thors argue that we should not conflate these two kinds of reasons; for, as we
will see, whilst every reason that motivates an action can always explain it,
the contrary is not always true. Moreover, it seems that an action performed
by an agent can be made intelligible in many ways; so, the category of ex-
planatory reasons seems to allow for further internal ramifications. One way
to make an action intelligible, for a start, is by appealing to the agent’s char-
acter, as shown by this example due to Alvarez (2009: 186). Suppose every
month Fred gives a lot of money to charity. A reason that explains why Fred
does so is, say, that he is a generous man; so, here we have an explanation
for an action that appeals to an agent’s character. Clearly, that he is a gen-
erous man is not the reason that motivates Fred to give money to charity -
that could be, say, that donating to charity is morally praiseworthy; and this
motivating reason can be used to explain Fred’s action as well. This shows
that reasons of different kinds can be given to explain Fred’s action; and of
course, such reasons explain Fred’s action in different ways. Another way
in which we could make an agent’s action intelligible is by appealing to her
goal; the goal of performing an action, in other words, can be an explanatory
reason for that action. And indeed, suppose that Fred’s goal is to provide
many disadvantaged people with a hot meal every day. That he wants to
provide many disadvantaged people with a hot meal every day is a reason
that explains why Fred every month donates a lot of money to charity. The
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moral is, motivating and explanatory reasons can both provide, in different
ways, explanations as to why an action was carried out.
In fact, a context in which this is particularly clear is precisely that of ac-
counting for why certain logical theories came about. In particular, to explain
why quantum logic came about we could certainly appeal to a previously
held interest in the events described by quantum mechanics. In doing so, we
would be providing a motivating reason that led logicians to devise systems
of quantum logic: the reason that spoke in favour of their developing systems
of quantum logic is that they found quantum phenomena worthy of interest.
This motivating reason does provide an explanation as to why quantum logic
came about. But another way to explain why quantum logic came about is by
appealing to the goal that drove such logicians, and doing so means provid-
ing an explanatory reason. And this goal appears to be grounded in the inter-
est of delivering an account of valid reasoning: one, for example, in which the
distributive law fails11. Meta-methodologically, valid reasoning corresponds
exactly to what Priest takes a logical theory to be primarily about. Therefore,
by appealing to Priest’s assumed meta-methodology, we could provide an
explanatory reason as to why quantum logic as a theory came about. Quan-
tum logic came about because logicians intended to give a certain account
of valid reasoning. Our contention now is twofold. First, by appealing to
Priest’s meta-methodology, one could always provide an explanatory reason,
of the kind just illustrated, as to why any logical theory came about12. Sec-
ond, by appealing to Williamson’s meta-methodology this is not the case - we
take it that the case of quantum logic makes the point sufficiently clear: the
11For an explanation why, see Birkhoff and Von Neumann (1936: 830-831).
12In fact, it seems that in some cases appeal to Priest’s meta-methodology, in addition to
providing an explanatory reason, could also provide a motivating reason as to why a logical
theory came about. This is particularly clear in the case of Aristotle’s syllogistic for exam-
ple, where an antecedent interest in forms of correct reasoning is certainly what motivated
Aristotle to the develop his syllogistic.
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goal of quantum logicians had nothing to do with the discovery of maximally
general truths about the real world.
What seems to follow at this point, on the Priestean meta-methodology
assumed, is that the relationship between a logical theory (a logica docens)
and its canonical application (logica ens) is best understood instrumentally,
in terms of means to an end. For, we have argued, the goal of delivering an
account of correct reasoning can always be put forward as the (explanatory)
reason why a logica docens was developed. So whilst the discovery of what
truths pertain to logica ens seems to be the goal of a logica docens, a logica docens
appears to be the means with which this goal can be pursued.
Notice that this form of instrumentalism about the relation between logica
docens and logica ens needs to be sharply distinguished from other forms of
instrumentalism, such as the one proposed by Haack (1974: Ch. 2) or the
one proposed by Kouri Kissel (2016). With some approximation, we could
characterise Haack’s instrumentalism roughly as the view that there are no
objective, theory-independent facts about validity. A logica docens merely pro-
vides a set of principles for reasoning, which can be abandoned whenever
they entail results incompatible with other theories13. On the other hand,
Kouri Kissel’s instrumentalism does not entail the absence of objective facts
about validity, but maintains that these can vary depending on our purpose
for utilising a logica docens. The kind of instrumentalism we are describing,
instead, is perfectly compatible with a robustly realist stance towards the
facts of validity. Consider an analogy with Newtonian Dynamics and the dy-
namics of the Earth. If one thinks of the former as a means to investigate the
latter, one is not thereby committed to the view that Newtonian Dynamics
does not describe an objective reality.
13In her (1978a: Ch. 12), Haack appears to have retracted at least part of her instrumental-
ism.
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This takes us to the next question to address. Having taken onboard
Priest’s meta-methodology, we should conclude that distinct logicae docentes
yield different accounts of valid reasoning. Moreover, having taken onboard
the anti-exceptionalist methodology, we also have an account for exercising
rational theory choice amongst them. Whether one thinks that logic ought to
be revised pretty much depends on what logica docens one rationally chooses.
But what does that mean exactly? The next section presents one way in which
we could understand this question.
1.4 Revision, Classical Recapture and the Maxim
of Minimal Mutilation
First of all, the way in which we have formulated the question seems to pre-
suppose that there is such a thing as a received logic - or better, a received logica
docens. To say that a received logica docens exists nowadays seems to us not
very different from a truism, which therefore does not need any justification.
As is well known, this logica docens is classical logic and is originally due to
Frege (1879); in what follows, we will call it C.
Some facts about C are perhaps worth rehearsing. Originally developed
as a purely mathematical formalism, C gradually came to be perceived as
a powerful tool in accounting for correct vernacular reasoning, eventually
reaching here a position of near hegemony. Many consider C to be in fact the
right tool guiding reasoning (for example, Quine (1970) or Rumfitt (2015)). Its
theoretical virtues are lauded even by some of its detractors, who maintain
that taking a departure from it is not to be done lightheartedly (Field (2008:
15)). Its proof-theory elegantly captures patterns of intuitively correct ver-
nacular reasoning; it has a simple standard semantics and enjoys reassuring
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meta-theoretic properties such as completeness and compactness.
One thing should not go unnoticed, however. Dating back from 1879, our
received logic is after all quite young. Just to have an idea of how young,
consider that Aristotle’s Organon was arranged in its now usual form by An-
dronicus of Rhodes around 40 BC, but its six books go back to about three
centuries earlier.
Moreover, if C came to be our received logic, it is natural to suppose that
it did so by supplanting a predecessor - a previous received logica docens.
However, singling out what is this received logica docens is unfortunately not
an easy task. Priest (2014: 214) summarises the issue in the following terms:
In the mid nineteenth century, text book logic (“traditional logic”)
was a highly degenerate form of medieval logic: essentially, Aris-
totelian syllogistic with a few medieval accretions, such as “im-
mediate inferences” like modus ponens.
In any case, our interest is not historical. Rather, what interests us is an-
other consideration. If such was more or less the status of the received logica
docens immediately preceding C, then we have direct empirical evidence that,
in logic, periods of revision of the received logica docens do occur sometimes.
This is a data point confirming one of the principles of anti-exceptionalism.
In fact, to say that C merely revised the then received logica docens is per-
haps only part of the story. Although we do not have to go into too much
detail, it appears to be more appropriate to say that C brought about not just
a period of revision, but rather a revolution14.
Be it as it may, we now have a first rough characterisation of what, today,
a revision of logic boils down to. A revision of logic today is tantamount
14For example, Mendelsohn (2005: 2) notes that one of the reasons why C was initially
not well received is precisely due to the fact that, instead of building on previous work, it
presented something radically new.
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to taking, in some way to be explored, a departure from C. As we will see
shortly, our focus will be on one particular way in which revision of C can be
understood. Since alternative ways are also possible, however, some prelim-
inary general remarks will facilitate discussion.
We characterise different kinds of revision of C as resulting from different
attitudes towards the phenomenon of classical recapture15. Speaking infor-
mally (a precise definition will be provided below) a logical system is said to
recapture another one if it is possible to specify a sub-system of the former
which retains exactly the valid inferences of the latter. Classical recapture is
therefore a special case of recapture between two formal systems: it is the re-
lation that a logical system bears to C if a sub-system of the former preserves
exactly the valid inferences of C. A system which has a subsystem equiva-
lent to C is also known as classical recapture logic. Although, as is well-known,
many systems of non-classical logic exhibit classical recapture, this has been
interpreted by advocates of non-classical logics in different ways. A taxon-
omy of at least some the possible reactions towards classical recapture would
therefore be particularly useful.
A similar taxonomy has been proposed by Aberdein (2001), who has sin-
gled out four possible stances towards classical recapture, and ordered them
by analogy with a spectrum of political tendencies (the analogy, of course, is
purely instrumental and not intended to suggest a correlation between logi-
cal and political views). In a decreasing order of radicalism, we encounter the
radical left first (the most radical approach), followed by the centre-left, the
centre-right, and eventually the reactionary right. To understand better the
significance of these four stances towards classical recapture, it is appropriate
to spell out some formal details of the account.
15The origin of the expression is due to the first edition of Priest (2006b: Ch. 16).
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First of all, we can consider a logical system L = 〈For, Val〉 as an ordered
pair where For is the set of wffs of the language of L and Val is the set of valid
inferences of L (a proper subset of the sequents defined on For). Given this
definition, two logical systems L1 = 〈For1, Val1〉 and L2 = 〈For2, Val2〉 are
said to be equivalent if, and only if, there exists a one-to-one correspondence
between the sets For1 and For2 of the two systems preserving the partition of
the sets of inferences into valid and invalid subsets. Two ways of contracting
a system are then compared. The first captures the notion of reduct:
Definition 1.1. (Reduct, Aberdein (2001)) L1 is a reduct of L2 iff L1 and L2
are inequivalent, For1 is defined on a proper subset of the class of constants
of L2 and Val1 contains precisely those elements of Val2 which contain only
elements of For1.
A reduct, in other words, is simply the logical system resulting from re-
stricting the class of constants of the original system. So characterised, no-
tice that reduction is the inverse of conservative expansion16. The second
contraction that can be defined over a system captures the notion of proper
subsystem:
Definition 1.2. (Proper Subsystem, Aberdein (ibid.)) L1 is a proper subsys-
tem of L2 iff L1 and L2 are inequivalent, For1 is a proper subset of For2 and
Val1 contains precisely those elements of Val2 which contain only elements
of For1.
This last definition deserves particular attention. Intuitively, the claim
that a system is a proper subsystem of another is often used to express the
thought that the latter is stronger than the former. But here, we need to be
16A system L1 is a conservative expansion of a system L2 if, and only if, L1 and L2 are
inequivalent and every valid inference of L1 in the language of L2 is already a valid inference
of L2.
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careful in pinning down exactly what is meant by ‘stronger than’. For, as
Humberstone (2005: 209) points out, talk of strength in logic seems to suffer
from an ambiguity:
[T]eaching experience attests to the difficulty that students have
with talk of one logic’s being stronger than another, invariably
intended by logicians, when no further qualification is added, to
mean deductively stronger, but often suggesting the reverse to stu-
dents, the stronger logic being taken to be the one making the
more stringent demands in respect of what is provable.
The idea is that there are two ways in which we can compare the strength
of logical systems. One is in terms of their consequence or deducibility re-
lation; here, strength is cashed out as deductive power. In this sense, the
expression ‘proper subsystem of L’ is used to define a system with a strictly
weaker consequence (or deducibility) relation of L, that is, properly included
in the consequence relation of L. But another way to understand the strength
of a logical system is in terms of the distinctions it can preserve; here, strength
is understood as expressive power. In this sense, the expression ‘proper sub-
system of L’ is used to define a system which preserves less distinctions than
L17.
Having distinguished between strength as deductive power and strength
as expressive power, it needs to be observed that an increase in one often
17To make precise the notion of a system’s expressive power, we could follow Humber-
stone (2005). The idea is to understand a system’s expressive power as given by the class
of synonymous formulae over its consequence relation. Two formulae P and Q are synony-
mous over a consequence relation ⊨ (P ≡⊨ Q)) if, and only if, for every formula context
C(·):
C1(P), . . . , Cn(P) ⊨ Cn+1(P) just in case C1(Q), . . . , Cn(Q) ⊨ Cn+1(Q),
Thus, two formulae are synonymous just in case they are interchangeable without change in
validity across all formula contexts. For a wide range of logics, Humberstone showed that
if a consequence relation ⊨1 is stronger than ⊨2, then ≡⊨2⊆≡⊨1 . Thus, a logic with a bigger
deductive power collapses more distinctions than one with a weaker deductive power.
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means a decrease in the other, and vice versa18. Indeed, on Aberdein’s defi-
nition, a system L1, with a strictly weaker consequence relation than L2, will
not count as a proper subsystem of L2, but rather as a proper supersystem
thereof.
For example, C has a consequence relation which properly includes the
consequence relation of intuitionistic logic. In terms of deductive power,
then, C is stronger than intuitionistic logic. However, on Definition 1.2, C
is a proper subsystem of intuitionistic logic. For, only some formulae of in-
tuitionistic logic are decidable, that is, those for which the Law of Excluded
Middle is valid (or equivalently, the rule of Double Negation is admissible).
Restricting intuitionistic logic to precisely those formulae yields C as a sub-
system.
Thus, we can see that Definition 1.2 expresses a more general form of
contraction than Definition 1.1. For, whilst a reduct can only be obtained
by reducing the set of constants on which the class of wffs of a logical sys-
tem is defined, a subsystem can also be generated by specifying some other
constraint (such as the constraint of decidability in the case of intuitionistic
logic).
At this point, we can define classical recapture as follows:
Definition 1.3 (Classical Recapture, Aberdein (2001)) L1 recaptures L2 if,
and only if, there is a proper subsystem of L1, L!1 , which is defined in terms
of a constraint on For1 finitely expressible in L1, and which is equivalent to
L2. If L2 is C, then L1 is a classical recapture logic.
In other words, a system is a classical recapture if, by specifying a finite
constraint on it, one can obtain a subsystem which is equivalent to C. Thus,
18See footnote 16 in this chapter.
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for example, intuitionistic logic is a classical recapture logic, given the above
decidability constraint.
However, we said earlier that the significance of classical recapture is
somewhat contentious19. On the most radical of attitude towards classical
recapture, which Aberdein (2001) describes as typical of the radical left, clas-
sical recapture is simply denied: no suitable constraint is deemed available
to recapture C - Aberdein and Read (2011: 676) attribute a similar position
to proponents of the so-called Scottish Plan in relevant logic, such as Read
(1988). The opposite end of the spectrum, the reactionary right, corresponds
to the position according to which a system exhibiting classical recapture is
considered as an extension of C - a similar attitude, Aberdein argues, is partic-
ularly clear in modal logic, which is typically understood as extending C. On
a more moderate left-wing position (corresponding to the centre-left), classi-
cal recapture is formally acknowledged but almost as a mere curiosity; it is
denied of any significance, in that C is deemed unintelligible. This attitude,
it is suggested, was roughly expressed by Dummett (1974) - see however
Dummett (1975) for a more conciliatory approach.
The position which we will be focusing on in the rest of the section is the
centre-right one. Here, the phenomenon of classical recapture is interpreted
in the following terms. C is understood as a special case of the classical recap-
ture logic or, conversely, the classical recapture logic is understood as gener-
alising C. The underlying thought to the centre-right attitude is that whilst C
is perfectly fine for reasoning in standard scenarios, in general it is not - this
approach is described by Beall (2011) as default classicality. The form of revi-
sionism guiding the default classicality (or centre-right) position is certainly
more moderate than the two left-wing positions in Aberdein’s scale. For, C
19The four positions in Aberdein’s scale, each one corresponding to a certain attitude to-
wards classical recapture, are discussed extensively by Aberdein and Read (2011).
1.4. Revision, Classical Recapture and the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation 45
is somehow regarded as being the right logic for reasoning in standard cases,
but it ought to be revised due to the presence of contexts where it does lead
us astray. A similar attitude towards C is for example quite clearly present in
Priest (1989, 2006b) - the contexts where C is inadequate, according to Priest,
being the inconsistent ones.
However, a tension needs to be highlighted here. On the one hand, C is
seen as the correct logic to reason in standard contexts. This means that in
these contexts the axioms and/or rules of inference of C do work as a guide
for correct deductive reasoning. As such, in these contexts, they are to be
accepted. On the other hand, to say that a non-classical system recapturing
C is better fit (than C) to handle non-standard contexts implies abandoning
some axioms and/or rules of inference of C. Intuitionism, for example, does
not accept Double Negation when reasoning in infinite domains. But if the
principles of C are correct to reason in standard contexts, abandoning them
is a casualty20; retaining them, accordingly, a virtue.
This suggests that, from the point of view of default classicality, the ex-
tent to which classically valid principles can be retained works in effect as a
criterion guiding rational theory choice amongst non-classical logics. That is
to say, in dealing with non-standard contexts, a logical system that can retain
more classically valid principles than another one will do, all things being
equal, a better job. Revision of a theory, in a slogan, ought to be as conserva-
tive as possible.
We can see this appeal to conservatism as an instance of what Quine (1970:
100) called the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation: revision of a theory must be
carried out piecemeal, doing the least damage to the theory as possible. In
our case, then, the Maxim has it that when revising C, one ought to take
20This is exactly how Priest (2006b: 221) describes the failure of Disjunctive Syllogism in
systems of paraconsistent logic.
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care mutilating it as little as possible - a mutilation occurring every time a
principle of C is abandoned21.
Of course, in exercising logical theory choice amongst non-classical logics,
how much weight should be attributed to the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation
is contentious. For example, suppose a system of non-classical logic scores
better than another one in terms of the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation, only
thanks to a number of ad hoc assumptions made precisely to retain classically
valid principles. Avoidance of ad hoc assumptions, we have seen, is another
criterion for logical theory choice. So should we choose a system that is, so
to speak, less elegantly close to C, or one that is more elegantly distant from
it? And again, suppose two systems of non-classical logic abandon the same
number of classically valid principles, but different ones. How do we apply
the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation in a similar case? There are perhaps no
once-and-for-all answers to these questions; a certain level of arbitrariness
may therefore always be required. Still, it seems that we can at least settle
on this partially satisfactory solution: in case of a tie, scoring better in terms
of the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation could decide the course of our logical
theory choice in favour of a certain logical system.
Having provided at least one way in which the Maxim of Minimal Mu-
tilation could contribute to the process of logical theory choice, we can set
other concerns aside. Our foregoing discussion of the phenomenon of classi-
cal recapture has highlighted the many ways in which revisionism of C can
be undertaken. We favour a centre-right (or default classicality) approach.
In doing so, we consider the possibility for a system to exhibit classical re-
capture as an important fact, and consequently attribute some weight to the
21An interesting discussion of how systems of non-classical logic score in terms of the
Maxim of Minimal Mutilation when handling aletheic paradoxes can be found in Hjortland
(2017b). Notice, however, that the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation could work as well as a
criterion not to revise C. For example, the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation plays a role in
Quine’s (1970: 86) rejection of quantum logic.
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Maxim of Minimal Mutilation. Both of these will constitute important as-
sumptions for our arguments in the next chapter.
Our discussion of classical recapture also completes this first chapter. Here,
we have illustrated where we stand with regard to certain issues in the phi-
losophy of logic, which we deem important for our investigation. We have
throughout committed ourselves to a number of assumptions. Thus, before
turning to other matters, it is important to quickly sum them up.
1.5 Taking Stock
We started by presenting the main tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic,
our preferred methodology, and contrasted them with those of the rival ex-
ceptionalist methodology. Logic is a posteriori and continuous with science;
as such, it is revisable just like scientific theories are. Logical theory choice
goes hand in hand with theory choice in science. A choice of logic is to be
carried out abductively, by comparing how different logics score against cer-
tain criteria expressing virtues that are desirable for theories to exhibit, such
as fit with the data, simplicity, elegance and so on.
Interestingly, however, two advocates of the anti-exceptionalist method-
ology such as Priest and Williamson ended up expressing different opinions
as to what logic we should accept. This disagreement, we have pointed out,
reflects a difference concerning what logic is taken to be about: roughly, cor-
rect vernacular reasoning for Priest and the general features of the world for
Williamson. Since both moves are compatible with the anti-exceptionalist
methodology (and presumably any other one) they pertain to a more general
realm which we have called meta-methodology.
We then have spelled out Priest and Williamson’s meta-methodologies in
more detail and sided with Priest. In particular, one merit of the Priestean
48 Chapter 1. Methodology, Meta-Methodology, and Theory Choice
meta-methodology is that it allows us to distinguish between different senses
in which the word ‘logic’ is used (logica docens, logica utens, logica ens). When
anti-exceptionalists hold that logic is revisable, they primarily mean ‘logic’
in the sense of the received logica docens.
Following Aberdein (2001), we then went on to describe different ways
in which revision of classical logic can be understood. These vary accord-
ing to the radicalism with which they interpret the phenomenon of classical
recapture. Our interest is in the so-called default classicality position, accord-
ing to which classical logic is in some sense correct to reason in standard
contexts, but it leads us astray in non-standard ones. But if the principles
of classical logic are correct in standard contexts, abandoning them must be
seen as a cost. Accordingly, we argued that the Maxim of Minimal Mutila-
tion is a helpful criterion guiding logical theory choice amongst non-classical
logics: all things being equal, a logical system that retains more classically
valid principles than another one is to be preferred.
In the next two chapters, we will address a case study to which we could
apply the assumptions we have made in this first chapter.
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Chapter 2
Revising Logic in Light of De Re
Intentionality
2.1 Introduction
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, although he was thought about by Conan
Doyle. And neither does Zeus, despite the fact that he was worshipped by
Homer. Nor, finally, does the Fountain of Youth, despite having been so ar-
dently sought for by Ponce de Leon. All this appears obvious to our eyes;
and, we submit, to the eyes of most non-philosophically trained people as
well.
One feature that these three examples share is that they all involve a rela-
tion between two objects. Moreover, the relations involved in these examples
have in turn something in common: they are all intentional relations. Inten-
tionality is widely considered to be a fundamental aspect of cognition, cor-
responding to its being directed towards an object of some kind. As we will
see more precisely, the object in question may be a thing or a proposition.
It is therefore appropriate to distinguish between acts of cognition directed
towards things (de re intentionality) and propositions (de dicto intentionality).
The form of intentionality which the previous three examples share is of the
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first kind, de re. This is the one which we will be essentially concerned with
in this chapter. The examples considered above are just three of the count-
less data points showing that we can be de re intentionally related to objects
which, be they purely fictional such as Holmes or mythological such as Zeus
or the Fountain of Youth, do not exist. Fictional and mythological charac-
ters are ubiquitous in every day talk. The phenomenon of de re intentionality
shows that relations do not in general entail the existence of their relata.
However, as previously noted in §1.1, to say that much runs afoul of our
received logica docens, that is, classical logic (C) on its (now standard) Quinean
parsing theory, as we will call it in the next subsection. What characterises the
Quinean parsing theory of C is a certain conception of existence, according to
which this is taken to be a first-order property of every thing. Obviously then,
if one takes seriously the data which the phenomenon of de re intentionality
presents us with, the need for logical revision becomes quite pressing.
By the end of the next chapter, we will have presented two programmes of
logical revision, and will be able to evaluate from anti-exceptionalist grounds
their merit in addressing the inadequacies of C (on its Quinean parsing the-
ory). This chapter is structured as follows.
We will start by presenting the Quinean parsing theory of C, and focus
our attention specifically on four of its principles (§2.2.1). Then, we move on
to say a little bit about the distinction between de re and de dicto intentionality,
and motivate our interest in the former by showing that it makes those four
principles particularly problematic (§2.2.2). In §2.2.3, we will corroborate our
arguments by presenting some evidence from linguistics showing that sup-
port for the main thesis they entail is available. In §2.2.4, we will present
possible lines of response which proponents of C on its Quinean parsing the-
ory might resort to, but find these accounts wanting.
The first programme of logical revision we will consider is that of the
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free logic tradition; specifically, its positive ramification. This will occupy us
throughout all of §2.3. The free logic tradition in general has urged that logic
ought to be revised by giving up on C, rather than its Quinean parsing the-
ory (which it accepted). However, although an endorsement of the Quinean
parsing theory is a common feature of the free logic programme, free logi-
cians have differed over what logica docens, to use a terminology we are now
familiar with, ought to replace C. We will thus present a system of positive
free logic, P , and bring to light its differences from systems of so-called neg-
ative and neutral free logic. In particular, in P all the principles discussed in
§2.2.2 turn out to be invalid. This automatically makes P a potentially good
candidate for exercising logical revision. Along the way, we will also see that
P is a classical recapture logic, and that many advocates of positive free logic
(though not all of them) have expressed an attitude towards this result which
seems typical of a centre-right position in Aberdein’s scale.
We will then conclude, in §2.4, by quickly taking stock of what we will
have seen in this chapter.
2.2 De Re Intentionality and Logical Revisionism
2.2.1 Quinean Parsing Theory
In §1.1.3 we have seen that a logica docens with its canonical application aims
to deliver an account of correct vernacular reasoning. What we have not
noted there, is that in order to accomplish this goal a logica docens must also
be equipped with what Aberdein and Read (2011: 615) call a parsing theory:
a way in which it can represent vernacular argumentation (see also Resnik
(1985, 1996)). This, in particular, requires a translation manual assigning
vernacular utterances to formal propositions. Sure enough, the parsing of
52 Chapter 2. Revising Logic in Light of De Re Intentionality
vernacular arguments will not be entirely transparent, inevitably involving
certain distortions and idealisations, which the logica docens will have to be
ready to account for1.
In the case of C, we submit, the idealised character of the parsing theory
emerges somewhat clearly when we consider the role it assigns to ∃, what is
commonly referred to as the existential quantifier2. It is precisely on the role of
∃ which we want to focus in this sub-section.
As is known, the reason why ∃ is typically called the ‘existential quanti-
fier’ is due to the fact that it is taken to capture vernacular expressions such
as ‘exists’, ‘there exists’ and, assuming no difference in meaning, also ‘there
is/are’3. Thus, in using ∃ in this way, which we may well call existentially
loaded, one is thereby taking ∃ to be the formal device representing the prop-
erty of existence. However, the idea that the property of existence is repre-
sented by ∃ can be understood in two different ways. Since these deliver
different parsing theories for C, the distinction is important for our goals.
On one account, put forward by Frege (1884, 1979) and Russell (1919),
existence is seen not as a first-order property (viz. a property of individu-
als) but, rather, as a second-order one4 - specifically, a property of concepts
(Frege), and of propositional functions (Russell). These are abstract objects
denoted by predicates such as ‘... is a wolf’, ‘... is a unicorn’ and so on. Often,
similar general kind terms do occur in general existential statements, such as
‘there exist wolves’ or ‘there are unicorns’. Then, to say that there are/there
1There is an interesting issue to be pursued here as to what degree of transparency it is
reasonable to demand from a parsing theory. For, whilst an overly opaque parsing theory
would mean the adoption of a system with a certain level of adhocness, a perfectly trans-
parent parsing theory seems somewhat utopian (natural language seems inherently more
expressive than any formal language). See Aberdein and Read (2011: §1.1) for discussion.
2For a historical perspective on the issue, see Priest (2008).
3Interesting grammatical subtleties emerge at this point, but for simplicity we can set
them aside. See Priest (2015).
4As is known, the origin of this idea can be at least traced back to Kant’s rejection of the
ontological argument for the existence of God (A592/B620-A602/B630 - Kant (1998: 563–
569)). For discussion see my (Forthcoming).
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exist wolves reduces to the claim that the concept (propositional function) of
being a wolf is instantiated. To formalise this claim, we can help ourselves to
∃ and offer ∃x(Wolf x). And to say that there are/there exist no unicorns re-
duces to the claim that the concept (propositional function) of being a unicorn
is not instantiated: ¬∃x(Unicorn x). Thus, existence on this view is equiva-
lent to the property of being instantiated, and that is a property of concepts
or propositional functions, not of individuals.
However, in addition to general existential statements such as ‘there are
wolves’, in the vernacular we also proffer singular existential statements (for
instance, ‘Mount Everest exists’). The view that existence is not a property
of individuals, then, has inevitably a certain impact on the parsing of similar
statements. For, be they in negative (‘Sherlock Holmes does not exist’) or
positive (‘Mount Everest exists’) form, the parsing of these statements cannot
have the subject-predicate structure that they actually seem to have. The
question, then, is how the parsing of such statements can be carried out.
An influential proposal is Russell’s (1905) theory of descriptions. Very
briefly, on this view subject terms such as ‘Sherlock Holmes’, ‘Mount Ever-
est’, and so on are seen as disguised definite descriptions: sentences of the
form ‘the F’, for F a certain condition. Definite descriptions, on Russell’s con-
ception, have a general quantificational form which does not involve subject
terms. Thus for example, assuming that ‘Mount Everest’ is analysed as the
definite description ‘the 8,848 m tall mountain’, the sentence ‘Mount Ever-
est exists’ has a logical form that can be more accurately expressed as ‘There
exists a unique 8,848 m tall mountain’. This sentence is only true of Mount
Everest, but the subject term ‘Mount Everest’ does not figure in it; indeed, its
formalisation according to Russell is ∃x(Mx&Tx&∀y(My&Ty → y = x)) -
for M and T the properties of being a mountain and being 8,848 m tall respec-
tively. Thus, here we have one way in which singular existential statements
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can be parsed so as not to exhibit a subject-predicate form5.
Whatever the merits of the view, we are interested in another account, ac-
cording to which existence is, despite being captured by ∃, a first-order prop-
erty (or a property of individuals) - Quine (1948), Van Inwagen (1977, 1983,
1998, 2003, 2008, 2009), Thomasson (1998, 2003, 2017). The parsing of sin-
gular existential statements is precisely one aspect which distinguishes this
view from the Fregean-Russellian one. For, singular existential statements,
on this new account, can be parsed so as to exhibit a subject-predicate form.
To see how this is possible we need to notice that in C, ∃ is interpreted
over a (non-empty) domain, populated by a class of individuals which ex-
haust the domain of discourse: no individuals are left outside such a domain.
Of course, its extension may vary across models, up to including, according
to some, absolutely everything without any restriction whatsoever6. But if
∃ is to express existence, then it is not possible for any individual in the do-
main of ∃ to lack it - would ∃ still capture existence otherwise? Equivalently,
every member of the domain of ∃ must be an existent. However, every mem-
ber of the domain of ∃ must also be identical to at least one thing, that is,
itself. But if existence and self-identity characterise every member of the do-
main of ∃ (and thus, every thing qua thing), then we can define existence as
the (first-order) property of being identical with something in the domain
of ∃. In other words, by letting the predicate E!C express existence so con-
ceived, we can stipulate that E!Cx =De f ∃y(y = x). We should notice that
the definiens here is an open formula, but we can form a corresponding pred-
icate, denoting the property of existence, by binding the free variable x with
a λ-operator, yielding the predicate λx∃y(y = x) - reading: being an x, such
5The view has incurred several criticisms, however. See, in particular Lectures 1 and 2 of
Kripke (1980) and Ludlow (2018: §5) for a more general overview.
6See Williamson (2003) and Rayo and Uzquiano (2006) for presentations of the view.
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that x is identical with something. And this predicate expresses a property
of individuals.
Of course, it does not express a first-order property in the sense in which
perhaps most properties do, such as, say, the property of being a wolf: for,
the latter is not enjoyed by any thing qua thing. To mark the distinction, then,
we can borrow from Berto (2015: 242) the expressions blanket and non-blanket
properties. The label blanket property is attributed to every property enjoyed
by any thing qua thing. Existence, according to the account just presented, is
a blanket property; as further examples of blanket properties, we could offer
identity, being either a wolf or not a wolf, being a wolf if everything is, and
so on. By contrast, non-blanket properties do not characterise any thing qua
thing. In doing so, they are enjoyed by some things and lacked by others; the
property of being a wolf is just a case in point, since it is indeed enjoyed by
certain things and lacked by others7.
However, although a blanket property, existence is here seen as a first-
order property none the less. Consequently, the view can now offer a parsing
of singular existential statements capable of retaining their apparent subject-
predicate structure. For example, if e stands for ‘Mount Everest’, ‘Mount
Everest exists’ can be formalised as E!Ce - provided this formula is equivalent
to ∃x(x = e). Van Inwagen (2003: 143) attributes the origin of this view on
existence to Quine’s (1948) influential essay On What there Is, particularly
with reference to his famous motto ‘to be is, purely and simply, to be the
value of a quantified variable’ (1948: 32). Accordingly, we will call Quinean
the parsing theory that this view generates.
Since we will often refer to them later on, it is convenient to first present
very quickly the language and semantics of C on its Quinean parsing theory.
7Another way to express the distinction is by appealing to Kant’s distinction between
determining and non-determining properties (A 598/B 626 - Kant (1998: 566–567)) - the
latter roughly corresponding to blanket properties and the former to non-blanket ones.
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Here and throughout, we will use bold capital letters A, B, C... as metavari-
ables for formulae; bold lower case letters a, b, c...x, y, z as metavariables for
terms, where a, b, c are used for individual constants, x, y, z for variables and
t for a generic term (either a constant or a variable); lower case greek letters
α, β, γ... as metavariables for predicates, followed where needed by a super-
script indicating the arity of a predicate.
The signature of C includes:
• The five sentential operators ¬, &,∨,→,↔;
• Infinitely many individual variables x, y, z...;
• Infinitely many individual constants a, b, c...;
• Infinitely many n-place predicates P, Q, R..., for n ≥ 0;
• The identity symbol =;
• The two quantifiers ∀, ∃;
• The ‘exists’ predicate E!C.
(For simplicity, we have omitted a stock of infinitely many n-place func-
tion symbols f , h, g...; this entails no loss of generality).
The set ForC of wffs of C is recursively defined as follows, subject to the
usual constraints about variable binding, ruling out vacuous and repeated
quantification:
A ::= |ξn(t1, . . . , tn)|¬A|A&B|A ∨ B|A → B|A ↔ B|ti = tj|∀xA|∃xA|E!Ct
Call a structure MC = 〈D, ν〉 a model for C, where: D is a non-empty set
(the domain of quantification), and ν is function such that ν(a) ∈ D, for each
individual constant a and ν(ξn, ) ⊆ Dn, for each n-place predicate ξ. Given a
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variable assignment g based on MC , the valuation function ν is extended to
a function νg whose domain is the union of the set of variables and the set of
constants of ForC , being defined as follows: for any term t, νg(t) = ν(t) if t is
an individual constant, and νg(t) = g(t) if t is a variable.
Satisfaction relative to a model MC and a variable-assignment g based on
that model is defined as follows.
C1 MC , g ⊨C ξn(t1, . . . tn) iff 〈νg(t1), . . . , νg(tn)〉 ∈ ν(ξ).
C2 MC , g ⊨C ¬A iff MC , g ∕⊨C A.
C3 MC , g ⊨C A&B iff MC , g ⊨C A and MC , g ⊨C B.
C4 MC , g ⊨C A ∨ B iff MC , g ⊨C A or MC , g ⊨C B.
C5 MC , g ⊨C A → B iff MC , g ∕⊨C A or MC , g ⊨C B.
C6 MC , g ⊨C A ↔ B iff MC , g ⊨C A and MC , g ⊨C B, or MC , g ∕⊨C A and
MC , g ∕⊨C B.
C7 MC , g ⊨C t1 = t2 iff νg(t1) = νg(t2).
C8 MC , g ⊨C ∀x A iff MC , g[o/x] ⊨C A for each o ∈ D.
C9 MC , g ⊨C ∃x A iff MC , g[o/x] ⊨C A for some o ∈ D.
Moreover, since we have introduced an ‘exists’ predicate for C, we add to
C1-C9 the following clause:
C10 MC , g ⊨C E!Ct iff νg(t) ∈ D,
which simply says, in accordance with the Quinean parsing theory, that
to exist is equivalent to belonging to D, the domain of ∃.
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We can take C to also be equipped with the usual natural deduction rules
of inference for the five connectives and the quantifiers. Admissible rules of
inference for E!C can be read off intuitively from the semantics.
Throughout this chapter, particular attention will be given to the follow-
ing valid schemata of inferences of C on its Quinean parsing theory:
EP: ξt ⊨C E!Ct.
GEP: ρ(t1, . . . , tn) ⊨C E!Cti, for ti ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}.
NGEP: ¬ρ(t1, . . . , tn) ⊨C E!Cti, for ti ∈ {t1, . . . , tn}.
LNE: ⊨C E!Ct.
Before turning to other matters, a quick guide to the labels just used is
in order. Following Williamson (1988), ‘EP’ stands for Existence Principle: it
says that having a property expressed by a monadic predicate entails exis-
tence. GEP is the generalisation of EP to n-place predicates, the Generalised
Existence Principle; it says that being related entails existence. NGEP is GEP in
its negative form, the Negative Generalised Existence Principle; it says that not
being related entails existence. ‘LNE’ stands for Logical Necessity of Existence,
the principle according to which the existence of any thing is a logical truth.
We can conceptually divide these schemata of inference into two groups.
The first group comprises EP, GEP and NGEP. We can interpret these schemata
as telling us, jointly taken, that all properties and relations are existence-
entailing, pure and simple8. In particular, not only do they entail the exis-
tence of those things which enjoy them, they also entail the existence of those
things which do not (witness NGEP).
8EP is in fact a special case of GEP, which could be understood as saying that one-place
relations are existence entailing. As we will see, having isolated the special case where GEP
is EP will be particularly important for our discussion in Chapter 4.
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On the other hand, from the last group, comprising only LNE, we get that
the existence of a thing is a truth which holds as a matter of logical neces-
sity. Denying it is equivalent to affirming a contradiction. LNE, accordingly,
entails all the other three inference schemata.
The adequacy of each of those four principles can be doubted on several
grounds. The next sub-section shows that the phenomenon of intentionality
can offer a unifying reason supporting those doubts.
2.2.2 Intentionality: De Re and De Dicto
Before we bring intentionality into the picture, we want to present a different
line of argument that can be pressed against one of the four principles just
mentioned, that is, LNE. According to this principle, the existence of any
thing denoted by a term is a logical truth. Equivalently, denying the existence
of any such thing results in a contradiction.
Consider the formula E!Cx; by LNE, this is a logical truth which, we have
seen, is by definition equivalent to ∃y(y = x). So ∃y(y = x) is in turn a
logical truth, asserting the existence of at least one thing. Then, it seems that
C on its Quinean parsing theory commits us to the view that there has to be
at least one thing! Put otherwise, a scenario where nothing exists is a con-
tradiction in terms. This claim may give one pause. That some things exist,
rather than nothing at all, many philosophers took as a striking fact requiring
some form of explanation9. A sceptic might surely reply that the kind of ex-
planation those philosophers were seeking is ultimately unavailable (Nozick
(1981: 115), Hempel (2001: 341)). Perhaps, but that reply seems to miss what
is at stake here. For, regardless of whether it is possible to explain why there
9Leibniz, for example, is amongst those philosophers; see for instance §7 of his Principles
of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason - Leibniz (1989: 638-639). Hume is another example; see
Part IX of his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion - Hume (2007: 64).
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is something rather than nothing, the point is that those philosophers clearly
regarded the possibility of there being nothing at all as being perfectly consis-
tent10. And, although we do not want to rule it out, the contrary claim (that
it is impossible for there to be nothing at all) appears to require a substantial
amount of justification11. Thus, unless one wants to take onboard such an
explanatory burden, one had better reject the view that there has to be, as a
matter of logical necessity, at least one thing. And this, in turn, amounts to
rejecting LNE.
Quine (1954) even considered this possibility, but ruled it out by means
of an inference to the best explanation. First, to allow for the possibility that
nothing exists is equivalent, given the Quinean parsing theory, to allow for
models with an empty domain of quantification. However, Quine argues,
in such models every universally quantified formula should be evaluated
as true and every existentially quantified one as false12. Hence, some for-
mulae which are valid if we restrict ourselves to models with a nonempty
domain of quantification, with the inclusion of models with an empty do-
main of quantification would become invalid. Since this would result in a
big loss of (deductive) power, we should refrain from including models with
an empty domain of quantification13.
10See in any case Brenner (2020) for arguments in favour of the view that the question why
there is something rather than nothing? is in principle answerable. Incidentally, he too takes
there being nothing at all as a possible scenario.
11For a probabilistic argument that there being nothing at all is a highly improbable sce-
nario, see Van Inwagen (1996), who nonetheless contends that ‘[there is] no known argument
that can plausibly be said to show that it is impossible for there to be nothing’ (1996: 99).
12However, as Williamson (1999) has shown, it is not immediate how to find a composi-
tional adjustment to the standard Tarskian definition of truth in a model under an assign-
ment delivering Quine’s ruling that all universal and existential formulae should respec-
tively be evaluated as true and false in models with an empty domain.
13Others, such as Leblanc and Meyer (1969) or Bencivenga and Indrzejczak (2014), did not
see any decisive reason for excluding models with an empty domain of quantification and
went on to develop systems of so-called inclusive logic - inclusive, that is, of models with
an empty domain of quantification. For the origin of inclusive logics see Bencivenga (2002:
152-155). The issue is also taken up by Oliver and Smiley (2013: 182-188).
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However, this argument hardly gives any reason for thinking that a sce-
nario where nothing exists is a contradiction in terms. In fact, it seems to
us that the argument may equally work as a reductio of Quine’s assumption
that ∃ needs to be interpreted as existentially loaded. For, if models with an
empty domain of quantification are to be excluded, that could be a reason
precisely not to take the domain of ∃ as only including existents. Perhaps
there is not much more to be added to the issue, save for the fact that the
burden of proof here is on the proponent of C on the Quinean parsing theory
to convince us that the principle stands (LNE, that is). Until then, rationality
seems to require to at least remain sceptic about the validity of LNE - by the
end of this subsection, in any case, we will present another reason against the
validity of LNE.
Let us now turn to the other group of inferences (EP, GEP, NGEP). We said
earlier that, jointly taken, they tell us that properties and relations as such are
existence entailing. In many circumstances, this accords with our intuitions.
Here are some substitution instances of the principles:
• John is a footballer. Therefore, John exists. (EP)
• Gavin married Stacey. Therefore, Stacey exists. (GEP)
• Mary did not get to the airport on time. Therefore, the airport exists.
(NGEP)
The reason why these arguments look fine is quite clear. The properties
of being a footballer, being married to Gavin and not being reached on time
by Mary, all presuppose a spatiotemporal collocation. And things which are
spatiotemporally collocated do undoubtedly exist. Thus, any individual who
is a footballer, or is married to Gavin, or is not reached on time by Mary, must
exist. How could it be otherwise?
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The problem is to what extent the principle that properties and relations
are existence entailing can be held in general. Notice that we are not asking
whether some isolated substitution instances of EP, GEP or NGEP succeed
in delivering counterexamples to these putative schemata of inference. For,
as Priest (2016a: 355) notes, logical data are soft. That is to say, even if a
substitution instance of a schema of inference licensed by a logic does strike
us as incorrect, theoretical considerations can always overturn our intuitions.
To this, we also add that, from an anti-exceptionalist point of view, it may not
be a good idea to abandon a logic which is not entirely adequate to the data, if
it scores very high with respect to the other criteria selected for theory choice
(see §1.1).
What we are asking is whether we can single out a class of cases which,
in virtue of some shared feature, systematically disturb the adequacy of the
schemata of inference at hand. As anticipated, and as many have pointed
out, one such class is the one of intentional contexts (Zalta (1983, 1988), Crane
(2016), Priest (2016b), Berto (2011, 2012a), Berto and Priest (2014)).
Intentionality is the mark of those mental states (such as thinking, believ-
ing, fearing, worshipping, imagining, seeking) which are necessarily directed
towards something14. Let us call verbs such as thinking, fearing, and so on,
intentional verbs. Then, an intentional context is a sentence or an argument in
which one or more intentional verbs occur.
Intentional states can be of at least two kinds, depending on the comple-
ment of intentional verbs. Thus, we can fear that global warming could create
big damage to the environment, or imagine that tomorrow the sun will shine, or
believe that an economic recession will soon hit the European Economic Area. In
each of these cases, the complement of the intentional verb is a sentence (the
14For an introduction, see Pierre (2019).
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one in italics); the content of the intentional states here is therefore a proposi-
tion. Berto (2012a: 56) calls de dicto such intentional states, namely those that
have a proposition as their content.
Now, de dicto intentional states should be contrasted with de re intentional
states. The content of the latter, as the name suggests, is an object. For ex-
ample, consider ‘the Romans worshipped Mars’, ‘John fears the person living
next door’, or ‘Jim thinks of Anne every day’. In these cases, we can see that
the complements of the intentional verbs are noun phrases (those in italics),
and noun phrases denote objects. Let us call intentional those objects denoted
by a noun phrase occurring as a complement of an intentional verb (thus,
introducing a de re intentional state).
Notice, finally, that certain intentional verbs can occur both in de dicto and
de re intentional contexts. So for example, one can think that the Edinburgh
Castle is well worth a visit (de dicto), but one can also think of a 1$ bill (de re).
De dicto intentional states are more difficult to model than de re intentional
states. An adequate treatment of de dicto intentional states, as Priest (2016b:
Ch. 1) has shown, requires expanding the above signature for C with a new
type of logical items, namely intentional operators. And once intentional op-
erators are added, the language seems to require a world-based semantics -
we will encounter again de dicto intentionality later in §3.3. By contrast, mod-
elling de re intentional states requires no expansion whatsoever; intentional
verbs introducing de re intentional states can be treated just like ordinary re-
lations, for after all this is just what they seem to be.
As we said at the beginning of this chapter, our focus hereafter will be on
de re, rather than de dicto, intentional states. The reason is that, for one thing,
de re intentional states very often present counterexamples to GEP and NGEP.
And the reason why they do, as we will see shortly, also explains why EP and
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LNE fail as well15. The phenomenon of de re intentionality has therefore a big
unifying power to explain the faults of C on its Quinean parsing theory.
Some plausibly invalid substitution instances of GEP and NGEP, involv-
ing de re intentional states, are in order:
• Ponce De Leon sought for the Fountain of Youth. Therefore, the Fountain
of Youth exists. (GEP)
• Le Verrier postulated Vulcan. Therefore, Vulcan exists. (GEP)
• Homer worshipped Zeus. Therefore, Zeus exists. (GEP)
• J.K. Rowling was asleep yesterday night, and was not thinking of Harry
Potter. Therefore, Harry Potter exists. (NGEP)
• Anna does not fear the Easter Bunny. Therefore, the Easter Bunny exists.
(NGEP)
• George does not prefer Gandalf to Frodo. Therefore, Gandalf exists.
(NGEP).
Whilst the premises of all these examples describe real or likely scenarios,
the conclusions do all strike us as incorrect. This may be because the noun
phrases in the conclusions refer to purely fictional characters (Harry Potter,
the Easter Bunny, Gandalf) or objects common sense or scientific progress
has eventually dispensed with, that is, mythological objects such as Vulcan,
15To this, we also add that the formulation of EP, GEP, NGEP and LNE does not include
any occurrence of intentional operators. Hence, there do not seem to be substitution in-
stances of those principles involving de dicto intentional contexts.
2.2. De Re Intentionality and Logical Revisionism 65
the Fountain of Youth and Zeus16. Be that as it may, these intentional ob-
jects, towards which cognitive activity is directed, simply appear to be non-
existent17. Obviously, our cognitive activity is not exclusively directed to-
wards non-existents: we clearly also think of (desire, fear...) things which are
very much existent. What the previous examples show, however, is that this
is in general not the case. Accordingly, it seems false that relations as such
are existence entailing: de re intentional relations such as those listed above
certainly do not seem to be.
Moreover, our cognitive activity may also be directed towards other kinds
of objects that could be taken to be non-existents, such as numbers or other
sorts of abstracta. The reason why we have not considered examples involv-
ing those objects has simply to do with the fact that it is not uncontentious
to take them as non-existents. There is not a similar problem with purely fic-
tional and mythological objects: these are clear examples of non-existents, if
anything is. This is why, in this and the next chapter we will restrict our at-
tention only to those two kinds of non-existents. And in any case, restricting
our attention to them is sufficient to make the point we are trying to make.
Indeed, acknowledging that we can be de re intentionally related to non-
existents such as purely fictional and mythological characters seems to have,
ipso facto, an immediate (negative) impact on the validity of LNE and EP.
Consider LNE first. If any of the previous substitution instances of GEP
and NGE fails, that is in part because the intentional object referred to in the
16We have called objects such as Holmes and Zeus purely fictional, in order to distinguish
them from the existent objects which sometimes feature in fictional stories. For example, in
one of the Holmes stories, Holmes has tea with British Prime minister William Gladstone,
who really existed. This makes Gladstone a fictional character of the Holmes stories, but
Gladstone is certainly not a purely fictional character like Holmes, who never existed.
17One could observe that mythological entities are a category of non-existents distinct
from purely fictional characters on the grounds that, for example, whilst hardly anyone has
ever seriously believed that Harry Potter existed, Homer worshipped Zeus precisely because
he believed that Zeus did exist.
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conclusion does not exist. Let t stand for any such object; if it is the case that
t does not exist, then pace LNE, it is false that, for arbitrary t, t exists.
Moreover, once we have accepted that some intentional objects do not
exist, it is not difficult to find troublesome substitution instances for EP either.
Here are two:
• Holmes is a purely fictional character. Therefore, Holmes exists.
• Zeus is a mythological creature. Therefore, Zeus exists.
In both cases the inference seems to fail almost by definition. Once we
accept that Holmes is a purely fictional character, we should not conclude
that he exists - quite the contrary, we should conclude that he does not, given
that part of being a purely fictional character is not to exist. Similarly for
Zeus and other mythological creatures.
Now, we have so far focussed our attention on a number of valid infer-
ence schemata of C on the Quinean parsing theory (LNE, EP, GEP and NGEP)
not all substitution instances of which strike us as valid. Such substitution in-
stances, in particular, all share a conclusion of the same form: ‘t exists’ - for t
a noun phrase. Therefore, in deeming such substitution instances invalid, we
are thereby committed to the view that sentences of the form ‘t exists’ may be
false; or, equivalently, sentences of the form ‘t does not exist’ may be true. We
already saw that a similar view is incompatible with C on the Quinean pars-
ing theory, and for this reason accused it of incurring problems of adequacy
to the data. By ‘data’, as we explained in the previous chapter, we mean the
data from natural language, concerning what arguments and utterances are
deemed correct in the vernacular. We, however, have so far almost took for
granted that vernacular argumentation allows sentences of the form ‘t does
not exist’ to be true. Thus, in the next sub-section, we want to get clearer on
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the extent to which, if at all, linguistic data from natural language can corrob-
orate this claim18. Subsequently, in §2.2.4, we will discuss, and criticise, some
ways in which proponents of C on the Quinean parsing theory may respond
to the claims we have made in this sub-section.
2.2.3 Linguistic Data
The thesis entailed by the claims we defended in the previous sub-section, as
just said, is that sentences of the form ‘t does not exist’ may be true. Cases
in which ‘t does not exist’ strikes us as true, we maintained, are for example
those in which a noun phrase (a singular name or a description) standing
for an intentional object is substituted in for t. Something remarkably close
to this view was proposed by linguist and philosopher Friedrieke Moltmann
(2013) as a defining criterion for an existence predicate in natural language.
It is now worth going into some details of her account, which will serve as
evidence that our views are continuous with the work of linguists in the field
of natural language semantics. Of course, this evidence is limited, and noth-
ing in principle prevents that future developments in linguistics may even
overturn it. In that case, our arguments would inevitably require to be cor-
roborated with new data. But because our primary goal here is outlining a
programme of logical revision, we will take the evidence presented as at least
sufficient to ground the legitimacy of our enterprise.
Moltmann (2013: §2.3) starts by considering a three-way distinction for
predicates in natural language, between ordinary predicates, existence pred-
icates, and predicates which do not fall under either of the previous two cat-
egories - more on why we have spoken of ‘existence predicates’ in the plural
shortly. What distinguishes ordinary from existence predicates, according to
18We are particularly grateful to Catarina Dutilh Novaes for pressing us on this issue.
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Moltmann, is their behaviour under negation. More specifically, Moltmann
(2013: 35) argues, ‘[s]entences with ordinary predicates in the present tense
[...] intuitively lack a truth value if the subject is an empty term or does not
stand for an actual, presently existing object’. ‘Subject’ is here to be under-
stood in a technical sense, that is, roughly, as the doer of an action; to be
contrasted with a direct object, or the receiver of an action. Consider for in-
stance the pair of sentences O1-O2 and O3-O4 below:
O1 Napoleon is right-handed;
O2 Napoleon is not right-handed.
O3 The king of France is bold.
O4 The king of France is not bold.
Each one of O1-O4 is formulated in the present tense, and contains an
occurrence of either the intransitive predicate: ‘... is right-handed’ (O1-O2),
or ‘... is bold’ (O3-O4) - where an intransitive predicate is one which takes a
subject but not a direct object. Those two predicates count for Moltmann as
ordinary, and each of O1-O4 as plausibly neither true nor false. The reason
is, Moltmann (2013: 35) argues, that ‘ordinary predicates in the present tense
in general presuppose that the subject stands for an actual presently existing
object’ - which Napoleon or the king of France are not. If this is correct, then
the following defining criterion for ordinary predicates in natural language
is an immediate consequence:
O A (intransitive) predicate ξ is an ordinary predicate iff for any world
w and time t, for any singular term t, if t does not stand for an actual
entity in w, then neither [t not ξ]w,t = true nor [t not ξ]w,t = false.
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In other words, ξ is an ordinary predicate just in case in any context in
which t does not stand for an actual individual, and ξ is an intransitive pred-
icate, the present tense sentence ‘t is not ξ’ is neither true nor false.
Examples of predicates which, given O, fails to qualify as ordinary pred-
icates and, as we will see, as existence predicates as well, are for instance is
important or is influential or is a philosopher. Indeed, consider N1 below:
N1 Plato is not influential.
Competent speakers would certainly consider N1 as false even though
Plato is not currently existing. For one thing, this classifies is influential as
being not an ordinary predicate; shortly, we will see why it classifies is influ-
ential as being not an existence predicate either.
Existence predicates in natural language behave differently than ordinary
predicates. Suppose again that the subject does not stand for an actual object
at the present time. Moltmann identifies the specificity of negated sentences
in the present tense containing an existence predicate and a subject of that
sort with their being true. In other words, Moltmann (2013: 36) is propos-
ing the following defining criterion for an existence predicate in natural lan-
guage:
E A (intransitive) predicate ξ is an existence predicate iff for any world
w and time t, for any singular term t, if t does not stand for an actual
entity in w, then [t not ξ]w,t = true.
That is to say, ξ is an existence predicate just in case in any context in
which t does not stand for an actual individual, and ξ is an intransitive pred-
icate, the present tense sentence ‘t is not ξ’ is true - and its negation, accord-
ingly, false.
Whilst the criterion E for existence predicates, we can now see more clearly,
classifies is influential as being not an existence predicate, Moltmann (2013:
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36) argues that it ‘obviously classifies exists [...] as an existence predicate’.
Consequently, just as for example E1 below is to be counted as expressing a
truth:
E1 The king of France does not exist,
So should E2:
E2 Pegasus does not exist.
If this confirms our view that sentences of the form ‘t does not exist’ may
sometimes be true, Moltmann’s account extends far beyond that point19. In-
deed, so far in this work we have tacitly restricted our discussion to sen-
tences of natural language containing terms standing for objects. However,
we might want to extend our discussion so as to include more complex types
of entities as well, such as events or, as Moltmann (2020: 318) calls them,
‘condition-like entities’ such as states, situations, conditions, rules and laws.
In doing so, by relying on Moltmann’s account, we could also acknowl-
edge the presence of further existence predicates in natural language, such
as: hold, occur, obtain, take place, happen, which do not apply to objects, but
rather events; or hold, which again does not apply to objects but rather to
condition-like entities20. Thus, for instance, E3 below is undoubtedly true, if
‘the demonstration’ fails to denote an actual event:
E3 The demonstration does not take place.
19One could perhaps maintain, along the lines of Salmon (1987, 1998), that in negative
existentials featuring definite descriptions of seemingly non-actual objects, such as E1, the
description in fact lacks denotation altogether and negation is understood as external nega-
tion. In this way, one does not need to posit, as we have argued, a non-existent object. See
however Moltmann (2015: 162-165) for a robust critique of the view.
20Moltmann (2015: 149) observes that exists could not take subjects standing for events but
may take subjects standing for condition-like entities. Thus, for instance, ‘the demonstration
exists/does not exist’ appears to be infelicitous, whereas ‘the law described by John does not
exist’ does not.
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Likewise, E4 expresses a truth if ‘the law described by John’ does not
express an actual law
E4 The law described by John does not hold.
It turns out, therefore, that not only there is linguistic evidence for the
view, applied to objects, we articulated in the previous section. There are also
correlates of this view when the domain of entities taken into consideration
is so enlarged as to include entities of more complex types, such as the ones
just illustrated in the previous paragraph - for a full account of which see
Moltmann (2020).
We believe that our discussion in the last two sub-sections makes at least
for a prima facie case to answer for proponents of C on the Quinean parsing
theory. Thus, a discussion of their attempts to answer the points we raised,
as we had anticipated at the end of §2.2.2, will occupy us throughout the next
sub-section, to which we now turn.
2.2.4 Quinean Rebuttals
In §2.2.2, we had proposed that we take certain substitution instances of LNE,
EP, GEP and NGEP as invalid, when they concern certain intentional objects
such as fictional or mythological characters. This, as we said, committed us
to the view that sentences of the form ‘t does not exist’ may express truths
- that is, at least, when t is used for an object belonging to either of those
two categories. The last sub-section showed that this view has found a home
in linguistic theorising about the semantics of natural language. So at this
point, we want to discuss how proponents of C on the Quinean parsing the-
ory might respond to the charges we pressed against their preferred theory.
To begin with, here is for instance Van Inwagen (2003: 145) (our italics):
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It seems [...] that much of what we say in fictional discourse is true
and that the truths of fictional discourse carry ontological com-
mitment to fictional characters. That is to say, it seems that fictional
characters exist. And, since the names that occur in works of fic-
tion, names like ’Mr Pickwick’ and ’Tom Sawyer’ (when they oc-
cur not in works of fiction, but in discourse about works of fiction,
in what I am calling fictional discourse), denote fictional charac-
ters if fictional characters are there to be denoted, Mr Pickwick and
Tom Sawyer are among the things that are – an assertion that we anti-
Meinongians regard as equivalent to the assertion that Mr Pick-
wick and Tom Sawyer are among the things that exist.
And here is Thomasson (2003: 222) (again, our italics):
So what sense can we make of those who would accept the exis-
tence of [...] works of literature, but deny the existence of fictional
characters? Perhaps they have an artificially inflated idea of what
would be required for there to be a fictional character (e.g. that
that there be some nonexistent person) – if so, it is they who are
taking fictional discourse and its commitments too seriously. In
any case, those who accept the existence of the relevant sorts of
literary work, but deny that of fictional characters, only distort
the ordinary rules for using the term “fictional character” without
yielding a genuinely more parsimonious ontology; if we accept
such works of literature, we need not fear that it would be profligate
to accept that there are fictional characters in the only sense that most
people ever expected there to be.
In different ways, the two passages deliver the same message. What
throughout the previous two sub-section struck as an uncontentious data
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point, namely that purely fictional characters are non-existents, would be
in point of fact false: purely fictional characters do exist! And this claim,
if correct, would immediately undermine our previous reasoning in §2.2.2.
For then, the supposed examples of invalid substitution instances of valid
inference schemata of C on the Quinean parsing theory would in fact be no
problematic at all for its proponents.
A response to this view might start by considering that it seems at least
correct to say that most people would find it quite puzzling that, for example,
‘Sherlock Holmes exists’ expresses a true proposition. Thus, it seems to us,
friends of the view that purely fictional characters exist need to explain two
things. First, what they mean exactly when they say that fictional charac-
ters exist; second, how can their view account, if at all, for the pre-theoretic
intuition, shared by most people, that they do not.
First of all, it is customary to call the position that purely fictional char-
acters exist fictional realism (see Everett (2005) for a thorough critical discus-
sion of the view). Of course, fictional realism does not entail that characters
such as Sherlock Holmes are to be found anywhere in the world. Indeed,
Van Inwagen and Thomasson take great pains to argue that purely fictional
characters are abstract in nature, even though they slightly differ over the
connotations that their abstract status is supposed to involve21. Accordingly,
we can call fictional abstractionism their proposed form of fictional realism.
So let us suppose we grant fictional abstractionism at least some prima facie
plausibility.
At least intuitively, fictional abstractionism seems incompatible with the
21For instance, Thomasson (1998) takes purely fictional characters to be the product of the
artistic activity of their authors. As such, they are created entities, differing from statues and
other concrete artefacts only in that the latter are, indeed, concrete. A similar view is put
forward by Braun (2005), whereas see Wolterstorff (1980) for an account of purely fictional
characters as non-created entities. Van Inwagen, on the other hand, took a noncommittal
stance on this issue.
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widely held pre-theoretic belief that purely fictional characters do not exist.
That this belief is widely shared should not be in dispute. Think of another
example, Santa Claus: is it not true that, at some point in life, many children
had to come to terms with the painful truth expressed by those four words,
‘Santa does not exist’?
However, both Van Inwagen (2003: 146-147) and Thomasson (1998: 111;
2003: 217-218) maintain that fictional abstractionism can still vindicate truths
of this sort. If this were the case, this would make the view incredibly attrac-
tive. For, the view would manage to save, in addition to the four principles
discussed in the previous sub-section, also what appear to be well estab-
lished intuitions. In the works referred to a few lines above, Van Inwagen
and Thomasson have indicated a number of strategies through which they
could achieve this result. We will now look at the one elaborated by Thomas-
son (1998: 111) which, unlike the others, crucially relies on the abstract nature
of purely fictional characters.
Briefly, the idea is that when one says ‘Sherlock Holmes/Santa does not
exist’ one is not thereby making an assertion to the extent that Sherlock Holmes
(Santa) is identical with nothing (something of the form ¬∃x(x = s) or
¬E!Cs). For that, in C at least, is a contradiction. Rather, what ‘Sherlock
Holmes/Santa does not exist’ ought to be taken to mean is that Sherlock
Holmes (Santa) is not to be found in the realm of concrete objects (something
of the form ¬Cs). And a claim of this form is perfectly coherent.
However, Berto (2012a: 95-96) has shown why a similar strategy looks
implausible - another critique of fictional abstractionism roughly along the
same lines can be found in Sainsbury (2009: Ch. 5). Unlike negative ex-
istentials expressed by means of ‘there is/are’ (‘there are no tigers’), nega-
tive existentials expressed by means of ‘exists’ (‘tigers do not exist’) do not
carry contextual restrictions to any domain. Consider the following example.
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When one utters (say, in a zoo) ‘there are no tigers’, one is thereby saying that
no tiger is to be found in the zoo. But if one uttered ‘tigers do not exist’, in a
zoo or otherwise, it seems that one is making the stronger, and false, claim
that tigers are nowhere to be found - perhaps meaning that tigers are extinct,
or something along those lines. To say that tigers do not exist in the zoo
but exist in the Savannah seems somewhat bizarre; or in any case this is not
how competent speakers normally communicate. And when we take into
account negative singular existentials, things look even more awkward. As
Berto (2012a: 96) observes, ‘we cannot sensibly say things like Obama does not
exist in Texas (save perhaps as an emblematic way of saying that Texas is very
much pro Republicans...); or A man existed at the door this morning, looking for
you’.
Applied to the cases of Sherlock Holmes and Santa, the point just high-
lighted seems to confirm what we already knew ahead of theoretical inquiry.
When people utter ‘Sherlock Holmes/Santa does not exist’ they do it with
the intention to express that Holmes (Santa) does not exist full stop, not that
he does not exist in the realm of concrete things. No tacit contextual restric-
tion whatsoever seems to be in place in similar assertions. Thus, if ‘Sherlock
Holmes/Santa does not exist’ expresses a truth, as most people would cer-
tainly say, it expresses a truth fictional abstractionism could hardly account
for. And if so, taking purely fictional characters as (existing) abstracta does
not look like a particularly promising way to go. Hence, we conclude, we
had better withdraw the initial plausibility we had granted to the view.
However, it does not follow yet that our previous appeal to non-existent
intentional objects to explain why EP, GEP, NGEP and LNE have invalid sub-
stitution instances is legitimate. For, what motivated our view was simply
the fact that sometimes, we seem to have de re intentional states directed to-
wards such objects. Granted, we have seen that the fictional abstractionist
76 Chapter 2. Revising Logic in Light of De Re Intentionality
attempt to consider these objects as abstracta is not particularly promising.
Perhaps though, there are other possibilities available to defend those prin-
ciples.
According to Priest (2016b: xix–xxxi), one would have three further strate-
gies at disposal. Each one of them attempts to replace the non-existent objects
seemingly involved in de re intentional contexts with some other kind of item:
a proposition (via a definite description), a monadic predicate and a mental
representation.
As Priest has shown (2016b: xix–xxxi; 58-59), each strategy is problematic
in its own way. However, the most promising of them is by far the latter,
or so it seems to us anyway; it is therefore worth to quickly look at it. The
argument here goes as follows: when one thinks (desires/imagines...) some-
thing, that something is in fact a mental representation. And, the argument
concludes, mental representations exist. Thus if, for example, Jim is thinking
of Anne, the view entails tat Jim is not intentionally related to Anne herself,
but rather to a surrogate object corresponding to the mental representation
of Anne.
But then, consider ‘Jim is thinking of Anne, who is 7 foot tall’. If the
sentence is true, it follows that there is someone Jim is thinking of and that
someone is 7 foot tall. Even granted that that someone Jim is thinking of is
a mental representation, it seems highly implausible (in fact, false) that the
mental representation Jim is thinking of be 7 foot tall! To be sure, it would all
be equally implausible if Anne in the example had been any other height.
The point is, rather, that height is not a feature that can be meaningfully
characterise a mental representation.
In general, the problem with the mental representation strategy can be
described in the following terms. When we are (de re) intentionally related
to something via some act of cognition (thinking/desiring/imagining...) the
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relatum which is thought of/desired/imagined often has properties which
seem impossible for mental representations to have (such as being 7 foot tall).
Notice, moreover, that the thesis that some intentional objects do not exist
plays no role in the failure of the mental representation strategy. Jim and
Anne, for all we know, may very well be existing things.
Just like fictional abstractionism, the view that intentional objects would
in fact be surrogate objects corresponding to mental representations does not
seem particularly convincing. The conclusion we draw is that we are better
off taking some intentional objects, such as purely fictional and mythological
characters, for what they intuitively look like: things which do not exist.
In taking this view, we commit ourselves to the thesis that C, on the
Quinean parsing theory, considers as valid inference schemata with invalid
substitution instances: EP, GEP, NGEP, LNE. And as we have seen, the phe-
nomenon of de re intentionality can provide an explanation for the failure of
each of those inference schemata.
At this point, given the evident problems of adequacy to the data incurred
by C on the Quinean parsing theory, one may think that a logical revision is
needed. So, in the next section, we will look at one way in which a similar
revisionary work could be carried out.
2.3 Positive Free Logic
We start by highlighting some considerations which follow from our previ-
ous discussion. First of all, a logical system incurs problems of adequacy to
the data when its principles do not match what is acknowledged as correct
vernacular reasoning. This, as far as we can see, may either happen because
a system licenses as valid inferences which are intuitively invalid, or else be-
cause it fails to license as valid inferences which are intuitively so. And C, we
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have argued, incurs problems of adequacy to the data in the former sense:
for example, by licensing as logically valid any sentence of the form ‘t exists’.
In particular, our discussion in §2.2.3 has provided evidence that our claim,
that exists does not exhibit a similar behaviour, can effectively be grounded
on the work of linguists, who have acknowledged the presence in natural
language of several existence predicates precisely manifesting the behaviour
we have attributed to exists.
However, it is important to remark that it is not a logical system per se to
incur problems of adequacy to the data. For, as we noted in §2.1.1, a logical
system (a logica docens) is merely a mathematical structure, with no imme-
diate connection to any data whatsoever. Rather, the connection between a
logical system and the data it aims to account for is crucially mediated by its
parsing theory. Issues of adequacy to the data only emerge at this point, that
is, when a system is equipped with a parsing theory. In our case, then, it is
not much C to be inadequate, but rather, as we always took care to clarify, C
on what we have called its Quinean parsing theory. And the Quinean pars-
ing theory of C, to repeat, is the thesis that existence is a first-order property
defined in terms of the quantifier ∃ and identity.
It follows that if C, on the Quinean parsing theory, ought to be revised,
the revision can be carried out in at least two different ways. The first op-
tion is to target the Quinean parsing theory and leave the semantics and/or
proof-theory of C intact. In this case, the main task of the revisionary work
will consist in providing an alternative parsing theory capable of solving the
problems of adequacy to the data that C did incur on its old parsing the-
ory. The second option is to preserve the Quinean parsing theory and revise
the semantics and/or proof-theory of C. Needless to say, the main task of
a revision in this sense will be to show that the problems incurred by C on
the Quinean parsing theory disappear once an alternative semantics and/or
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proof theory is/are in place.
Free logics can be seen as an example of revisionary approach in the latter
sense, targeting the semantics and proof theory of C, rather than its Quinean
parsing theory. As Bencivenga (2002: 148) for example notes (our italics):
[Free logicians] wanted to reform classical logic, and substitute for
it a better instrument, they thought that both the usual formal systems
and the usual formal semantics were faulty in important ways, and it
is only fair to define free logics so as to make sense of the precise
task that they set for themselves.
And although we can distinguish between at least three main strands
within the free logic project (more on this shortly), an endorsement of the
Quinean parsing theory seems to be a common trait to each of them. Here
is again Bencivenga (2002: 148–149), this time proposing a definition of free
logic (our italics):
I propose the following definition. A free logic is a formal system
of quantification theory, with or without identity, which allows
for some singular terms in some circumstances to be thought of
as denoting no existing object, and in which quantifiers are invariably
thought of as having existential import.
Of course, if the quantifiers are ‘invariably thought of as having existen-
tial import’, this is because they (∃, specifically) represent the device through
which existence can be expressed. And this claim seems to very much corre-
spond to the gist of the Quinean parsing theory illustrated previously.
The novelty brought about by free logic is represented by the clause that
some singular terms are allowed to denote no existing object. On the seman-
tics of C (on the Quinean parsing theory), a similar condition was ruled out
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by the stipulations that (1) the valuation function was defined as total (viz.
assigning a referent to each term) and (2) such referent was to be found in the
domain of ∃. Hence, in C, on the Quinean parsing theory, every term denotes
an existent.
Some systems of free logics have rejected the totality of the valuation func-
tion, whereas others have retained it but rejected that a term’s referent had to
be found in the domain of ∃. In each case, it is clear that the revisionary work
of free logic focussed on the semantics (and, consequently, the proof-theory)
of C, not its Quinean parsing theory.
Allowing terms to denote no existing object means one of two things:
either that some terms are assigned a referent and this is a non-existent, or
that some terms simply lack reference altogether. It is customary to call a
term that either refers to a non-existent or does not refer at all an empty term,
and empty-termed a formula where an empty term occurs.
A conception of empty terms as lacking reference altogether was devel-
oped by so-called negative and neutral free logic. Thus, systems of negative
and neutral free logic typically resort to a partial (as opposed to total) valua-
tion function, but differ in their treatment of empty-termed atomic formulae.
On the negative account (Burge (1974), Gratzl (2010)), any such atomic for-
mula is automatically evaluated as false. On the neutral account (Lehman
(1994, 2001, 2002) empty-termed atomic formulae are automatically evalu-
ated as truth-valueless22.
Distinctive of the so-called positive approach to free logic is the concep-
tion of empty terms as having referents, albeit corresponding to non-existent
objects: the valuation function, on the positive account, is therefore typically
22With one exception. If E! is the existence predicate of neutral free logic and t is an empty
term, then E!t is evaluated as false. Other systems of neutral free logic, however, can restore
truth-values for empty-termed atomic formulae through the mechanism of supervaluations.
See on this Van Fraassen (1966) and Bencivenga (1986, 2002: §10).
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total23. Moreover, empty-termed atomic formulae, on this account, are al-
lowed to be true (Cocchiarella (1966), Leblanc and Thomason (1968), Bacon
(2013)).
One consequence of positive free logic is that if empty terms denote non-
existents, and at the same time ∃ is interpreted as existentially loaded, then
empty terms must refer outside the domain of ∃. A simple semantics for
positive free logic (often known as dual domain) is thus in order - call P the
system it generates.
Let the language of P be just like that of C, except that its existence predi-
cate is now E!P, and a model MP = 〈DO, D, ν〉 a structure where: DO, the so-
called outer domain, is a nonempty set; D, the inner domain (of ∃), is a possi-
bly empty set such that D ⊆ DO; ν is a total function such that ν(t) ∈ DO for
each term t (individual constant or variable) and ν(ξn) ⊆ Dn
O
for each n-place
predicate ξ. A variable assignment is a function whose domain is the set of
variables. Satisfaction relative to a model MP and a variable-assignment g
based on that model is defined exactly as per C, for the five connectives and
identity. The clauses for the quantifiers and the existence predicate are given
below:
P8 MP , g ⊨P ∀x A iff MP , g[o/x] ⊨P A for each o ∈ D.
P9 MP , g ⊨P ∃x A iff MP , g[o/x] ⊨P A for some o ∈ D.
P10 MP , g ⊨P E!Pt iff νg(t) ∈ D.
The key idea is that, on the one hand, ∃ is interpreted as existentially
loaded, which means in particular that, for arbitrary t, E!Pt =De f ∃x(x = t).
23An exception is Antonelli’s (2000) proto-semantics. Whilst allowing some empty-termed
atomic formulae to be evaluated as true, systems of positive free logic on Antonelli’s proto-
semantics do not allow empty terms to refer. However, Antonelli (2007) later criticised the
account as artificial.
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But the range of ∃ is restricted to a subset of the outer domain, and the latter
may thus include non-existent objects.
It is now an easy exercise to formally show that EP, GEP, NGEP and LNE
are all invalid in P . More precisely, by uniformly substituting E!P for E!C
in the formulation of EP, GEP, NGEP and LNE, the results are four invalid
inference schemata.
Thus, having a property expressed by a monadic predicate is no longer
taken to be a sufficient condition to exist, and this invalidates EP. Similarly for
being related or failing to be related, whence the failure of GEP and NGEP.
In sum, properties and relation are no longer taken as existence-entailing.
Moreover, the domain of ∃ is possibly empty, and this fact has two nice con-
sequences. First, that the possibility of there being nothing at all is now al-
lowed. Secondly, and accordingly, that LNE fails as well: denying the exis-
tence of a thing referred to by a term is no longer taken as self-contradictory.
Notice, however, that there is also another reason why LNE fails in P . That
is, suppose that h stands for Sherlock Holmes and d for Conan Doyle. Then,
presumably, although ν(h) ∈ DO and ν(d) ∈ DO, ν(h) /∈ D and ν(d) ∈ D
and so MP |=P ¬E!Ph but MP |=P E!Pd; that is, Holmes does not exist but
Doyle does. Thus, although in this case there exists something, it is still not
the case that, for arbitrary t, t exists.
This means that the previous problems of adequacy to the data incurred
by C, on the Quinean parsing theory, are now avoided. In P , for example,
‘Ponce De Leon sought for the Fountain of Youth’ can be formalised as Sp f ,
and it is not difficult to find a model for this formula which is also a model
of ¬E!P f .
All this is certainly a step in the right direction. However, on closer in-
spection, it seems that P still raises important concerns about adequacy to
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the data. If, say, the Fountain of Youth does not exist, then the natural conse-
quence would seem to be that some things do not exist. However, a moment’s
reflection reveals that this claim, in P , expresses a necessary falsehood. In-
deed, ‘some things do not exist’ is here appropriately expressed by the for-
mula ∃x(¬E!Px) which, given the existentially loaded interpretation of ∃, is
a contradiction. And this upshot, once P is provided with the resources to
acknowledge as true sentences such as ‘The Fountain of Youth does not ex-
ist’, appears to be entirely unmotivated. We will resume this issue again in
the next chapter; in the remainder of this section, we want to survey a few
more facts about P .
First, given the failure of EP, GEP, NGEP and LNE, the consequence re-
lation of P is properly included in that of C. Thus, if deductive power were
the criterion with which to assess whether a system counts as a subsystem of
another, then P would have to count as a subsystem of C.
However, things look differently if we look at the relation between P and
C in terms of expressive power. For, there are distinctions, which P can retain,
that C does collapse; so, P is more expressive than C. For instance, the for-
mulae E!Ct and t = t are interchangeable in C in all formula contexts without
change of validity, something which does not happen in P between E!Pt and
t = t - whilst ⊨C t = t iff ⊨C E!Ct, it is not the case that ⊨P t = t iff ⊨P E!Pt.
In fact, it is possible to specify a finite constraint on P , which yields C as
a subsystem. For, only some formulae of P contain terms which all denote
members of D. If we restrict P precisely to those formulae, then we obtain a
subsystem of P which is equivalent to C24. Hence, given Aberdein’s defini-
tion from §1.4, P is a classical recapture logic.
A question that arises at this point is what to make of this classical re-
capture result. Here, free logicians have expressed positions corresponding
24For a syntactic argument along the same lines, see Meyer and Lambert (1968).
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to different attitudes in Aberdein’s scale. On the right-wing front we can
find Van Fraassen (1969), Lambert (2002) and Bacon (2013), who all see pos-
itive free logic as a generalisation of classical logic (on the Quinean parsing
theory). Insofar as the quantifiers and non-empty-termed formulae are con-
cerned, these authors do agree that classical logic is correct; the defects of
classical logic are only due to not admitting empty terms. Classical recapture
is therefore an important result, confirming that positive free logic can retain
classical logic as a special case. A similar point of view, ascribable to a centre-
right position in Aberdein’s scale, is however rejected by Bencivenga (2002:
187), who maintains that this form of logical conservatism does not do jus-
tice to either free or classical logicians. For, proponents of classical logic on
the Quinean parsing theory have their views about empty terms (viz. there
being none of them). And such views, Bencivenga argues, free logicians did
very little to preserve. Positive free logic is thereby an alternative, rather than
a generalisation, of classical logic; and this arguably puts Bencivenga on the
left-wing camp.
In any case, in §1.4 we noted that for proponents of non-classical logics
who took a centre-right position towards classical recapture classical logic is
in some sense correct to reason about standard cases. From this point of view,
it is therefore not just important to revise C in favour of a logic recapturing
it; it is also important that the recapturing logic dispenses, in light with the
Maxim of Minimal Mutilation, with as few principles of C as possible. If the
principles of C are correct for reasoning about standard cases, not being able
to retaining them is a cost.
So what principles of C should one abandon if one were to revise it in
favour of P? The first casualties are all the natural deduction introduction
and elimination rules governing the quantifiers in C, being all unsound with
respect to the semantics of P . This should not be surprising: if semantically
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the range of the quantifiers in P is restricted to a subset of the outer domain,
this restriction requires a syntactic counterpart, in absence of which the proof
theory of P would be unsound. The required restriction is carried out by
means of the predicate E!P, ensuring that, when a quantified formula is in-
troduced or eliminated, the inference is drawn from assumptions referring to








where t is new and does not occur in A or B.






where t is new and does not occur in A.
∀xA E!Pt ∀E
A[t/x]
Notice in particular the multiple roles that E!P plays in this group of rules.
For example, in ∃I and ∃E its presence guarantees that we do not draw an ex-
istential conclusion from a claim involving a non-existent object - one cannot
conclude that there exist winged horses from ‘Pegasus is a winged horse’. In
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∀E, the presence of E!P serves two purposes. On the one hand, it blocks infer-
ences from universal claims about all existents to a particular claim about a
non-existent - one cannot conclude that Pegasus is spatiotemporally located
from ‘every (existing) thing is spatiotemporally located’. On the other hand,
recall that P allows for contexts where nothing exists. Since singular claims
are false in similar contexts, having E!Pt as a further premise for ∀E guaran-
tees at least the existence of (the thing referred to by) t. And with the guar-
antee that we are not reasoning about a context with no existents, universal
elimination can proceed.
When assessing the costs of P , it should be added that free logicians
would certainly object to describing the failure of classical ∃I and ∃E as ca-
sualties. For, both of these rules are built on the assumption that every term
denotes an existent, and the denial of this assumption is precisely a central
thesis of free logic in general, and positive free logic in particular. However, a
similar line of response does not seem to be available to explain the failure of
the classical rules for ∀. Giving up on the assumption that every term denotes
an existent should not ideally have an impact on the behaviour of universal
quantification. It could be replied that classical ∀E still presupposes that the
domain of quantification (of existing things) be non-empty, and this is an as-
sumption which is rejected in P . However, we will see in the next chapter
that classical ∀I and ∀E can be held even if not every term denotes an existent
or nothing at all exists. Hence, the failure of classical ∀I, ∀E is a demerit of P .
Finally, another casualty incurred by P worth highlighting is the classical
principle of substitutivity of co-extensive open formulae. Let A and B be
two formulae containing n free variables x1, . . . , xn; then A and B are co-
extensive if, and only if, it is the case that ∀x1, . . . ∀xn(A ↔ B). Whilst in C
co-extensive open formulae can always be substituted for one another salva
veritate, in P this is no longer the case. For, consider two co-extensive open
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formulae of P such as x = x and x = x&E!Px - they are co-extensive in that
⊨P ∀x(x = x ↔ x = x&E!Px). However, suppose now that x picks out
a non-existent: the consequence is that x = x is true whilst x = x&E!Px is
false, and so we have a counterexample to the principle of substitutivity of
co-extensive open formulae25.
Our exposition of P gave us an overview of one way in which we could
solve some problems of adequacy to the data which C on the Quinean pars-
ing theory incurs in handling non-existent intentional objects, and the impli-
cations associated with such an attempt.
We will now turn, in the next chapter, to presenting the second programme
of logical revision we will be concerned with. Before, however, we can quickly
take stock of what in this chapter has been claimed.
2.4 Conclusion
We have started by distinguishing between two parsing theories of C: the
Fregean-Russellian one and the Quinean one. We then focused our attention
on four valid principles of C on the Quinean parsing theory. After having
distinguished between de re and de dicto intentionality, we have argued that
the four principles in question are inadequate to the data, and ought to be re-
jected. We then presented some lines of argument available to proponents of
C on the Quinean parsing theory to oppose this claim, but found all of them
unconvincing. Finally, the rest of the chapter was dedicated to presenting
the key elements of the free logic programme of logical revision in general,
and of its positive ramification in particular. There are, however, other ways
25Leeb (2006) however showed that substitutivity of co-extensive open formulae can be
restored for positive free logic in his State of Affair Semantics. Yet on this semantics, the
extension of a formula is no longer a truth-value, but rather a state of affairs construed es-
sentially as a set.
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in which the project of revising logic can be carried out. The next chapter is





In taking the phenomenon of de re intentionality seriously, we thereby take
seriously the idea that reality, besides including things that exist, also in-
cludes things, such as purely fictional and mythological objects, that do not.
If such is how the real world is, then the system P of positive free logic deliv-
ers an account of reasoning more adequate to the data than C on the Quinean
parsing theory. And we think that this is indeed how the real world is.
As we have seen, the free logic programme assumes the Quinean parsing
theory to be correct: existence is captured by ∃. Other revisionary traditions
have taken another path, and this chapter is concerned with one of them:
noneism. We will therefore start by spelling out the revisionary proposal of
noneism, and introduce a system of logic, N R, implementing its principles
- the reason for the superscript ‘R’ will become clear shortly. This will give
us two candidates systems for logical revision: P and N R. Each one of them
delivers a certain account of reasoning, and our task at that point will be to
single out the one underpinned by the logic with the highest degree of ra-
tionality, as codified by the anti-exceptionalist mechanism of theory choice
illustrated in Chapter 1. As far as adequacy to the data, expressive power,
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simplicity and adherence to the Maximal of Minimal Mutilation are the cri-
teria guiding rational theory choice, the best theory appears to be N R, or so
we will argue by the end of §3.2.
The rest of this chapter is dedicated to looking at noneism from another
point of view. Indeed, describing noneism as a programme of logical revision
is only part of the story. For, noneism is also a fully-fledged metaphysical the-
ory concerned with providing a systematic account of intentionality. And, if
the phenomenon of intentionality calls for a revision of logic, it is important
to know more about intentionality itself, and what issues emerge when the-
orising about it.
First of all, it is important to note that noneism accounts for intentionality
in a modal framework, which is essentially required to provide an account of
de dicto intentional contexts. Since our discussion so far has set such contexts
aside, however, our interest in this part of the chapter will be exclusively
on the non-modal aspects of noneism. The most important contribution of
noneism in this regard is its anti-literalism, or the view that non-existents can-
not have in reality existence entailing properties. Of course, anti-literalism
suggests also a rival view, literalism. We will talk about them in §3.3.
The rest of the chapter is dedicated to the most fundamental issue arising
when theorising about the non-existent: its ontological dependency on the
existent. We will have a first look at the issue in §3.4, when we will discuss
an account put forward by Crane (2016) on which, roughly, non-existents
depend for (almost) the entirety of their properties on the representational ac-
tivities of cognitive agents. This view, we argue, should be resisted.
We then move on, in §3.5, to see how the issue of the ontological depen-
dency of the non-existent on the existent is framed within the modal frame-
work of noneism. Here we need to distinguish between realist forms of the
view and anti-realist forms thereof. One way to characterise the distinction
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is by saying that, on the realist picture, a non-existent is not ontologically
dependent on any existent object; it would have still been an object, for ex-
ample, had nothing ever existed. The anti-realist disputes this.
In §3.5.1, we will see the different stories these theories deliver in account-
ing for the baptism of a purely fictional character. The anti-realist might be
thought as having a certain advantage over the realist, being the only one
entitled to talk of creation of a purely fictional character, thereby vindicat-
ing ordinary intuitions. Moreover, the system N R, our preferred candidate
for logical revision, is more intuitively thought of as implementing realist
assumptions (hence, the superscript ‘R’). So, it might be argued that the pre-
dictions made by this system are not as good as we had thought. In §3.5.2,
we show that the advantage that the anti-realist seems to have is merely ap-
parent. The data which anti-realist noneism claims to be able to account for
can also be accommodated in N R by expanding it in an obvious way. The
expansion provided shows that there is a clear, non-metaphorical sense in
which talk of creation of a purely fictional character is not precluded to the
realist. There remain residual divergences between realism and anti-realism,
but it is far from clear that common sense favours the anti-realist account.
After this last section, we will sum up the content of this chapter.
3.2 Two Candidates
This section is divided into three parts. In the next sub-section, we will intro-
duce the characterising aspect of the noneist programme of logical revision:
its non-Quinean parsing theory. We will then present some evidence from
linguistics supporting the non-Quinean parsing theory of noneism (§3.2.2).
Then, in §3.2.3 we will present the system N R, which is admittedly a trivial
adaption of C, but is still worth looking at for our discussion in the second
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part of this chapter. Finally, in §3.2.4, we will argue from anti-exceptionalist
grounds that theory choice is most rationally exercised by favouring N R over
P .
3.2.1 Non-Quinean Parsing Theory
We saw in the last chapter that the essence of the free logic programme, as
described by some of its advocates, is the attempt to embed the Quinean
parsing theory within systems other than C - P being a case in point.
This sub-section is concerned with another revisionary programme, which
despite sharing with free logic the same kind of dissatisfaction with C on the
Quinean parsing theory, could be interpreted as being driven by a differ-
ent goal: providing C with a non-Quinean parsing theory. The gist of the
Quinean parsing theory is that the ‘exists’ predicate can be reduced to a com-
bination of identity and ∃ which, as we know, presupposes an existentially
loaded reading of ∃. Thus, a non-Quinean parsing theory will accordingly
interpret ∃ in existentially (or ontologically) neutral terms. The revisionary pro-
gramme in question is that of noneism.
In the words of of its initiator,
There are [...] two main ways of reforming classical quantifica-
tion theory, by (existence) free logics [...] and, more radically, by
(ontologically) neutral logics [...] Free logic changes both the for-
malism and (therefore) the interpretation of classical quantifica-
tional logic. Neutral logic changes the interpretation of quantifi-
cation and accordingly can retain its formalism; but it augments
the formalism in such a way as to include the correct insights and
criticisms of free logic (Sylvan (1980: 74-75)).
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The insights and criticisms of classical logic put forward by free logic are
described as ‘correct’ by Sylvan. Thus on the one hand, the common root the
two revisionary programmes originate from is clearly acknowledged.
At the same time though, the commonalities do not extend much fur-
ther. The possibility for terms to refer to non-existents on the one hand, and
the retention of the Quinean parsing theory on the other, inevitably brought
free logicians to revise the classical semantics and rules of inference for ∀
and ∃ (what Sylvan calls the ‘formalism’ of classical logic) as we saw earlier.
However, in dispensing with the Quinean parsing theory, a logic could by
contrast retain the classical formalism as it is, save for the fact that it is now
re-interpreted in non-Quinean terms.
Moreover, in the passage above, Sylvan describes this form of revisionism
as more radical than the one proposed by free logicians, and a few pages later
refers to the free logic programme as a ‘halfway house [...] scarcely likely
to make the transition to a fully liberated logic easier’ (1980: 79). There is a
fundamental reason why Sylvan is right, which we have already encountered
in the last section of the previous chapter. That is, in free logic one cannot
talk generally about non-existents, despite resorting to a semantics, such as
that of P , fully acknowledging them as entities. For example, in P one can
truthfully assert that Pegasus does not exist, but not that some things do not
- which would seem the natural consequence of the previous assertion. To
truthfully assert that some things do not exist, the further transition towards
a non-Quinean parsing theory is inevitable.
Here is the essence of the non-Quinean parsing theory of noneism, out-
lined by one its champions:
[N]oneists such as myself, hold that one can quantify over some-
thing without taking it to exist. More specifically, what is most
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naturally called the particular quantifier (being the dual of the uni-
versal quantifier) should not be read as ‘there exists’ – or even
‘there is’, there being no real difference between being and ex-
istence; it should simply be read as some, leaving it open whether
the some in question exists or not. This view flies in the face of
current orthodoxy, as is witnessed by the fact that nearly every
logic textbook will simply call the particular quantifier the existen-
tial quantifier without further comment and write it as ∃, which
invites this reading (Priest (2008: 42)).
Priest argues that the Quinean reading of ∃ in terms of ‘there is’ or ‘there
exists’ should be replaced by one that does not carry existential implications,
and ‘some’ is adequate for this job. If ‘some’ is to leave open whether the
some in question exists or not, then being identical with some thing is not,
contra Quine, automatically equivalent with being identical with an existent.
Consider Pegasus: being identical with itself, it is identical with something,
but that thing (Pegasus itself) is a non-existent. So, existence cannot be re-
duced to a combination of quantification and identity. To exist, from a noneist
point of view, is simply to enjoy the property expressed by the monadic pred-
icate E!N, under the assumption that E!Ny ∕= ∃x(x = y).
One quick comment is now in order about the symbolism used through-
out this chapter. Priest (2016b: 13) proposes to abandon the usual symbolism
of quantification and replace it with one not tied, unlike the old ∀ and ∃, to
the usual Quinean interpretation. In his formalism, universal quantification
is thus expressed by the novel symbol A (standing for ‘all’) and particular
quantification by S (standing for ‘some’) - particular, as he notes above, be-
cause it is the actual dual of universal quantification. However, we will not
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follow his proposed convention here, and keep ∃ to express (neutral) partic-
ular quantification. This is merely a terminological point, but if particular
quantification is governed, as Routley observes, by the same principles as
existential quantification in classical logic, then changing the symbolism is
an unnecessary concession to the Quinean. If the latter has a faulty interpre-
tation of ∃, then it seems to us that it is up to her to devise a new symbol
expressing her existential quantification. Using ∃ to express neutral particu-
lar quantification seems to us the most intuitive move to make for the kind
of reform that noneism wishes to bring about.
In any case, if ∃ is given a neutral reading, then using ∃ alone to formalise
general existential statements will clearly not do. To formalise general exis-
tential statements, the noneist will also have to help herself to her existence
predicate E!N. Here are three examples of what this means exactly. Consider
the sentence ‘there exist wolves’; this is now parsed as ∃x(E!Nx&Wx). An-
other example, ‘there are tigers’; its parsing is now given as ∃x(E!Nx&Tx).
Moreover, consider ‘John is carrying something’; we would have to parse
this ∃x(Cjx&E!Nx), and specify that the thing John is carrying is an existent.
This is due to the fact that it would seem that John cannot carry something
which does not exist; on the Quinean parsing theory, by contrast, a similar
specification would be redundant. Finally, ‘some things do not exist’ now
becomes ∃x(¬E!Nx), a claim which noneism intends to vindicate.
We now have an intuitive understanding of the kind of logical revision-
ism which noneism proposes, and the new parsing theory that derives from
such form of revisionism. In §3.2.3, we will give a semantics for the system
N R, implementing the assumptions encountered in this sub-section. Before
turning to those matters, however, a few words are needed as to whether the
main tenet of the programme of logical revisionism proposed by noneism,
its understanding of quantification in existentially neutral terms, could find
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any ground in linguistic theorising. This issue will occupy us in in the next
sub-section.
3.2.2 Linguistic Data
In §3.2.1, we described as the main principle of noneism qua programme of
logical revision its taking quantification as being existentially neutral. A simi-
lar view targets the equivalence, holding in C on the Quinean parsing theory,
between the two predicates ‘... exists’ and ‘... is identical with something’.
This sub-section, we noted at the end of §3.2.1, is concerned with presenting
what linguistic evidence, if any, is available to ground the legitimacy of the
noneist form revisionism under discussion in this chapter.
First of all, we can in part rely on our previous discussion in §2.2.3. Our
discussion has highlighted the presence of accounts, defended by linguists
such as Moltmann (2013, 2015, 2020), on which natural language contains
several existence predicates which, when occurring in negated sentences in
the present tense, may well express truths - for instance of the form ‘t does
not exist’. This evidence, notice, does not by itself support noneism; it may as
well support a form of free logic such as P , as we have seen in the previous
chapter. The thesis at the core of the noneist programme of logical revision,
therefore, needs to find a correspondence with further data from natural lan-
guage not yet considered.
We start by calling attention to a remark by Moltmann (2020) who has
proposed an answer (in the affirmative) to the question whether natural lan-
guage permits a form of existentially neutral quantification. In fact, not only
does natural language, according to Moltmann, permit such a form quan-
tification; natural language primarily reflects the view that quantification is
existentially neutral:
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The common, Quinean view is that existence is expressed by quan-
tification or the there is/are–construction. In natural language, how-
ever, existential quantifiers and there is/are do not as such convey
existence. Natural language rather reflects the Meinongian view
according to which quantifiers such as a, some, two and there is/are
are neutral regarding existence and non-existence, as is the use of
‘referential’ singular terms (names and definite descriptions).
They can all be used to talk about ‘nonexistent entities. In natural
language, existence is not expressed by quantifiers, but instead by
existence predicates such as exist in English. This is reflected, for
example, in the possible truth of Meinongian statements such as
(1), where there are ranges over things of which existence is de-
nied:
(1) There are objects of thought that do not exist (Moltmann (ibid.:
314-315).
In this passage, Moltmann first contrasts the Quinean interpretation of
quantification with what she calls the Meinongian one - the noneist inter-
pretation, rooted in the work of Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong1, is
subsumed under the latter. Then, Moltmann goes on to claiming that, of
those two rival views, it is the Meinongian one which is reflected in natu-
ral language. For quantifiers, it is said, are neutral with respect to whether
the entities they could be used to quantify over exist or not, just as per the
noneist account outlined in §3.2.1. To hammer the point home, Moltmann
concludes by providing an example of true sentence involving noneist (and,
so, Meinongian) neutral quantification, namely, sentence (1) in the passage.
1See in particular Meinong (1960).
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Although perhaps the example provided by Moltmann in the passage
may be disputed by appealing to a more sophisticated analysis of it2, we
agree with Moltmann that a much better case for seeing the presence of neu-
tral quantification at work in natural language comes from other construc-
tions. Specifically, those involving noun phrases modified by relative clauses
containing intentional predicates.
Consider for example sentences such as I1-I3 below:
I1 There are some events that John read about that did not take place.
I2 There are buildings described in the book that do not exist.
I3 Some buildings the guide mentions do not exist.
We can see that the noun phrases ‘some events’, ‘buildings’ and ‘some build-
ings’ in I1-I3 respectively, are each modified by a relative clause containing
an intentional predicate: ‘read about by John’, ‘described in the book’ and
‘mentioned by the guide’ respectively.
According to Moltmann (2020: 316), I1-I3 represent sentences of ordinary
English which ‘do not presuppose any form of philosophical reflection’. The
thought here is that such sentences are ordinarily used by competent speak-
ers to covey a content which is easily envisaged to be accepted as true.
What makes this possible appears to be crucially due to the fact that I1-I3
contain relative clauses involving an occurrence of in intentional predicate.
By removing such clauses, one could hardly imagine that the resulting sen-
tences be accepted by competent speakers. For, consider:
I1∗ There are some events that did not take place.
I2∗ There are buildings that do not exist.
2If, for example, objects of thought are understood as mental representations, as per the
account sketched in §2.2.4, then the example referred to by Moltmann as evidence for the
presence of neutral quantification in natural language would misfire.
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I3∗ Some buildings do not exist.
In I1∗-I3∗, the relative clauses appearing in I1-I3 have been removed. Those
sentences, if uttered in any ordinary context, would plausibly be deemed as
false, and perhaps even infelicitous. The reason seems to be, that general
terms such as ‘buildings’ or ‘events’ carry an existential force in absence of
modifiers such as clauses featuring intentional predicates3.
If this is correct, we think that the right conclusion to draw here is twofold.
On the one hand, quantificational expressions of natural language may have
an existential import. This is witnessed by the fact that sentences such as
I1∗-I3∗ appear at least to be false, if not infelicitous altogether. At the same
time, reflection on examples such as I1-I3 equally shows that, if quantifica-
tion exclusively came with an existential import, we would thereby struggle
to make a coherent of sense of such sentences, which we can undoubtedly
make. And this, in turn, we take to show that there is a coherent sense to be
made of non-existentially loaded quantification in natural language, thereby
giving legitimacy to the noneist programme of logical revision.
Having argued that evidence from natural language supporting this pro-
gramme is available, we now want to look more closely at the formal details
of it. We had anticipated towards the end of §3.2.1, that in §3.2.3 we would
have provided a semantics for a system, N R, implementing the main revi-
sionary principles of noneism. Let us now, as promised, carry out this task.
3.2.3 N R
Providing the required semantics, it turns out, is admittedly a trivial task.
For example, the modal semantics given by Priest (2016b: 11-12; 31-32) for the
five connectives, quantifiers and identity is exactly as per C - with the proviso
3Or intensional predicates as well, such as temporal predicates shifting the time of evalu-
ation of a sentence - as Moltmann (2020: 316) correctly observed.
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that since quantifiers are now interpreted as non-existentially loaded, their
domain may well include non-existents. From Priest’s semantics we could
therefore read off a non-modal system, call it N R, a model MN R = 〈D, ν〉
for which is exactly analogous to a model for C. The crucial difference, which
distinguishes this system from both C (on the Quinean parsing theory) and P
concerns the ‘exists’ predicate (E!N). In the latter two systems, the stipulation
concerning the ‘exists’ predicate, in line with the Quinean parsing theory,
was that its extension was identical to the domain of the quantifiers. In this
new system by contrast, we simply have that ν(E!N) ⊆ D, so that there is no
guarantee that the domain of the quantifiers is only populated by existents -
in fact, nothing prevents that there may be models even without any of them.
An appropriate semantic clause for E!N is thus in order:
N10 MN R , g ⊨N R E!Nt iff νg(t) ∈ ν(E!N).
Now, it is immediate to see why EP, LNE, GEP, and NGEP all fail given
the semantics presented. For the sake of illustration, however, let us give the
semantic arguments needed.
As for EP, suppose t stands for Pegasus and let M be the predicate ‘... is
a mythological character’; then presumably, ν(t) ∈ ν(M), but ν(t) /∈ ν(E!N).
Hence, the principle fails.
LNE is immediately undermined by the condition that ν(E!N) ⊆ D. Sup-
pose t stands for Sherlock Holmes; then, νg(t) /∈ ν(E!N), and so E!Nt is false.
Hence, it is not the case that, for arbitrary t, ⊨N E!Nt. In fact, as we men-
tioned earlier, given that there is no stipulation ruling out the case where
nothing exists, namely where ν(E!N) = ∅, there may be models MN R of N R
such that, for arbitrary t, MN R ⊨N R ¬E!Nt.
Now for GEP and NGEP, starting with the former. Let p stand for Ponce
De Leon, f for the Fountain of Youth, and S be the dyadic relation ‘... sought
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for...’; then consider a model MN R of N R where ν(p) ∈ ν(E!N), ν( f ) /∈
ν(E!N) and ν〈p, f 〉 ∈ ν(S). Whilst MN R ⊨N R Sp f , we also have MN ∕⊨N
E!N f . Thus, here we have a counterexample to GEP.
As for NGEP, suppose j stands for John, g for Gandalf, m for Mickey
Mouse and P be the three-place relation ‘... prefers... to...’; consider a model
MN R of NR where ν(j) ∈ ν(E!N), ν(g) /∈ ν(E!N), ν(m) /∈ ν(E!N) and
ν〈j, g, m〉 ∈ ν(P). Whilst MN R ⊨N R Pjgm, we also have MN
R ∕⊨N R E!Ng
and MN R ∕⊨N R E!Nm. So, this is a counterexample to NGEP.
As a result, like P , N R too can avoid the problems of adequacy to the
data, highlighted in the previous chapter, incurred by C on the Quinean pars-
ing theory.
Now, we should ask whether N R is a classical recapture logic. That is, is
there a finite constraint which can be imposed on N R, generating a proper
sub-system of it equivalent with C? The answer is yes, and this appears quite
clearly if we look at the differences between N R and C from a semantical
point of view. The only difference is that, in C, every term denoted an ex-
istent, because the extension of the ‘exists’ predicate was identical with the
domain of quantification; that is, we had ν(E!C) = D. In N R, terms are al-
lowed to denote non-existents, as the ‘exists’ predicate singles out a subset
of the domain of quantification, that is, we have ν(E!N) ⊆ D. Now, suppose
we restrict N R precisely to those formulae such that any term occurring in
them, free or bound variable or individual constant, refers in ν(E!C). What
we obtain is a sub-system of N R where ν(E!N) = D, and this system can be
obviously shown to be equivalent to C. Hence, N R is a classical recapture
logic.
We consider this an important fact, showing that N R can still retain C as
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a special case4. Moreover, as we pointed out earlier in §2.3, in P the classi-
cal rules for ∃ and ∀ are unsound. In N R, by contrast, they remain sound;
although of course they are purged of their existential import. Adherence to
the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation is at stake here, as it is when we also con-
sider that N R can retain the principle of substitutivity of co-extensive open
formulae which, as we know, one looses in P .
In this sub-section, we have given a quick and informal presentation of
the noneist system N R. In the next sub-section, we argue that given certain
criteria for theory choice, relying on it instead of P is the most rational choice
to account for the data which de re intentionality presents us with.
3.2.4 Logical Theory Choice
As we saw earlier in §1.2, we have a methodology to make a rational choice
between different logics. It reflects the very same abductive mechanism un-
derlying the rational choice of a scientific theory. Logical theorising, on the
methodology assumed here, is a scientific enterprise.
Scientific theories are assessed based on the extent to which they satisfy
certain criteria, and a selection between them is the result of determining
which one, in terms of cost-benefit, does a better job satisfying those criteria.
As we noticed, this requires assigning each criterion considered for theory
choice a certain weight, reflecting how important it is for a theory to score
well against it. Of course, the weight assigned to a criterion is very much rel-
ative to what a theory has to explain, what it is a theory of. Thus for instance,
the criterion of adequacy to the data, roughly understood as a theory’s ca-
pacity of making correct predictions, will presumably be paramount for a
theory having to account for empirical phenomena such as, say, the process
4Sylvan (1980: 188) too considers the classical recapture result for an analogous system of
neutral quantification as showing its generalising C.
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of crystallisation of a solid. It may not receive, however, the same importance
in other areas such as mathematics, where what counts as correct data is per-
haps not equally clear. This also shows that, in order to determine the weight
of a criterion, a certain amount of unpacking appears to be required.
In the context at hand, we selected four criteria for theory choice: ade-
quacy to the data, simplicity, expressive power and adherence to the Maxim
of Minimal Mutilation. So, let us say a bit about them before giving scores to
N R and P - we will not literally be giving scores to those systems, but simply
note roughly how well (or badly) they perform with respect to each one of
the criteria considered; our discussion will be carried out informally.
First of all, one word about why we focused on those four criteria. Every
list of criteria for logic choice will inevitably involve some level of arbitrari-
ness5. In our case, we have simply relied on pretty standard assumptions, to
keep things as clear and uncontroversial as possible. As far as adequacy to
the data, simplicity, and power are concerned, we have seen in §1.2 that for
example Priest (2014, 2016a) and Williamson (2017) consider them in their
lists of criteria for logic choice. Adherence to the Maxim of Minimal Mutila-
tion, on the other hand, reflects our assumption that C on the Quinean pars-
ing theory, despite its inadequacies in handling de re intentional contexts, is
still in some sense correct to reason about standard cases. Accordingly, its
revision should be as conservative as possible. Of course, what the standard
cases are is a contentious matter; in most contexts of our ordinary life, how-
ever, by reasoning classically one would seem to make correct predictions.
Which takes us to justify how much we weight our criteria. We clarified in
§1.3 that we are assuming logical theorising as being concerned with deliver-
ing an account of correct reasoning. For this reason, the criterion of adequacy
to the data is paramount for our discussion; it is the most important criterion.
5For discussion, see Quine and Ullian (1970) and Lycan (1988).
104 Chapter 3. Noneism
And what we are taking the data of logical theorising to be, we have already
said in the previous chapter: the validity or invalidity of vernacular argu-
ments. These are the data a logic has to be prepared to accommodate.
As concerns the power of a theory, we distinguished in §1.4 between ex-
pressive and deductive power. We are considering here ‘power’ in the sense
of expressive power, which we defined as a theory’s capacity to preserve dis-
tinctions. It is certainly a virtue for a theory to be expressive, but by no means
as important as being adequate to the data.
Simplicity can certainly be spelled out in many ways. Thus for instance,
in context of logical theory choice, Priest (2019) distinguishes between con-
ceptual simplicity and ontological simplicity. Ontological simplicity can be
roughly understood in terms of the costs associated with the kinds of enti-
ties a theory requires to account for the data it aims to explain. In the present
dispute, ontological simplicity does not seem to be of particular relevance.
As for conceptual simplicity, it can be roughly measured by the complexity
of a theory, which in turn would require some unpacking. Given our presen-
tation of P and N R, we can take it as measured by the complexity of their
models. This is admittedly very vague, and perhaps inevitably so. We there-
fore take simplicity so defined as the criterion with the lightest bearing on
the rationality of a logic.
Adherence to the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation has a certain weight for
us, but of all the criteria it is the most contentious. Logicians taking what
we called in §1.4 a radical left attitude towards the phenomenon of classical
recapture, for instance, would not be particularly impressed by a logic scor-
ing well with respect to this criterion. Thus, let us suppose that it bears more
weight than simplicity, but less than expressive power.
To sum up these considerations, here is our ranking of the criteria in de-
creasing order of weight:
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1. Adequacy to the data
2. Expressive Power
3. Adherence to the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation
4. Simplicity
We now have a list of criteria for theory choice and a ranking in terms of
their weight. Let us now see how well P and N R score with respect to those
criteria.
Adequacy to the Data
We already noted that P cannot accommodate data from general talk
about non-existents, despite admitting such entities in the domain of dis-
course. This is unfortunate, as for example the fact that people often tell
stories about (or think of, or fear) some things which do not exist, is a data
point which needs to be accommodated. And for this to be possible, non-
existentially loaded quantification appears to be required.
It may be replied that the whole issue is not a big deal, for once we can
accommodate singular talk of non-existents (‘Holmes is a detective’, ‘Pegasus
does not exist’, ‘Anna thought about Oliver Twist’) we have already, at least
implicitly, accommodated general talk about them, even if we cannot express
it. In response, one could point out how odd a similar claim would be if it
were used to justify the (odd) view that general talk of existent objects is
not necessary. No one, in other words, would seriously say that once we
can accommodate singular talk of existent objects, we could take general talk
about them as sorted and be content even if we could not express it. So why
the double standard?
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One answer may be that most of the time we deal with existent objects,
and this justifies having an existentially loaded device. Maybe, but it is at
least dubious whether a similar answer could justify not having a a device
expressing non-existentially loaded quantification. For, without it we would
fail to account for many instances of correct argumentation. Consider for
instance the following argument:
• Pegasus does not exist. Therefore, some things do not exist.
This is a vernacular inference which most people find correct, and represents
a data point that needs to be accounted for. In particular, on the defining cri-
terion for an existence predicate we introduced in §2.2.3, the premise of the
argument is true. For recall, exists on that criterion qualifies as an existence
predicate, and this means the present tense sentence ‘t does not exist’ comes
out true if t does not stand, like Pegasus, for an actual individual. As for
the conclusion of the inference, it can be hardly maintained to be necessarily
false. On the contrary, we have seen earlier in this chapter (§3.2.2) that evi-
dence for neutral quantification over things which do not exist is available. A
logic capable of accounting for the data, accordingly, will need to vindicating
this inference.
In P , however, it is easy enough to construe a model of P invalidating the
argument. Consider any model where ¬E!P p is true (p stands for Pegasus
and denotes outside the inner domain); since ‘some’ is treated as equivalent
to ‘some existent’, ‘some things do not exist’ has to be parsed as ∃x(¬E!Px),
and this formula has no model.
By contrast, N R is built precisely on the negation of the equivalence be-
tween ‘some’ and ‘some existent’, and can therefore account for the validity
of the inference: ¬E!N p, in this system, entails ∃x(¬E!Nx).
Likewise, consider:
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• Some things do not exist. Therefore, New York is in Brazil.
It is difficult to maintain that anyone reasoning in this way in public
would not be corrected. To account for this data point, once again, neu-
tral quantification is essentially required (to model the truth of the premise).
Since in P , though not in N R, we could only account for the argument by
treating it as valid, P appears to make incorrect predictions.
As far as the criterion of adequacy to the data is concerned, we conclude,
N R does a much better job than P .
Expressive Power
As concerns expressive power, N R is certainly more expressive than P .
For one thing, as we saw, N R can distinguish between quantification and ex-
istence. In fact, from a purely formal point of view, the only real difference
between N R and P can be described by saying that the former allows quan-
tification over the outer domain, and the latter does not. One, therefore, in
N R, is not forced to treat, say, ‘something is identical to a’ and ‘a exists’ as
equivalent. The former can be expressed as ∃x(x = a), the latter as E!Na.
These formulae have different truth-conditions: if a is a non-existent, then
∃x(x = a) is true whilst E!Na false.
P , by contrast, collapses the distinction between quantification and exis-
tence: to say that something is identical to a is just equivalent to saying that
a exists: ∃x(x = a) and E!Pa are treated as logically equivalent.
Moreover, in P there is only one kind of quantification, and that is exis-
tentially loaded. Accordingly, one is forced to treat as false both ‘something
is such that A and does not exist’ and ‘something is such that not-A and does
not exist’. These sentences are respectively expressed by ∃x(A[x]&¬E!Px)
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and ∃x(¬A[x]&¬E!Px), and they are treated as logically equivalent because
the second conjunct expresses a contradiction.
By contrast, N R can discriminate between the two forms of quantifica-
tions. Thus, ∃x(A[x]&¬E!Nx) and ∃x(¬A[x]&¬E!Nx) are independent from
one another.
The discriminatory power of N R is superior to the discriminatory power
of P , which means that the former fares better than the latter with respect to
the criterion under consideration.
Adherence to the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation
This criterion measures the degree of conservativeness of logical revision,
that is, the damage we would make to C by revising it for a certain logic.
We have seen that both P and N R are classical recapture logics, and this we
found to be an important result. We have already pointed out the costs in-
curred in revising C by P . The casualties are the rules for ∀ and ∃ on the
one hand, and the subsitutivity of co-extensive open formulae, on the other.
Since N R does not force us to depart from any of these principles, the kind
revision it brings about is the most conservative of the two. We conclude that
N R scores better with respect to the criterion at hand.
Conceptual Simplicity
As we said, we are taking simplicity as conceptual simplicity, understood
in terms of the complexity of a theory’s models. If we look at the models of P
and N R, the latter are simpler, but not in a particularly important way. The
main complication which P incurs here is the distinction between inner and
outer domain, which is in itself a very simple addition. In this case, what is
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probably best to do is score P and N R on a par with respect to the criterion
of simplicity.
This was the last of our criteria to consider for theory choice. Before con-
cluding and turning to other matters, let us quickly recap in Table 3.1 below
how we scored P and N R - a ✓denotes an advantage, whereas a blank de-
notes a tie.
N R P Weight
Adequacy to the Data ✓ High
Expressive Power ✓ Medium/High
Adherence to the MMM ✓ Medium
Conceptual Simplicity Medium/Low
TABLE 3.1: Theory Choice: P and N R.
As shown in Table 3.1, N R has an advantage over P with respect to all
the four criteria considered for theory choice, except for simplicity, where the
scores are about the same. Choosing N R, at this point, appears to be the most
rational choice to make if we want a good logic accounting for the data that
de re intentionality presents us with.
We concluded in this sub-section a task which we set out to do on the
very first page of Chapter 1, that is, offering an account of logic choice when
revising logic in light of de re intentionality. We started by explaining what
we assume to be at stake in logical theorising. This theoretical activity, we
said in §1.3, is essentially concerned with giving an account of vernacular
reasoning. We then went on in the next chapter to clarify what are the data
we have to account for when undertaking such a project, and identified those
with those inferences in the vernacular which our intuitions acknowledge
as (in)valid. Then, we highlighted a class of valid principles of C on the
Quinean parsing theory, which systematically clash with the data coming
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from phenomena of de re intentionality, namely, the fact that through our
cognitive abilities we can be related to objects that do not exist. Thus, we
introduced the system P of positive free logic, our first candidate for logical
revision, which delivered a better account of reasoning. In this chapter, we
first encountered the revisionary programme of noneism, and then presented
N R, a system implementing its non-Quinean parsing theory. The account of
reasoning it delivers constitutes an improvement over P . It is the best logic
we have to account for the data we have been considering in this work.
Now, the data in question concern intentionality, and as we noted in the
introduction, ‘noneism’ does not just denote a programme of logical revision
but also a theory of intentionality itself. Intentionality requires that we take
the non-existent seriously. The non-existent is a vast jungle of objects of dif-
ferent kinds: from purely fictional to mythological characters, from objects of
erroneous scientific theorising to, according to some, numbers and abstract
objects. Such objects are ubiquitous in every day talk and many things are
said about them in ordinary contexts. Some of these things are literally true
whilst others literally false. This is the main principle of noneism qua theory
of intentionality, and the next section is about it. This will give us a philo-
sophical framework in which to understand the issue we will take up in two
sections, until the rest of the chapter. The issue, namely, of the ontological
dependency of the non-existent on the existent. Let us, however, come to
that issue after having said something about what is literally true and what
is not about non-existents.
3.3 Literalism and Anti-Literalism
Non-existents are objects, and just like existent objects, they are different
from one another. Just like the Eiffel Tower is not the Colosseum, it may be
3.3. Literalism and Anti-Literalism 111
said, so Holmes is not Cinderella. Non-existents thus appear to be discrim-
inable in terms of their properties. But in what sense do they have properties?
This is the topic of this section. For definiteness, we will restrict our attention
to purely fictional and mythological characters. We will first draw a distinc-
tion between two contexts in which a property is ascribed to a non-existent
of either kind. Then, we will introduce a distinction between two views with
different ideas as to what sorts of properties non-existents have in reality. The
views in question are literalism and anti-literalism, which we will encounter
in this order - noneism, as anticipated in the introduction, has espoused the
latter view. We will then take stock before turning, as promised, to talk about
non-existents qua ontologically dependent objects.
In the previous chapter, we have encountered some examples of proper-
ties of non-existents, and relations we bear to them. To some extent, they
are all pretty straightforward and not too problematic. At least for those
who do not see a problem in saying that reality includes non-existents, it ap-
pears obvious that Holmes is a non-existent who has the property of being a
purely fictional character, or that the Fountain of Youth is a non-existent re-
lated to Ponce De Leon because the latter sought for the former. What these
examples have in common is that they involve properties which are not as-
cribed to non-existents in the stories in which they feature. Rather, they are
ascribed to them in external discourse about those stories. Hereafter, we will
say that properties ascribed to fictional and mythological objects in external
discourse about both fiction and myth are extra-fictionally ascribed to them.
Perhaps we should say that a property ascribed to a mythological object in
external discourse about myth is extra-mythologically ascribed to it, but we
find this terminology quite cumbersome.
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Phenomena of extra-fictional ascriptions of properties need to be con-
trasted with phenomena of intra-fictional ascriptions thereof6. For example,
in his stories Doyle characterised Holmes as being a real (not fictional) detec-
tive and as living at 221b Baker Street: these are examples of intra-fictional
ascriptions. Likewise, according to the legend, the Fountain of Youth would
restore the youth of anyone who would drink from, or bathes in, its waters:
all these are, again, intra-fictional ascriptions7. However, it might not seem
equally obvious that a non-existent could live at 221b Baker Street or have
waters of any sort (magical or otherwise). So do Holmes and the Fountain of
Youth have those properties intra-fictionally ascribed to them?
It seems that in some sense the answer has to be yes; ordinarily, people
say all the time that Sherlock Holmes is a detective, that he lives at 221b
Baker street and so on. Similarly for the Fountain of Youth and other purely
fictional and mythological characters. If such characters lacked the properties
they have in the stories in which they feature, what would we be talking
about when we talk about them? Claims that people ordinarily make about
those characters need somehow to be vindicated. In particular, one way to do
6We have borrowed the terminology from Berto (2012a: 92). Another way in which we
could try to mark the distinction is by distinguishing between intra-fictional and extra-
fictional properties. Berto, however, observes that this choice could reveal problematic be-
cause there may be cases of properties of non-existents which might not be clearly intra-
fictional or clearly extra-fictional. One way to elaborate on this is by imagining a story where
a character is ascribed a logical property such as, say, self-identity. Is this an intra-fictional
or extra-fictional property? There may be also cases where the distinction between proper-
ties intra-fictionally and extra-fictionally ascribed is not as obvious as we would want. For
example, Pelletier (2003) has called attention on the phenomenon which in narratology is
known as metalepsis. This happens, for example, when a real (typically omniscient) narrator
performs an intrusion into the world of the story to ascribe, in the story, certain properties to
the characters. Are these properties intra-fictionally or extra-fictionally ascribed? For more
on metalepsis see Genette (1980).
7Here is Fine (1982: 97) on the matter:
On the one hand, [fictional characters] have certain properties within the con-
texts in which they appear; they love and hate, thrive and fail, and live their
varied lives. On the other hand, they also relate to the real world; they are cre-
ated by authors, read by readers, and compared, for better or worse, with one
another and with what is real.
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so is by maintaining that purely fictional and mythological characters literally
have the properties they have in the stories featuring them, that is, in reality.
This is literalism8.
We need to be careful here pinning down exactly what could possibly
ground literalism. One might think that it is the prima facie plausible princi-
ple that every time we characterise, or represent, an object as having a certain
condition, the object we have characterised does have that condition. This is
the naïve form of what usually goes by the label of characterisation principle.
More precisely, the principle says that if A is any condition, then we can al-
ways characterise an object o as satisfying condition A, and rest assured that
o does satisfy A. However, the troubles that the naïve form of the character-
isation principle generates for literalism are plain to see, and give rise to the
so-called characterisation problem which, in fact, involves two problems. First,
suppose A is F(x)&E!N(x); by applying the characterisation principle to the
condition at hand, an object in reality, say t, is such that it satisfies A. So it is
the case that F(t)&E!N(t), which implies that ∃x(Fx&E!Nx). Thus, we have
a priori proven the existence of Fs in reality and this means that we could
in general obtain an existential proof of any kind of thing - just replace F(x)
with any other condition whatsoever. Even worse, it turns out that any the-
ory presupposing the naïve characterisation principle becomes trivial. For
example, if we apply the characterisation principle to the condition F(x)&B,
we obtain an object, say u, such that F(u)&B, whence B follows in turn. Thus,
the principle allowed us to prove an arbitrary condition. It is therefore clear
that literalism cannot presuppose the characterisation principle in its naïve
form.
However, a number of non-naïve literalist theories have emerged in the
past fifty years in an attempt to tackle the characterisation problem - for an
8The expression is due to Fine (1982: 97).
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overview of which see Berto (2012a: 115-137). Typically, those have restricted
the applicability of the characterisation principle to a certain class of condi-
tions, that is, those exclusively made up of so-called characterising (or nu-
clear, or assumptible) properties of individuals (Parsons (1980), Sylvan (1980),
Jacquette (1996)). Roughly, characterising properties are seen as intrinsic to
the nature of an object; non-characterising properties, by contrast, simply su-
pervene on the characterising properties that an object has9. In particular,
existence is not taken as a characterising property. The restricted version of
the principle now has it that if A is any characterising condition, then we can
always characterise an object o as satisfying condition A, and rest assured
that o does satisfy A. So restricted, the resulting form of the characterisation
principle no longer exposes literalism to the problems highlighted above. Lit-
eralism can now legitimately maintain that, in reality, non-existents do have
all the characterising properties which they are intra-fictionally represented
as having. Holmes, for example, has in reality the characterising property of
being a detective, and the Fountain of Youth that of being a fountain. So this
is how non-naïve literalism vindicates the intuition that purely fictional and
mythological characters have the properties they are intra-fictionally charac-
terised with.
One thing should not go unnoticed. As we just saw, amongst the propo-
nents of literalism just mentioned is Sylvan who, as we know from §3.2.1,
is also the initiator of the noneist programme of logical revision. Priest’s
noneism however, as we will now see, delivers another, quite different story
9For example, Parsons (1980: 22-23), who uses the nuclear/extra-nuclear terminology, pro-
vides the following examples. Nuclear properties: being blue, being tall, being kicked by
Socrates, being golden, being a mountain. He also distinguishes between four kinds of extra-
nuclear properties. (a) Ontological: existence, being fictional, being mythological... (b) Modal:
being possible, being impossible... (c) Intentional: being thought about by Meinong, being
worshipped by someone... (d) Technical: being complete, being inconsistent...
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from Sylvan’s. Thus, in our discussion of noneism qua theory of intentional-
ity hereafter, ‘noneism’ should be understood, unless otherwise specified, as
referring to Priest’s version of the view.
To begin with, Priest (2016b: 83-84) has criticised the distinction between
characterising and non-characterising properties as artificial and lacking any
real motivation other than providing a solution to the characterisation prob-
lem. To account for the intuition that non-existents must have the properties
they are intra-fictionally represented as having, Priest (2016b: 83-85) has pro-
posed another solution to the characterisation problem. This consists not in
restricting the naïve characterisation principle, but rather in qualifying it fur-
ther by resorting to the formal apparatus of worlds10.
The gist of the idea is in order; for absolutely any condition A, when we
characterise an object o as having condition A, we thereby succeed in charac-
terising o as satisfying A - that much, Priest (2016b: 85) contends, is a priori.
Yet, this does not mean that o satisfies A at every world, or in particular that
o actually satisfies A, that is, at the actual world. In fact, this is often not the
case. In his stories, for example, Doyle characterised Sherlock Holmes as be-
ing a detective and as having his domicile at 221b Baker Street. Although,
Priest argues, these are properties of Sherlock Holmes, they are properties
that Holmes does not have at the actual world. What motivates this thought
is a highly plausible, anti-literalist intuition. No detective called ‘Sherlock
Holmes’ has actually ever lived at 221b Baker Street. After all, Holmes is a
non-existent, and how could a non-existent inhabit an existent place such as
221b Baker Street? In fact, how could a non-existent inhabit anything at all?
Pace literalism, only existents seem to be able to inhabit a place. The property
10For a critique of Priest’s solution to the characterisation problem see Kroon (2012), and
Berto and Priest (2014) for a reply. We should note that the noneist solution to the character-
isation problem has also been accepted by theorists, such as Berto (2008, 2011) who, despite
sharing with noneism the same Modal Meinongian framework, describes himself as not being
a noneist (2017: 3742).
116 Chapter 3. Noneism
of inhabiting a place, in other words, appears to be existence entailing, and it
is therefore false to say that a non-existent actually has such a property (more
on this shortly). Analogously for being a detective and the other existence
entailing properties Holmes was intra-fictionally ascribed by Doyle: these
are not properties that Holmes has at the actual world.
At the same time, things surely could have gone otherwise! There are
possible worlds where Victorian London is populated by a (n existent) de-
tective called ‘Sherlock Holmes’ who lives at 221b Baker Street, for example,
the worlds that realise the Doyle Stories. Well, it is at those worlds, though
not at ours, that Holmes has the properties which Doyle intra-fictionally as-
cribed to him11. With a similar world-based solution to the characterisation
problem, Priest (2016b: 85) argues that the characterisation principle can be
accepted in its full generality: absolutely any condition characterises an ob-
ject12. Each of the two parts of the characterisation problem is blocked. First,
an object characterised as satisfying a certain condition may satisfy it only at
worlds other than the actual - we have seen how this happens with Sherlock
Holmes. Thus, the noneist version of the characterisation principle does not
imply that we could a priori establish every condition. Secondly, and accord-
ingly, the noneist version of the characterisation principle does not imply that
we could a priori prove the existence in reality of arbitrary kinds of things.
11This is one aspect over which a Modal Meinongian such as Berto differs from Priest. In
Berto and Priest (2014), it is reported (p. 186) that Berto, though not Priest, takes Holmes
as not existing at any possible world, a view which we think seems to follow somewhat
naturally from his discussions in Berto (2011, 2012b).
12Even inconsistent conditions do so, given that Priest’s semantics for noneism allows
for impossible worlds. For example, we could characterise an object i as having condition
x ∕= x&A. Given the characterisation principle, the theory would entail that i does satisfy
the condition, but the worlds where it does so can only be impossible. See Priest (2016b:
15-18).
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The plausible story delivered by noneism is, in sum, this: in reality, non-
existents can only have properties which are not existence entailing. Con-
sequently, they typically do not literally have in reality the properties intra-
fictionally ascribed to them; they have such properties at worlds other than
the actual. This is how noneism vindicates the intuition that purely fictional
and mythological characters have the properties they are intra-fictionally
characterised with.
At this point, one may wonder how we can distinguish existence entail-
ing from not existence entailing properties, but noneism is not committed to
any particular answer to this question. As Priest (2016b: 246) put it ‘Com-
mon sense can, for the most part, determine which properties are existence-
entailing; and where common sense provides no verdict on the matter [...]
other theoretical considerations will have to determine it’. And this view, we
add, seems quite commonsensical. Being purely fictional and being mytho-
logical, for example, do not appear to be existence entailing. Same for being
sought for by Ponce De Leon, or being thought about by Doyle, or being fa-
mous - notice that these properties are all normally extra-fictionally ascribed
to non-existents. Being blue, by contrast, or being tall, appear to be clear
examples of existence entailing properties, for they require spatiotemporal
collocation, which non-existents lack. Similarly, being scary, being kind, or
being noisy are existence entailing, for they presuppose causal efficacious-
ness, which non-existents cannot have.
As a final comment, one aspect of the account that should not be over-
looked is that it crucially relies on intentional operators. These, as we men-
tioned in §2.2.2, are elements of the logical vocabulary required to formalise
intentional verbs introducing a de dicto intentional state, the content of which
is a proposition. And indeed, when an agent characterises an object as being
such and such (in a story, fiction, and so on), she thereby represents a certain
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proposition as holding in the matter at hand. The intentional verb represents
here introduces a de dicto intentional state of the agent, the content of which
is the proposition she represents as holding (in the matter at hand). In char-
acterising Holmes as being a detective, for example, Doyle represented the
proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Holmes is a detective’ as holding in
his stories. To model acts of characterisation of an object, then, we need an
intentional operator, call it Ψ, formalising the intentional construct ‘... rep-
resents... as holding (in the matter at hand)’. Although, as we said, inten-
tional operators will play no role in our discussion, let us quickly see for
completeness their functioning on Priest’s account. First, if t is any term, A
any formula, and Φ any intentional operator, tΦA is a formula, reading ‘t Φs
A’. Priest’s noneist semantics is couched in a constant domain S5 framework,
supplemented with a K accessibility relation governing the functioning of in-
tentional operators, defined as follows: for any term t and operator Φ, RtΦ is
a binary relation on the set W of worlds. Thus if w, w′ are in W, RtΦww
′ holds
just in case at w′ things are how t Φs them to be at w. Thus in particular, if
Φ is Ψ, then w′ is a world realising the facts t represented as holding (in the
matter at hand)13.
Since we are about to turn to other matters, we can take stock. In this sec-
tion, we have talked about noneism qua theory of intentionality. We have first
of all seen that purely fictional and mythological characters can be ascribed
properties in two different contexts: in internal fictional discourse and in ex-
ternal fictional discourse. Then, we have seen what distinguishes noneism
from literalist accounts of non-existents. Literalism maintains that purely fic-
tional and mythological characters have, in reality, the properties they have
13One might want to impose certain conditions on some operators. Thus for example, if
Φ formalises the intentional construct ‘...represents... as holding in a fiction’, then one might
want to stipulate that the world at which the agent Φs is not amongst those realising her
representation: ¬RtΦww.
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intra-fictionally. Noneism, by contrast, maintains that this is typically not the
case. For, those properties are typically existence entailing, and non-existents
cannot have in reality similar properties.
The next two sections are dedicated to an issue closely related to our dis-
cussion so far. We have said that purely fictional and mythological charac-
ters feature in stories, in which they are characterised in certain ways. Stories
however, be they fiction or myth, are human creations. They are the product
of certain activities of cognitive agents. Thus, one view that one may take at
this point is that those non-existents and their properties simply supervene
on the activities of existent objects. In taking a similar view, one is thereby
advocating some form of ontological dependency of the non-existent on the
existent. In the next section, we will illustrate an account of non-existents as
ontologically dependent entities recently proposed by Crane (2016). This ac-
count, as we will see, is based on the idea that all properties of non-existents
(with one notable exception) are grounded in particular on our representa-
tional activities. We will argue that a similar idea is problematic and should
be resisted. Then, in two sections, we will see how the issue of the ontologi-
cal dependency of the non-existent on the existent gives rise to a distinction
within noneism, between realist and anti-realist forms of the view. Before
coming to this distinction, however, let us turn to Crane’s account first.
3.4 Crane
Crane (2016: 68-69) characterises non-existents as having only three kinds of
properties: logical properties such as self-identity, representation-dependent
properties14 and non-existence15.
14For the origin of the idea of representation-dependent properties see McGinn (2002).
15Crane (2016: 66) draws a more general distinction between substantial and pleonas-
tic properties, and characterises all properties of non-existents as pleonastic. Substantial
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We do not have much to say about self-identity and other logical prop-
erties, except that we agree with Crane on the matter: non-existents have
indeed such properties. As concerns representation-dependent properties,
Crane characterises them as ‘properties which depend upon the fact that
the object is being represented in some way: in thought, language, pictures,
and so on’ (2016: 68). Thus for example, Holmes has the representation-
dependent property of being a detective, because there is some fiction where
he is represented as being a detective. And pegasus has the representation-
dependent property of being a horse, given that there is some myth where
it is represented as a horse. Restricting our attention only to fictional and
mythological characters, Crane’s point might be at first sight read as say-
ing that all the properties intra-fictionally ascribed to those non-existents are
grounded on the representational activity of cognitive agents. However,
putting things in this way would not exactly capture what Crane has in mind.
For, he then goes on to subsume under the category of representation-dependent
all properties of non-existents, except for their logical properties and non-
existence - “[a]ll properties of non-existents are representation-dependent,
with the exception of the property of non-existence itself” (2016: 68)16. And
since these include extra-fictionally ascribed properties, Crane seems to con-
sider them representation-dependent as well - this, as we will see, will turn
out to be problematic.
Non-existence is seen as another property of non-existents, although not
properties are described as “characteriz[ing] the nature of real existing things” (2016: 66),
whereas pleonastic properties ‘are properties that straightforwardly follow from the truth
about something, without any further metaphysical assumptions’ (2016: 68). We have not
found this distinction immediately obvious, but in any case it is not important fo our goal
to comment on it. We can restrict our attention to the three more specific kinds of properties
which Crane takes non-existents to have.
16Crane does not mention logical properties here, but we take it that he would not think
of them as representation-dependent.
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a representation-dependent one. Why is non-existence not a representation-
dependent property of non-existents? Because, Crane argues, its being en-
joyed by non-existents is grounded not on our cognitive activity, but on very
worldly facts, namely, that non-existents are nowhere to be found in the
realm of existing things. As Crane puts it, “Fix the facts about everything
in the world, and you have fixed the truth of the negative existentials” (2016:
75)17. Existent things, in other words, are the real truth-makers of negative
existentials.
Now, the moral we can draw from Crane’s account is that non-existents
are dependent on us existents for all the properties they have, both intra and
extra-fictionally. At least as far as extra-fictionally ascribed properties are
concerned, we find this thought quite plausible. For example, the property
of being a purely fictional character can be truthfully ascribed to Holmes in
external fictional discourse, and Holmes seems to be very much dependent
for this property of his on the literary activity of Doyle - this issue will come
up again in the next section. However, we have seen that Crane also claims
that non-existents are dependent for their properties on our representational
activities in particular. And here, as far as extra-fictionally ascribed proper-
ties are concerned, we are generally in disagreement with Crane.
A similar point to the one we want to make was also made by Priest
(2016b: 277), who argued that Crane’s account appears to break down in
certain contexts, such as the following one. This case is interesting in that
Priest and Crane gave different interpretations of it. Take the case of Vul-
can, a planet (now considered non-existent) which was postulated in 1859
by astronomer Urbain Le Verrier to explain the perturbations in the orbit
of Mercury. Then, consider the sentence ‘Vulcan was postulated by Le Ver-
rier in 1859’. Crane (2016: 134) took the sentence as illustrative of the idea
17See Priest (2016b: 277) for criticism of Crane on this issue.
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that Vulcan has the representation-dependent property of being postulated
by Le Verrier in 1859. Priest (2016b: 277-278) dissented: “[the property of
being postulated by Le Verrier in 1859] does not appear to be representation-
dependent”.
We agree with Priest. For, Crane here seems to be overlooking a dis-
tinction between two different property ascriptions to Vulcan. First of all,
Crane (2016: 135) takes the property of being postulated by someone as
representation-dependent “for obvious reasons: to postulate something is to
say or claim that it exists, and this is a way of representing that thing”. Crane
is quite right: to postulate something is indeed to say that it exists. And
indeed, Le Verrier postulated Vulcan because he ascribed to Vulcan, inside
the Vulcan theory, the property of being an existent (among others). Because
Le Verrier made this property ascription, however, one can infer a further
property of Vulcan, which can be ascribed to it in external discourse about
the Vulcan theory: the property of being postulated by Le Verrier. Inside the
Vulcan theory, to be sure, Le Verrier did not ascribe to Vulcan the property
of being postulated by Le Verrier. Now, even granted that the properties Le
Verrier ascribed to Vulcan inside the Vulcan theory are dependent upon his
representational activity, the property of being postulated by Le Verrier is
certainly not. In fact, that Vulcan has the property of being postulated by
Le Verrier does not seem to be dependent on the representational activities
of anyone whatsoever. The fact that Vulcan was postulated by Le Verrier ap-
pears to be very much grounded on Le Verrier’s actions, that is, his putting
together the Vulcan theory and claiming there that Vulcan existed.
Here is an even clearer example to illustrate the same point. Consider the
extra-fictional ascription ‘Ponce De Leon sought for the Fountain of Youth’.
Here, it seems that Crane will have to say that the Fountain of Youth has the
representation-dependent property of being sought for by Ponce De Leon.
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However, the truth of the ascription appears to have little to do with the
representational activity of Ponce De Leon or, for that matter, anyone else.
The reason why ‘Ponce De Leon sought for the Fountain of Youth’ expresses
a truth seems to be dependent on the actions that Ponce performed, not on
someone representing the Fountain of Youth as being sought for by him.
Notice that these are not isolated cases. Here are other relevant examples
of extra-fictional ascriptions, involving relations. Consider ‘John has heard of
Harry Potter’, or ‘Homer worshipped Zeus’, or ‘Mark ignores the characters
of Norse mythology’. Hearing of, worshipping and ignoring do not seem to
be representation-dependent relations in any obvious sense. And the point
extends to extra-fictional ascriptions of monadic properties too. Consider
‘Harry Potter is the most famous fictional character of our days’; again, it
is not obvious to see how an appeal to our representational activities could
contribute to explain the truth of this sentence.
Thus, in this section we have seen how the ontological dependency of the
non-existent on the existent is interpreted on Crane’s account. Crane takes
non-existents as dependent, for all their properties except non-existence, on
our representational activities. And this, as we have seen, turns out to be
quite problematic. Our representational activities alone cannot account for ev-
ery property of non-existents. So, if this was the end of the story, the alleged
ontological dependency of the non-existent on the existent, despite perhaps
some initial plausibility, would not be a particularly convincing thesis. Much
more, however, remains to be said.
To shed some light on the issue, we should look for cases where mat-
ters appear sufficiently clear. To this end, we can consider the case of purely
fictional characters. For, we said at the end of §3.3 that purely fictional char-
acters feature in stories, which we described as human creations. It would
thus seem natural, at this point, to extend considerations about creation to
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purely fictional characters themselves. After all, claims to the extent that,
say, ‘Doyle created Holmes’ are commonplace in usual parlance about fic-
tion. And creation, in some informal sense to be made precise, would seem
to be an adequate notion to express the ontological dependency under con-
sideration here. Thus, if theoretical inquiry eventually found our every day
claims true, we would have certainly gained some insight into whether the
non-existent ontologically depends on the existent. This question takes us
directly to the distinction between realist and anti-realist noneism, which we
mentioned at the end of §3.3. Whether purely fictional characters are created
(in some sense to be explained) is precisely what is disputed by the parties
to this distinction - the realist, as imaginable, being the nay sayer18. The next
section has two goals. We will start by illustrating the disagreement between
the parties. Then, we will remove some possible advantage which the anti-
realist might be thought of as having over the realist. After this section, we
will eventually turn to sum up what in this chapter has been claimed.
3.5 Realism and Anti-Realism
This section is divided into two parts. The next sub-section illustrates the
realist/anti-realist divide within noneism. Here we will get a better grip as
to what is exactly at stake in discussing the creation of a purely fictional char-
acter, and clarify the parties’ views on the matter. Prima facie, we said, it is
the anti-realist who has a better claim to plausibility, due to her conforming
to standard intuitions. In §3.5.2, however, we will show that many of those
intuitions can be vindicated also in a realist framework such as that of the sys-
tem N R by expanding its semantics in an obvious way - we will explain why
18Priest (2016b: 211-215) for example is a nay sayer, a realist - although see (2016b: 263-
267) for his discussion of how an anti-realist account can be formally developed. Forms of
anti-realism can be found in Berto (2012b, 2012a).
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this framework is realist in due course. And, we will argue, talk of creation is
not a prerogative of the anti-realist either. There is a non-metaphorical inter-
pretation of the creation of purely fictional characters available to the realist,
on which their actual individuation is conferred to them by the actions of au-
thors of fiction. Before coming to these issues, however, let us look in more
detail at the distinction between realism and anti-realism.
3.5.1 Creation and Baptism
Realism and anti-realism, we said, appear to disagree as to whether the lit-
erary activities of authors of fictional stories create the characters referred
to in those stories: the realist denies the proposition, the anti-realist accepts
it. In the context at hand, ‘creation’ seems to have to do with certain acts
performed by authors, which bring purely fictional characters into... what
exactly? Let us leave aside this question for just one paragraph, and then
resume it immediately afterwards. For the time being, let us simply say that
one way in which the creation of a fictional character could be understood
is as an act of some kind performed by an author of a fictional story. Of all
the possible acts we might consider, the one described in the next paragraph
appears to be the most plausible candidate for an act of creation.
When a purely fictional character is introduced in a story, it is introduced
with the name an author has chosen for it. In the Holmes stories, Holmes is
introduced and presented as ‘Holmes’, and that is the name Doyle chose for
him. However, Doyle could not have introduced Holmes in a story, had Doyle
not also been the one who performed the act with which, for the first time,
someone referred to Holmes with the intention of imposing a name on him.
An act of this sort, where someone is called for the first time and attributed
a name, is usually known as baptism. Doyle, accordingly, is responsible for
126 Chapter 3. Noneism
Holmes’ baptism19. If there is an act with which Doyle created Holmes, his
baptism would certainly seem to be the one. So let us now resume the ques-
tion we had left in the first paragraph.
What did Doyle bring Holmes into when he created him on his baptism?
We can draw an analogy with a perhaps less obscure process of creation, the
creation of an artistic painting. One cannot create a painting, it seems, unless
one does things, such as putting paint on canvas, which bring the painting
into existence. If that is what creating something means, that is, bringing
it into existence, then it seems that Doyle certainly did not create Holmes
when he baptised him, given that Doyle could not have brought Holmes into
existence (Holmes does not exist).
This may give the realist some advantage over the anti-realist. Insofar as
creation has such an existential import, common sense notwithstanding, the
baptism of a fictional character cannot be an act of creation. However, that
creation, particularly artistic creation, carries such an ontological bearing has
been disputed. For instance, Deutsch (1991: 211) argues that “the concept of
artistic creation is not even approximated by the crude ontological notion of
bringing things into existence”. The point is also echoed by Berto (2012a) as
he notes that
the process of putting paint on a background, thereby creating
painted canvas, can have little to do with the creativity involved
in creating an artistic painting, that is, in the creation of an art-
work (2012a: 223).
19If some version of the causal theory of names is correct (see Kripke (1980)), we have
picked up the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ from some speaker who used it with the intention to
refer to the object baptised by Doyle, who in turn picked it up from another speaker who
used it with the same intention, and so on. We have, in other words, a causal chain, starting
with Doyle’s baptism of Holmes, which continued through time thanks to many speakers
before us who have used ‘Sherlock Holmes’ with the intention to refer to the object of Doyle’s
baptism.
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Berto and Deutsch suggest that phenomena of artistic creation are too
complex to be fully captured by the notion of bringing something into exis-
tence20. There seems to be something to at least some forms of artistic cre-
ation, in other words, which is left out if we equate creating and bringing
into existence. And indeed, Berto goes on to say, echoing Deutsch again,
that in good dictionaries one does not merely find ‘bringing into existence’
as the only meaning for ‘creating’; rather, one also finds “another definition,
in which to create is to invent via (or in) one’s imagination” (2012a: 223). If
inventing something through one’s imagination is a form of creation, it cer-
tainly does not appear to be an existentially loaded form thereof. Moreover,
this non-existentially loaded form of creation appears to be importantly rele-
vant for our discussion. Indeed, that purely fictional characters are made up
by the imagination of the authors who invented them seems to be precisely
what common sense intuitions about purely fictional characters amount to.
The anti-realist now appears to have overturned the disadvantage she
had over the realist. For, equipped with this new non-existentially loaded ac-
count of artistic creation, entitling her to speak of purely fictional characters
as created by authors of fiction, she can now vindicate ordinary intuitions.
The question for the anti-realist then becomes: what does an author exactly
do to a character when she baptises it?
The answer is: she makes available a new object in the domain of quan-
tification (viz. out of nothing) and attributes a name to it. It is only thanks to
its baptism by an agent that the object came to inhabit the domain of quan-
tification; prior to its baptism, it was simply nothing at all. Thus, for example,
before Doyle baptised Holmes, Holmes was nothing at all or, counterfactually,
had Doyle never baptised Holmes, Holmes would not have been anything at
all.
20A somewhat similar view is also defended by Fine (1982: 131).
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Anti-realist noneism clearly articulates a view of purely fictional charac-
ters as ontologically dependent on the artistic activities of their authors: the
non-existent, it may be said, ontologically supervenes on the existent. The
view is formulated in a variable domain semantics, in which the domain of
the quantifiers is allowed to vary across worlds. This way, what fictional
characters are included in the domain of quantification of a given world can
be made dependent on what exists therein21. Priest (2016b: 264-267) has
presented two ways in which a semantics for anti-realist noneism could be
developed, based on neutral and negative free logic22 - the key features of
which we had encountered in §2.3, and we will find again in the next sub-
section.
How about our realist? We left her a few paragraphs ago having lost
her advantage over the anti-realist, when the latter introduced the new non-
existentially loaded notion of creation. So what happens, according to her,
when an author baptises a character? The account of baptism of a purely
fictional character, on this view, is admittedly very different.
According to realist noneism, when an author baptises a fictional charac-
ter, she attributes a name to an object which she selected, not made available out
of nothing, from a set of pre-available non-existents. The selection of a charac-
ter, in particular, is achieved by an act of so-called mental pointing, which dif-
fers from an act of physical pointing only in that it is carried out mentally23.
And the object thus selected already had the properties the author wanted it
to have in her stories, at the worlds that realise them24. We could express the
21For how this could be formally achieved see Priest (2016b: 267).
22See also Berto (2011) for an anti-realist semantics.
23Priest (2016b: 142) calls the mental act through which a non-existent is thus selected an
act of primitive intentionality. For discussion see Priest (2016b: 140-144).
24Commentators such as Hale (2007, 2017), have raised concerns to the extent that the act
of baptising an object with a name would seem to require some form of causal interaction
with the object baptised. But if the object is a non-existent this cannot be, given that causation
is an existence-entailing relation. However, see Priest (2016b: 141-13; 208-211) for arguments
against the view that causation is generally involved in the act of naming an object.
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point of realist noneism, again, both in temporal and counterfactual terms,
using Doyle as an example. Temporally, we could say that prior to Holmes’
baptism by Doyle, Holmes was already something. Counterfactually, had
Doyle never baptised Holmes, Holmes would have still been something. Re-
alist noneism, accordingly, delivers an account of purely fictional characters
as ontologically independent from the artistic activities of their authors.
One potential problem for such a realist account of purely fictional char-
acters is that when an author imagines a character for her stories as having
such and such features, far too many objects always seem to have the fea-
tures in question. In virtue of what, then, does an author select one object
in this immense crowd? For example, when Doyle had to select Holmes for
baptism, he must have imagined an object with some properties: a detective,
having great powers of deduction, living at 221b Baker Street, and so on.
Then, think of how many non-existents matching this description he could
have picked from. One of them for instance was right-handed, another one
left-handed, and yet another one ambidextrous; one of them loved snails,
another one found them revolting; one of them fluently spoke latin, another
one only knew a few words of it; one of them weighed 80 kg, one of them
was three grams lighter. As far as we know, in his stories Doyle did not say
anything as to whether Holmes had any of the properties just mentioned;
nor does there seem to be anything in the Holmes stories allowing us to in-
fer anything about these matters. As far as the description Doyle gave of
Holmes in his stories is concerned, these objects are exactly alike. So an ex-
planation is needed as to how Doyle could select an object from a bunch of
objects between which there is simply nothing to select. This is part of what
Sainsbury (2009: 58) calls the Selection Problem25. According to Priest (2016b:
25The issue is discussed at length in Berto (2012a: 207-228). Another important aspect in-
volved in the Selection Problem is this. More often than not, authors do not have determined
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211-215), the problem is solved by noticing that mental pointing is arbitrary.
Once the class of non-existents satisfying the properties an author wants her
character to have is singled out, mental pointing randomly selects a member
of this class.
Priest (2016b: 264) describes the modal semantics of noneism referred to
earlier in §3.3 as being underpinned by realist assumptions. Being formu-
lated in constant domain, what fictional characters are included in the do-
main of quantification is not a fact dependent on what exists at a given world.
The resulting picture is one where the non-existent does not ontologically su-
pervene on the existent.
This last remark concludes our presentation of the distinction between
realist and anti-realist noneism. We have summed up their main differences,
as understood in this sub-section, in Table 3.2 below.
Purely Fictional Characters Are... Realism Anti-Realism
... Created on their baptism No Yes
... Ontologically independent Yes No
... Already available before baptism Yes No
TABLE 3.2: Differences between Realist and Anti-Realist
Noneism
So where are we at now? It is the anti-realist who appears to be in a better
position, being capable of accounting for ordinary intuitions about purely
fictional characters. On one account, creating was understood as bringing
something into existence; since however purely fictional characters are not
brought into existence, the anti-realist was left with the task of making her
position coherent. This was accomplished with a non-existentially loaded
all the properties of their characters before writing a story. Rather, their characterisation ap-
pears to be an incremental process, where features and details are added as the story unfolds.
But then, how can the realist ensure that an author added those features and details to the
right object? See Priest (2016b: 211-212) and Berto et al. (2020: 5-9) for discussion of this
issue.
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account of creation, with which the anti-realist could explain the baptism of
a purely fictional character as an act through which a new object is made
available ex nihilo in the domain of quantification. The realist, by contrast,
in rejecting the view that purely fictional characters are brought ex nihilo into
the domain of quantification, accounts for their baptism as an act of mental
selection. Of the two, the realist picture appears to be more distant from the
ordinary person’s judgement, and one may think that the anti-realist has a
better claim to plausibility than the realist.
This is important for our discussion, given that, as we said at the begin-
ning of this section, the system N R, our preferred logic, is naturally thought
of as being underpinned by realist assumptions - we will say why shortly.
Thus, one could argue, N R may not be as adequate a logic as we had first
supposed.
It seems that the only thing left to do is to find out whether N R can with-
stand the pressure posed by anti-realist noneism. To do so, we should single
the non-modal system that anti-realist noneism presupposes, to see whether
the latter is capable of more correct predictions than N R. As we previously
noted, and as we will see more precisely in the next sub-section, anti-realist
noneism requires some form of free logic (neutral or negative). We will
for definiteness consider the negative free logic-based version of anti-realist
noneism - Priest (2016b: 266), in any case, notes that there are reasons to pre-
fer this form of anti-realist noneism.
As we will see in the next sub-section, even granted that anti-realist noneism
may have a better claim to plausibility as a modal theory, the non-modal
system it requires does not appear to make correct predictions which N R
cannot make. In fact, the intuitions that anti-realist noneism imported from
common sense can be suitably re-interpreted in realist terms and formally
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implemented in N R. In particular, as anticipated at the beginning of this sec-
tion, a non-metaphorical talk of creation of a purely fictional character will
turn out to be available to the realist. These matters we take up in the next
sub-section, to which we now turn.
3.5.2 Common Sense Realism
What follows is the plan for this sub-section. We will start by explaining why
N R is more naturally thought of as implementing realist assumptions. Sub-
sequently, we will illustrate the modal semantics of (the negative free logic-
based form of) anti-realist noneism, in order to single out the non-modal sys-
tem it is based upon. This, as we will see, is an immediate variant of the
system P , modified in the most obvious way to express the anti-realist ac-
count of ontological dependency of the non-existent on the existent. After
that, we will isolate which elements of the anti-realist semantics reflect our
ordinary views on fictional characters, and argue that they can be suitably
re-interpreted philosophically in realist terms. Finally, we will conclude by
showing how to expand the semantics of N R in accordance with such or-
dinary views. After that, we will conclude and sum up the content of the
present chapter.
The system N R, we said, encourages a realist interpretation. But as we
have seen, realist and anti-realist noneism are formulated in modal settings.
So in what sense is a non-modal system like N R built on realist assumptions?
Simply, in the sense that realist noneism is formulated in a constant domain
semantics, and every term, in a similar framework, always refers inside the
(unique) domain of quantification. Similarly in N R; every term we care to
consider picks out an object in the domain of quantification. Suppose h is
Holmes and we wanted to evaluate h = h in a context where Doyle still
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has to come into existence. In a similar context, ν(h) refers to Holmes, even
though Doyle does not exist yet. And h = h, in a similar context, is evaluated
as true. The clearest interpretation of N R is indeed in realist terms26.
By contrast, the form of anti-realist noneism under consideration here, as
we noticed in the previous sub-section, is formulated in a variable domain
setting, based on negative free logic. This means that (a) the domain of quan-
tification is relativised to worlds, and (b) terms may refer outside the domain
of quantification of a given world. Whether or not they do refer outside the
domain of a world, depends on the actions of the existents at that world. At
a world w where Doyle has not created Holmes, for example, ‘Holmes’ will
refer outside the domain of w. And when terms refer outside the domain of
a world, any atomic formula in which they occur is automatically evaluated
as false at that world. Suppose that h = h is evaluated at the actual world (@)
at a time where Doyle has not yet created Holmes. In that context, h refers
outside the domain of @, and h = h is evaluated as false at @.
The non-modal system which the semantics just illustrated is based upon,
call it N N, is a system of negative free logic, a model MNN = 〈DO, D, ν〉 for
which is a structure where: DO, the outer domain, is a non-empty set; D, the
inner domain, is a subset of DO; and ν is a total valuation function defined as
usual. Just like in P , D is the domain of the quantifiers. This time however,
the stipulation about the ‘exists’ predicate E!N∗ is that it singles out a subset
of the inner domain, ν(E!N
∗
) ⊆ D. Satisfaction relative to a model N N and
a variable assignment g based on N N is defined as per P except for atomics
and the ‘exists’ predicate:
NN1 MNN , g ⊨NN ξn(t1, . . . tn) iff 〈νg(t1), . . . , νg(tn)〉 ∈ ν(ξ) and for every
1 ≤ i ≤ n, νg(ti) ∈ D.
26Notice, also, that the non-modal fragment of the realist semantics is exactly analogous
to the semantics for N R. See (2016b: 11-12; 31-32).
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NN10 MN N , g ⊨N N E!N
∗
t iff νg(t) ∈ ν(E!N∗).
The definition of satisfaction for atomics now entails that any formula
including occurrences of terms referring outside the inner domain is auto-
matically evaluated as false. Informally, we can think of the inner domain as
the domain of objects of reality (existent or otherwise). Outside this domain
are the objects which have not been made available for quantification.
Now, the anti-realist semantics is reflecting two ordinary intuitions about
purely fictional characters, which is important to keep distinct. The first is the
intuition that purely fictional characters are created by the actions of existent
objects: this is represented in the semantics by the fact that, for example, at
any time before Doyle created Holmes, ‘Holmes’ refers to nothing in the in-
ner domain. The second intuition that the semantics vindicates is that purely
fictional characters are individuated by the actions of existent objects: this
is shown by the fact that any atomic formula containing ‘Holmes’ is false if
Doyle has yet to create Holmes. This means that purely fictional characters
are what they are in terms of their properties (that is, objects distinct from
other objects), thanks to the actions that make them available for quantifica-
tion.
Let us see what sense can a realist make about those intuitions. First, con-
sider the intuition about the individuation of a purely fictional character. As
we saw in the previous sub-section, a realist maintains that purely fictional
characters are ontologically independent from the actions of authors of fic-
tion. In particular, on the realist account, when an author mentally selects a
fictional character for baptism, the character is picked out as already having
the properties the author wanted it to have in her stories, at the worlds that
realise them. Thus, at the worlds realising the stories in which they feature,
purely fictional characters are not individuated by the actions performed by
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authors of fiction.
However, the realist is perfectly entitled to maintain that purely fictional
characters are individuated in reality by the actions of authors of fiction. That
is, the realist is entitled to maintain, for example, that at any world being
just like the actual one except that Doyle has not baptised and written stories
about Holmes, Holmes has no properties therein other than logical proper-
ties, such as self-identity. Holmes, according to this picture, acquired his
non-logical properties, such as that of being purely fictional, only thanks to
Doyle’s actions. From this point of view, although Doyle’s actions do not
make available for quantification a new object tout court, they nonetheless
make available a new object in the domain of individuated objects. And although
this is not a form of creation ex nihilo in the sense of the anti-realist, it is still a
form of non-metaphorical creation, which results in the expansion of a sub-
domain of the domain of the actual world.
The picture we are describing, to be more precise, is one where the non-
existent bifurcates into two categories: the category of individuated and that
of non-individuated objects. At the actual world, the former category in-
cludes, for example, Holmes, Frodo and Gandalf. But Holmes, Frodo and
Gandalf are non-individuated at any world in which Doyle and Tolkien are
non-existent; for, at any such world, these characters have not been individ-
uated by the actions of their authors. As such, at those worlds, they only
have logical properties. The realist, by appealing to this distinction, can ac-
count for ordinary intuitions about the creation of purely fictional charac-
ters in terms of the transition of a non-existent from the category of non-
individuated objects to the category of individuated ones.
Moreover, the fact that non-individuated objects only have logical prop-
erties implies that every atomic formula containing terms referring to them
is automatically evaluated as false - just as anti-realist noneism treats as false
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any atomic including occurrences of terms referring outside the inner do-
main. Thus, before Doyle created Holmes, for some suitable sense of ‘cre-
ated’, Holmes was a non-individuated object, and accordingly any formula
containing ‘Holmes’ gets evaluated as false. The difference with anti-realist
noneism concerns is self-identity: this is a logical property which non-individuated
objects have, and so t = t is always true; for the anti-realist, by contrast, if t
denotes outside the inner domain, then t = t is false.
We now expand the semantics for N R to accommodate the distinction
between individuated and non-individuated non-existents. A model is now
a triple M = 〈D, ν, N〉 where: D and ν are as per N R and N is subset of
D, the set of non-individuated objects. N can be defined as the set of all the
things which are self-identical but lack every other property. Formally, for
every n-place relation Rn and n-tuple 〈t1, ...tn〉,
N = {x : x = x & If ⊨ R(t1, ...tn), then x /∈ 〈t1, ...tn〉}.
That is, N is the set of the x which are self-identical but lack every other
property.
Satisfaction relative to a model and variable assignment g based on that
model is defined as usual. The only difference concerns the definition of
satisfaction for atomics, given below
M, g ⊨NN ξn(t1, . . . tn) iff 〈νg(t1), . . . , νg(tn)〉 ∈ ν(ξ) and for every 1 ≤
i ≤ n, νg(ti) /∈ N.
Equipped with the semantics just presented, the realist will be able to ac-
commodate talk of creation of purely fictional characters, understood as the
transition from the set of non-individuated objects to the set of individuated
ones. This is important, in that talk of creation was thought to be exclusive
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to the anti-realist. Admittedly, there appears to be a formally coherent and
non-metaphorical sense of creation available to the realist as well.
Before summing up the content of this chapter, let us take stock of what
has been claimed in this last section. We started in the last sub-section by il-
lustrating the distinction between realist and anti-realist noneism, which we
characterised as a distinction over the issue of the ontological dependency
of purely fictional characters on the actions of authors of fiction. After pre-
senting both views, we observed that the anti-realist had an initial advantage
over the realist, due to her being able to vindicate talk of creation of purely
fictional characters. This section showed that the advantage was merely il-
lusory. The realist can accommodate data from our ordinary judgements on
purely fictional characters, and can do so with the best logic we have at dis-
posal to account for the data of de re intentionality.
3.6 Conclusion
Noneism has been the protagonist of this chapter, both qua programme of
logical revision and qua theory of intentionality. The first part of this chap-
ter was concerned with the first sense of noneism. We started in §3.2.1 by
introducing its logical revisionism, which is characterised by a rejection of
the Quinean parsing theory, and an interpretation of quantification in exis-
tentially neutral terms. We thus went on to present linguistic evidence for
the non-Quinean parsing theory of noneism (§3.2.2). We then presented, in
§3.2.3, the system N R, which incorporated the tenets of the revisionary pro-
gramme of noneism. In 3.2.4, we considered and motivated four criteria for
logical theory choice: adequacy to the data, expressive power, adherence to
the Maxim of Minimal Mutilation and conceptual simplicity. We then as-
sessed how well each of the systems P and N R performed with respect to
those criteria, and finally argued from anti-exceptionalist grounds that the
logic that is most rational to accept is N R; it is our best logic.
The second part of this chapter was concerned with noneism qua theory
of intentionality. In particular, our interest in this part was in the issue of the
ontological dependency of the non-existent on the existent. We thus started
in §3.3 by presenting the distinction between literalism and anti-literalism
about the properties of non-existents. Then, we moved on in §3.4 to present,
and criticise, an account by Crane (2016) on which almost the entirety of the
properties of non-existents are considered as grounded on the representa-
tional activities of cognitive agents. Such an account, we argued, should be
resisted: our representational activities alone cannot account for every prop-
erty of non-existents.
Finally, in §3.5 we looked at how issues of ontological dependency of the
non-existent on the existent are framed within noneism. We distinguished in
§3.5.1 between realist and anti-realist versions of noneism and illustrated the
different interpretations they give to the baptism of a purely fictional charac-
ter. The anti-realist, we noted there, could be thought as having a better claim
to plausibility, being the only one properly entitled to speak about purely fic-
tional characters as created by cognitive agents, thereby vindicating ordinary
beliefs on the matter. This was important for our discussion, in that N R, our
preferred logic, invites a realist reading. Theoretical scrutiny, however, al-
lowed us to restore (at the very least) parity between the two accounts. Talk
of creation of a purely fictional character, we showed, is possible even within
a realist framework such as that of N R, provided it is interpreted as the tran-
sition of a non-individuated non-existent into an individuated one. If this
was the pressure that anti-realist noneism was putting on the adequacy of




From Collapse Theorems to
Proof-Theoretic Arguments
4.1 Introduction
The present chapter and the next one, together, constitute the second part of
this work. So far, we have argued that C on the Quinean parsing theory li-
censes an account of reasoning inadequate to the data of de re intentionality,
and ought to be revised. Along our way, we have encountered two revision-
ary programmes, and eventually argued from anti-exceptionalist grounds
that our theory choice is more rationally exercised by relying upon the noneist
system N R.
Our dissatisfaction with C on the Quinean parsing theory was mainly
grounded on its taking as valid principles with admittedly invalid substi-
tution instances. Two chapters ago, we considered four of them; specifically,
those which we labelled EP, LNE, GEP and NGEP. Relying on these princi-
ples in intentional contexts, as we have seen, will often lead one astray.
A natural thing to say at this point is that a noneist and a proponent of
C on the Quinean parsing theory are in disagreement about the validity of
the principles in question, that much seems hard to deny. Following a piece
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of jargon in use at least since Lewis (1990), we will hereafter call allist a pro-
ponent of C on the Quinean parsing theory. Although, we said, a noneist
and an allist appear to be in disagreement about the validity of the principles
referred to a few lines above, not everyone would accept the reality of their
disagreement. Some, such as Williamson (1988), have implied that it turns
on an equivocation. The allist and the noneist would be merely talking past
each other.
The equivocation in question, according to Williamson, concerns the word
‘exist’, which would mean one thing in the mouth of the allist, and another
one in the mouth of the noneist. The reason he adduces for this striking claim
has to do specifically with one of the four principles we discussed two chap-
ters ago, EP. Two theorists disagreeing over its validity, Williamson contends,
do not seem able to define ‘exists’ as the only monadic predicate up to logical
equivalence obeying a certain set of rules of inference. And this, Williamson
contends, is probably due to an equivocation about the meaning of ‘exists’.
We will call proof-theoretic this style of argument, where the impossibility for
two logicians to characterise up to logical equivalence a logical expression
results in an equivocation of its meaning.
Even though they face intuitive objections1, we will grant Williamson that
1Two of them were pointed out to us by Graham Priest, whom we thank for the remark, in
private conversation. The first objection is to the extent that two logically equivalent propo-
sitions often hardly mean the same thing. Consider, for instance, the propositions expressed
by the sentences ‘John will go skiing next week’ and ‘Either John will go skiing next week,
or John will break his legs tomorrow and will go skiing next week’. If P is ‘John will go
skiing next week’ and Q is ‘John will break his legs tomorrow’, the two sentences become P
and P ∨ (P&Q) which, at least in classical propositional logic, are provably equivalent. But
it is by no means obvious that the propositions expressed by those two interpreted formu-
lae share the same meaning; taking a hyperintentional position might be a natural option
here. On hyperintentionality, see Nolan (2014). Obviously, we are raising this issue just to
set it aside, as if we were to press this objection we would be denying one of Williamson’s
assumptions and his argument could not even get off the ground. Our discussion in this
chapter will therefore bracket similar concerns. The second objection is to the extent that it
is not a disagreement about rules of inference for a concept that determines an equivocation
about its meaning. Priest, in private conversation, suggests that philosophers might for ex-
ample disagree about the KK principle for the concept of knowledge, but not disagree about
its meaning - the KK principle saying that if an agent knows a proposition P, then she knows
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proof-theoretic arguments are correct. In fact, since Williamson seems to take
seriously the possibility, we will even grant him that equivocations about
the meaning of a logical expression are exactly those where two logicians are
not in a position to characterise it up to logical equivalence. This gives us
a principled criterion to single out real disputes in logic. We will call it the
Genuineness Criterion: real disputes are precisely those where the parties
can characterise a logical expression up to logical equivalence.
There are three reasons why Williamson’s discussion does not say much
about whether a logical dispute between a noneist and an allist is real or
merely verbal. First, because there are certain domains, comprising non-
existents, where some forms of noneism will require EP to be a valid prin-
ciple. Second, because it is still possible possible for two theorists to disagree
about EP and yet be able to characterise ‘exists’ up to logical equivalence.
Third, because the Genuineness Criterion criterion undershoots: it fails to
license as genuine disagreements it would have to vindicate.
We will start in §4.2 by illustrating one instance where, for Williamson,
we could establish the reality of a logical dispute with a proof-theoretic ar-
gument. Then, we will move on in §4.3 to quickly illustrate a language with
an allist and a noneist ‘exists’ predicates, and explain how their disagree-
ment about the validity of EP disqualifies, according to the account under
discussion, the reality of any residual disagreement they could have about
the validity of a logical principle. In §4.4, we provide our first two results.
We start in §4.4.1 by presenting a system of negative free logic, which we will
then expand in §4.4.2 to provide a system sound for a weak form of noneism,
that she knows P; see Williamson (2000) for discussion. But Williamson, as we will see more
precisely in this chapter, does not maintain that every dispute about the rules of inference
for a concept turns on a disagreement about its meaning. This needs to be decided on a
case by case basis, checking whether the disagreement satisfies what in §4.2 we will call the
Genuineness Criterion. Nothing principled, for Williamson, prevents that a disagreement
over whether knowledge obeys the KK principle did not turn on an equivocation about the
meaning of knowledge.
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as we will call it. Weak noneism takes non-existents as lacking absolutely any
property, including self-identity, and admits EP as a valid principle. An allist
and a proponent of this form of noneism can thus characterise ‘exists’ up to
logical equivalence, while disagreeing on the validity of other principles gov-
erning ‘exists’. And their disagreements, by the Genuineness Criterion, do
not turn on equivocations. In §4.4.3, we present a refutation of Williamson’s
thesis that there cannot be a genuine disagreement about the validity of EP.
A characterisation of ‘exists’ up to logical equivalence is provided between
an allist and a proponent of mid noneism, a view licensing a use of ‘exists’ not
governed by EP. Finally, in §4.5, we take issue with the Genuineness Crite-
rion: we will show the presence of logical disputes where it is impossible for
the parties to provide a characterisation of ‘exists’ up to logical equivalence
whilst licensing deductively equivalent uses of it. By the Genuineness Cri-
terion, we should consider as verbal such disagreements, which have all the
appearance of being substantive. Williamson’s discussion, we conclude, is
far from having established anything important about the status of a logical
disagreement between an allist and a noneist.
4.2 Collapse Theorems and Proof-Theoretic Argu-
ments
In its general form, what we have called the proof-theoretic style of argument
is, in Williamson’s words, a “technique for arguing that an apparent conflict
is a real one” (1988: 110). It takes off from the so-called collapse theorems2.
Imagine two logics L1 and L2 differing only in that L1 includes a logical
constant c1 in its vocabulary and L2 a logical constant c2. c1 and c2 possibly
2Some of which are known at least since Carnap (1943).
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obey different rules of inference. Consider now a logic L3 whose vocabulary
includes both c1 and c2. A collapse theorem for c1 and c2 in L3 is a proof that
they are intersubstitutable.
An illustrative example given by Williamson (1988) of how proof-theoretic
arguments work concerns the disagreement between classical and intuition-
ist logicians, about whether negation obeys Double Negation (DN). First of
all, when the rules of inference governing classical and intuitionist negation
are those of natural deduction, it is well-known that the two connectives col-
lapse3.
Consider now two rules that both negations obey, that is, Ex Falso Quodli-
bet (EFQ) and Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA). These rules, it turns out, are
strong enough to define up to logical equivalence any monadic connective
obeying them, as can be quickly shown. For, let ⊗1 and ⊗2 be any two
monadic connectives obeying EFQ and RAA. By EFQ for ⊗1, P,⊗1P ⊢ P and
P,⊗1P ⊢ ⊗2 P. So by RAA for ⊗2, ⊗1P ⊢ ⊗2 P; whence ⊢ ⊗1P → ⊗2 P
by conditional introduction. Similarly, one can derive ⊢ ⊗2 P → ⊗1P. Thus,
⊢ ⊗2 P ↔ ⊗1P: there is only one monadic connective (up to logical equiva-
lence) obeying EFQ and RAA.
At this point, we can conclude that the disagreement about DN is real
and not merely verbal. If EFQ and RAA govern both classical and intuition-
ist negation, then the two negations collapse. Moreover, classical and intu-
itionist logicians can agree to univocally characterise negation as the only
monadic connective up to logical equivalence that obeys EFQ and RAA. If
so, their beliefs about DN cannot be both correct: either the intuitionist is
right and the classicist wrong; or vice versa, the classicist is right and the
intuitionist wrong. In any case, there cannot be a logic with two negations,
3The proof is originally due to Harris (1982).
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only one of which obeys DN4. Hence, the disagreement about DN is real, not
merely verbal.
It is difficult to underestimate Williamson’s optimism about the impor-
tance and applicability of proof-theoretic arguments. First, their success in
singling out real disagreements is not confined to the single case of nega-
tion5. As he puts it, they “can be extended [...] to the other standard logical
constants, conjunction, disjunction, the material conditional, the quantifiers”
(1988: 113-14). Nor is their significance limited to distinguish real and verbal
disagreements. Indeed, “one might regard the possibility of giving [a proof-
theoretic argument] as a criterion of a logical constant” (1988: 114).
The proof-theoretic argument for classical and intuitionist negation shows
that Williamson takes the possibility to characterise up to logical equivalence
an expression (such as ‘not’) as a sufficient condition for genuine disagree-
ment.
It is not entirely clear whether Williamson also takes proof-theoretic ar-
guments to work in the opposite direction. That is, whether impossibility of
characterising an expression up to logical equivalence is sufficient for ver-
bal disagreement. Nonetheless, given some of his remarks it seems at least
possible to make this assumption.
Suppose two theorists t1 and t2 cannot exhibit a collapse theorem for two
logical constants c1 and c2, which formalise a certain expression e. A fortiori,
t1 and t2 cannot characterise e up to logical equivalence. Thus Williamson:
The question is what, if anything, can replace [the proof-theoretic
argument] in cases, such as the present one, where it does not
4See Hossack (1990), Hand (1993), Raatikainen (2008), Murzi & Hjortland (2009) and es-
pecially Schechter (2011) for relevant discussion.
5Another proof-theoretic argument has been proposed by McGee (2000), who claims that
there is only one domain for unrestricted quantification. As a consequence, disagreements
about what exists would not be merely verbal. See Dorr (2014) for more discussion.
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apply. If we can find no replacement, any remaining belief in the
non-equivocality of the dispute [...] would be little better than
blind faith: for although there may well be an initial presumption
that we mean the same by same-sounding words, a given instance
of such a presumption hardly deserves to survive the failure to
find evidence in its favour, if we have looked in earnest. (1988:
119)
The view is that unless another method can help t1 and t2 determine the
reality of their disagreement, we ought to conclude that they would be sim-
ply verbally disagreeing.
Let us therefore assume that proof-theoretic arguments are the only tool
available to assess the reality of a disagreement. If so, they induce a criterion
for genuine disagreement, which we call the Genuineness Criterion. That
is:
In a dispute about an expression e, the parties are genuinely disagreeing
if, and only if, they are able to define e up to logical equivalence.
Genuinely disagreeing about e is equivalent to being able to characterise
e up to logical equivalence. We will now apply these considerations to the
debate about ‘exists’ between the allist and the noneist.
4.3 Failure of Collapse
Let ℓ be a language containing countably many variables x, y, z . . ., individual
constants a, b, c, . . ., n-place predicates P, Q, R . . ., the five connectives, the
universal quantifier ∀, and two primitive monadic predicates E!A and E!N
representing the allist and the noneist’s existence predicates respectively.
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Let the set of well formed formulae obtainable from the elements of ℓ be
recursively defined as usual. As for the semantics, let the range of E!A be
identical to the domain of ∀, with the usual stipulation that the latter is not
empty. Let the range of E!N be a possibly empty subset of the domain of
∀. The case where the range of E!N and the domain of ∀ are the same set is
allowed, although in general this does not happen.
It is not obvious to determine how the allist is to interpret E!N and the
noneist E!A. Indeed, this is a delicate issue. Generally, a standard assumption
is that the noneist takes E!A to mean ‘is a thing’6. However, virtually any
reading of E!N is compatible with allism. Therefore, we will not make any
assumptions about how the allist is to read E!N: she can simply give it her
preferred reading7.
Satisfaction and validity being defined as usual, we call the resulting logic
LT. That is, LT is the set of the n-tuples of ℓFor determined by the relation ⊨LT .
A sound proof-theory for LT requires that E!A and E!N be governed by
different rules of inference. In particular, we consider three; two of which we
know from Chapter 2.
LNE (Logical Necessity of Existence): A monadic predicate ξ obeys
LNE if, and only if, for any term t, ⊢LT ξt.
EP (Existence Principle): A monadic predicate ξ obeys EP if, and only
if for any monadic predicate µ and term t, µt ⊢LT ξt.
NEP (Negative Existence Principle): A monadic predicate ξ obeys NEP
if, and only if for any monadic predicate µ and term t, ¬µt ⊢LT ξt.
6For instance, Williamson (1988), Lewis (1990) and Woodward (2013) all share this as-
sumption.
7Woodward (2013) has argued that the allist should read E!N as meaning ‘is actual and
concrete’. See Priest (2013) for problems deriving from this choice.
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Whilst E!N does not obey any of LNE, EP and NEP, E!A obeys each of
them. To remove any doubt, the domain of ∀ is stipulatively nonempty and
coincides with the range of E!A. Hence, it is a theorem that there is at least
a term t of which E!A holds, and so E!A obeys LNE. However, the extension
of E!N is sometimes properly included in that of E!A. In these cases, there is
at least a term t of which E!N does not hold, and so E!N does not obey LNE.
The remaining cases can be checked by similar reasoning.
It needs to be observed that it is technically possible to formulate a re-
stricted version of EP which E!N does obey. One way to do this is by intro-
ducing a new stock of terms (variables and constants), impose their denota-
tion to fall into the range of E!N, and then formulate EP with respect to this
new stock of terms8.
But even with a restricted version of EP accommodating the noneist’s use
of ‘exists’, the two parties would still be in disagreement as to whether ‘exists’
obeys EP in its unrestricted form.
If (unrestricted) EP were a rule governing both uses of ‘exists’, then these
could be proven to collapse. Furthermore, it could also be shown that there is
only one monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying (unrestricted)
EP.
Indeed, let ξ and µ be any two monadic predicates of LT obeying (unre-
stricted) EP. For any term t, the rule yields both µt ⊢LT ξt and ξt ⊢LT µt. So,
⊢LT µt ↔ ξt.
‘Exists’ would therefore be suitable to be defined by the parties as the only
monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying (unrestricted) EP. If so,
by the Genuineness Criterion, any remaining disagreement about ‘exists’
would be real.
8The cases of LNE and NEP are trickier. As they will play an important role in §4.5, we
momentarily postpone their discussion.
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But because (unrestricted) EP governs only one sense of ‘exists’, a collapse
theorem is not available, and the parties cannot accordingly define ‘exists’ up
to logical equivalence - or so says Williamson (1988: 119-120). Imagine now
a dispute about whether ‘exists’ obeys EP, NEP or LNE. By the Genuineness
Criterion, each of these disputes is merely verbal. Although an allist and a
noneist might believe to be disagreeing about some fact of the matter when
they dispute about the validity of those principles, they are in fact simply
talking past each other.
Let us take stock, before turning to other matters. So far, we have illus-
trated a criterion by Williamson (1988) to determine the real character of a
logical disagreement, which requires the deployment of what we called proof-
theoretic arguments. Logicians may sometimes disagree about the validity of
a principle governing a logical expression. To determine whether their dis-
agreement is due to an equivocation about the meaning of that expression,
and is therefore merely verbal, one should determine whether the logicians
can characterise the expression up to logical equivalence in terms of shared
rules of inference. They are not equivocating if, and only if, they can pro-
vide the required characterisation; this, we called the Genuineness Crite-
rion. We have seen, in particular, two applications of the Genuineness Cri-
terion. First, to a disagreement between classical and intuitionist logicians
about the validity of DN; secondly, to a disagreement between a noneist and
allist about the validity of EP. Only the former, according to the criterion at
hand, would count as a case of real disagreement; the latter being merely
verbal.
The rest of this chapter is dedicated to show the limitations incurred in
applying the Genuineness Criterion to determine the status of a disagree-
ment between an allist and a noneist. In the next section, we present two
cases in which, by Genuineness Criterion, a disagreement between an allist
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and a noneist is to be considered real. The first, presented in §4.4.2, concerns
a form of noneism which validates EP; the second, presented in §4.4.3, con-
cerns a form of noneism which does not validate EP. Allists and proponents
of such forms of noneism can characterise ‘exists’ up to logical equivalence,
as Williamson demands. Thus, jointly taken, these results illustrate an im-
portant consequence for our discussion. Namely, that a disagreement about
the validity of EP does not prompt any conclusion about the status of a dis-
agreement, whether it is verbal or otherwise.
4.4 Collapse and Characterisability
In this section, two important results are proven. First of all, we said above
that we will here present a form of noneism validating EP. Is this to be inter-
preted as saying that we are assuming some tacit restriction to the domain
of quantification of the logic? The answer is no: we will show how to obtain
forms of noneism licensing a use of ‘exists’ obeying EP, even if the domain of
discourse is not restricted in any form whatsoever. Specifically, this will be
our concern in §4.4.2. The second result proven in this section is a refutation
of Williamson’s thesis that the Genuineness Criterion does not allow for a
real disagreement about EP; this will concern us in §4.4.3.
We now want to start in the next sub-section by illustrating a disagree-
ment about ‘exists’ which, given the Genuineness Criterion, is not merely
apparent. Looking at this case will be extremely illuminating for our discus-
sion about allism and noneism, which we thereby resume in §4.4.2.
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4.4.1 Negative Free Logic
Imagine a theorist whose use of ‘exists’ obeys EP, but does not obey either
NEP or LNE. Let LN be this theorist’s logic and let E! be her existence predi-
cate. Then,
1. ∕⊢LN E!t, for some term t (LNE);
2. Pt ⊢LN E!t, for all terms t (EP);
3. ¬Pt ∕⊢LN E!t, for some term t (NEP).
A similar use of ‘exists’, licensed for instance by the system N presented
by Gratzl (2010), is distinctive of so-called negative free logics.
As we saw in Chapter 2, logicians endorsing such systems of logic are rep-
resentative of a certain research programme within the broader project of free
logic. Distinctive of the negative approach to free logic are the philosophical
ideas that terms sometimes lack reference and that any atomic containing a
non-referring term (such as Pegasus) needs to be automatically evaluated as
false9.
This effect is typically achieved by requiring that the valuation function
from terms to the possibly empty domain of quantification is partial instead
of, as customary, total.
The truth-condition for atomics is modified accordingly by imposing that
ξ(t1, . . . , tn) is false when either some of the ti are assigned a referent that
does not belong to that of ξ or some of the ti are not in the domain of the
valuation function. The truth-condition for E! simply stipulates that to ex-
ist is equivalent to being denoted by a term in the domain of the valuation
function.
9See Morscher & Simons (2001) and Lambert (2001) for philosophical discussion of neg-
ative free logic. Notice the difference with the negative free logic-based form of anti-realist
noneism discussed in Chapter 3: there, terms were not allowed to lack reference.
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Formally, let Mn = 〈D, ν〉 be a model where D is a possibly empty set and
for every t (variable or constant), if t ∈ Dom(ν), then ν(t) ∈ D. Satisfaction
relative to a model Mn and a valuation function g based on that model is
defined as follows:
N1 Mn, g ⊨ ξn(t1, . . . tn) iff 〈νg(t1), . . . , νg(tn)〉 ∈ ν(ξ) and t1, ..., tn ∈Dom(ν).
N2 Mn, g ⊨ E!t iff t ∈ Dom (ν).
That E! does not obey LNE, namely that E!t fails for some t, follows immedi-
ately from the proviso that D is possibly empty - in which case, t /∈ Dom(ν).
On the other hand, to show that ¬ξt does not entail E!t, and so E! does not
obey NEP, let t be a term not in Dom(ν); then, ξt is false by N1, and therefore
¬ξt true. By N2, E!t is false.
An allist and a user of ‘exists’ in the sense of negative free logic differ
over which rules of inference exactly govern ‘exists’. Nonetheless, their uses
of ‘exists’ collapse, given that they both obey EP. Thus, they can characterise
‘exists’ as the only monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying EP -
the proof is analogous to the one outlined in §4.3
Considerations analogous to the classicist/intuitionist dispute apply here:
by the Genuineness Criterion, the disagreements about LNE and NEP be-
tween the allist and our proponent of negative free logic are not merely ap-
parent.
Our discussion of negative free logic will inform our discussion of allism
and noneism in an important sense. For, a slight addition to the previous se-
mantic apparatus gives rise to a version of noneism licensing a use of ‘exists’
which collapses into the allist’s use thereof.
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4.4.2 Outer Domains, Partial Interpretations: Weak Noneism
We begin with a helpful comment by Da Costa & Bueno (1999), who identify
two philosophical pictures coming out from the development of free logic.
As they put it,
According to the Meinongian picture, the interpretation function
introduced by the semantics is total; a singular term always has a
value, which is either an existent or a non-existent object. As a re-
sult, all singular terms have reference. According to the Russellian
picture, the interpretation function is partial; thus some singular
terms lack reference (1999: 219).
Being designed in such a way that terms could fail to refer, the system of
negative free logic outlined in the previous section is subsumed under the
Russellian picture.
The Meinongian picture is given by two conditions. The interpretation
function must be total, so that no term would fail to refer. Moreover, the
reference of each term must be either an existent or otherwise. According to
this account, the system P of positive free logic encountered in Chapter 2 is
an example of Meinongian free logic.
However, certain tweaks here give rise to interesting results. It is possible
to ensure, in the spirit of positive free logic, that every term is assigned a
referent (existent or otherwise), while at the same time force terms referring
to non-existents to behave as the non-referring terms of negative free logics.
One way to obtain this is by splitting the total interpretation function typical
of positive free logic into two partial ones, and leave the truth-condition for
atomics as per negative free logic. In a way, this gives rise to a mixed system
of free logic, upheld by a philosophical view which we call weak noneism.
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Fix a language with countably many individual constants a, b, c . . ., vari-
ables x, y, z . . ., n-place predicates P, Q, R..., the five connectives, the univer-
sal quantifier ∀ and the existence predicate E!. The set of wffs is defined as
usual.
Let a model MW = 〈DO, DI , ν, ρ〉 be a quadruple where: DO is a nonempty
set (the outer domain); DI is a possibly empty set such that DI ⊆ DO (the in-
ner domain). Moreover, ν and ρ are partial functions such that:
W1 For each term t (constant or variable), if t ∈ Dom(ν), then ν(t) ∈ DI .
W2 For each term t (constant or variable) such that t ∕∈ Dom (ν), ρ(t) ∈
DO − DI .
W3 For each n-place predicate ξn, ν(ξ) ⊆ Dn
O
.
Satisfaction relative to a model MW and a valuation function g based on
that model is defined as follows (the clauses for the remaining connectives
are as usual):
W4 MW , g ⊨ ξn(t1, . . . tn)iff t1, ..., tn ∈ Dom(ν) and 〈ν(t1), ..., ν(tn)〉 ∈ ν(ξ).
W5 Mn, g ⊨ E!t iff t ∈ Dom (ν).
W6 MW , g ⊨ t = u iff t, u ∈ Dom (ν) and ν(t) = ν(u).
W7 MW , g ⊨ ∀x A iff MW , g[o/x] ⊨ A for each o ∈ DO.
Call the resulting logic LW . What deserves consideration is W4, the truth-
condition for atomics. Intuitively, there are two ways for an atomic ξ(t1, ..., tn)
to come out false. One, of course, is when not all the referents of t1, ..., tn
fall under the extension of ξ. Yet another is when not all of the ti are in the
domain of ν. In a similar case, however, this would not mean, as per negative
free logic, that the ti in question would lack reference. For by W2, ρ provides
a referent to those terms in the outer domain.
154 Chapter 4. From Collapse Theorems to Proof-Theoretic Arguments
W6 deserves some comment too. Since this clause implies that t ∕= t is
true when t is not in the domain of ν, identity here receives a non-standard
treatment just as it does in negative free logic. As a consequence, the proof
theory of LW can only admit a weakened form of Identity Introduction, as
outlined below.
Weak noneism is perhaps more adequately thought of as belonging to a
third picture, in addition to the Russellian and Meinongian ones highlighted
by Da Costa and Bueno. It is not fully Russellian, in that some terms may
refer to non-existents. However, it is not fully Meinongian either, in that it
treats as false each atomic including an occurrence of a term denoting a non-
existent. To put it briefly, weak noneism characterises non-existents as things
that lack absolutely every property, including self-identity.
Rules of inference adequate to the above semantics for weak noneism in-
clude the usual ones for the five connectives, in addition to the following
ones:
WR1 From ∀xA and E!t, infer A[t/x].
WR2 If A[t/x] follows from a set of undischarged assumptions Γ, then infer
∀xA, provided t is new does not occur in Γ or A.
WR3 From E!t, infer t = t.
WR4 From t = t infer E!t.
EP From ξt, infer E!t.
Having EP as an admissible rule of inference may strike someone as a
bad outcome for a noneist theory. This explains why the version of noneism
resulting from LW could only aspire to be a weak form of it. The admissibility
of EP depends on the fact that ξt is always false if t is a non-existent, and so
truth would be trivially preserved if one were to infer E!t from it.
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However, even granted that admissibility of EP is not desirable for noneism,
there are three additional reasons why, though weak as it may be, the philo-
sophical view yielded by LW is certainly a form of noneism. That is,
1. E! still fails to obey NEP;
2. E! still fails to obey LNE;
3. ∀xE!x is not a theorem of LW .
Whilst the first two results are in some sense expected, the third one is
not at all obvious. Indeed, one would normally expect ∀xE!x to come out as
a theorem when EP is an admissible rule, as per classical and negative free
logic. What makes ∀xE!x fail is the combination of W2 and W4. W2, inspired
by positive free logics, ensures referents to non-existents; W4, inspired by
negative free logic, implies that an atomic be false when a term is not in the
domain of ν. The result is that a model with non-existents is a countermodel
for ∀xE!x, which from a noneist point of view is nothing but delightful.
The attractiveness of this result is that it shows how a use of ‘exists’ gov-
erned by EP can be demarcated from a use of ‘exist’ licensing ‘every thing
exists’ as a theorem. In LW , one can have the former while avoiding the
latter.
There are three disputes to be had between a proponent of weak noneism
and an allist: about whether ‘exists’ obeys LNE, NEP, and about whether
‘everything exists’ should be taken to be a theorem. Yet, due to their obeying
EP, the parties’ uses of ‘exists’ collapse. And again, they could characterise
‘exists’ as the only monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying EP.
So by the Genuineness Criterion, none of those disputes are merely verbal.
We described LW as a mixed system of free logic. We now turn to a second
application of free logics to our discussion.
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4.4.3 Collapse without Existence Principle
In this section, two important facts are shown. First, another way of provid-
ing truth-conditions for atomics, more in the spirit of positive free logic, gives
rise to a second view which we call mid noneism. This is the view licensing
a use of ‘exists’ not governed by any of EP, NEP, LNE and in which ∀xE!x is
not a theorem.
However, unexpectedly, the uses of ‘exists’ of allism and mid noneism do
collapse. Even more strikingly, there are rules of inference common to both
uses of ‘exists’, which are strong enough to allow for a characterisation of ‘ex-
ists’ up to logical equivalence. Pace Williamson, the Genuineness Criterion
does not exclude a real disagreement about EP.
Suppose W4, the clause for atomics of weak noneism, was replaced with
the following W4M.
W4M MM, g ⊨ ξn(t1, . . . tn) iff either 〈ν(t1), . . . , ν(t)n)〉 ∈ ν(ξ) or, for some ti
amongst t1, . . . tn, ti ∕∈ Dom(ν).
Call mid noneism the theory resulting from weak noneism by replacing W4
with W4M and leaving everything else unchanged. Call LM the logic of mid
noneism, and suppose that ‘exists’ in LM is expressed again by the predicate
E!.
The usual rules of inference for the five connectives are adequate to the
semantics of LM, as are all of WR1-WR4.
Unlike LW , however, LM cannot admit EP. For some ξ and t, ξt ∕⊢LM E!t.
For, let t be such that t /∈ Dom (ν). Then, ξt is true by W4M but E!t false by
W5.
Sure enough, mid noneism may be thought of as having a very artifi-
cial account of non-existents. By W4M, it has it that non-existents have any
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property. By W5 and W6, this does not hold without exceptions: they lack
self-identity and existence.
Of course, these two claims have been advocated independently from one
another. For instance, that non-existents (trivially) enjoy any property is a
consequence of C on the Quinean parsing theory. Similarly, that non-existents
lack self-identity and existence is an important assumption of negative free
logic. Yet, as far as we know, the combination of both is a novelty.
It is absolutely not our goal in this chapter to advocate or justify mid
noneism. We only submit that mid noneism represents a formally coherent
account of non-existents. Its attractiveness for our goals is that, as we now
demonstrate, it sanctions a use of ‘exists’ which, despite failing to obey EP,
nevertheless collapses into the allist’s use thereof.
Indeed, under standard assumptions, the allist’s use of E!A obeys corre-
sponding versions of both WR3 and WR4 - non-standard assumptions are
discussed in the next section. To put this last point precisely, let L1
C
be a logic
whose language includes E! and E!A. Then, both E!A and E! obey rules R3
and R4 below.
R3: A monadic predicate ξ obeys R3 if, and only if, ξt ⊢L1C t = t, for any
term t.
R4: A monadic predicate ξ obeys R4 if, and only if, t = t ⊢L1C ξt, for any
term t.
This is enough to secure a collapse theorem for E! and E!A in L1
C
.
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(→) By R3 for E!A, E!At ⊢L1C t = t, and by R4 for E!, t = t ⊢L1C E!t. By
reiterated applications of →I and →E, ⊢L1C E!
A
t → E!t.
(←) By R3 for E!t, E!t ⊢L1C t = t, and by R4 for E!
A, t = t ⊢L1C E!
A
t. By
reiterated applications of →I and →E, ⊢L1C E!t → E!
A
t.
Are the proponent of mid noneism and the allist really disagreeing when
the former denies and the latter asserts that ‘exists’ obeys EP? By the Gen-
uineness Criterion, the answers has to be yes! For, by generalising over any
two monadic predicates obeying R3 and R4, they can now prove that there
is only one monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying these two
rules of inference. The proof is identical to that of Theorem 4.1 but E! and
E!A are replaced by any two monadic predicates ξ, µ obeying R3 and R4.
Consequently, they can characterise ‘exists’ up to logical equivalence as the
monadic predicate which obeys R3 and R4.
This is tantamount to a refutation of Williamson’s thesis that the Gen-
uineness Criterion is incompatible with a real disagreement about EP. And
now, we want to conclude our discussion with an analysis of the philosophi-
cal significance of the Genuineness Criterion.
4.5 Collapse and Non-Characterisability
We think it is a mistake to rely on the Genuineness Criterion as a tool to
assess the reality of a disagreement. Our claim is that the Genuineness Cri-
terion fails to vindicate many disagreements, which its advocates would in-
stead want to do justice to.
For example, suppose two logical constants c1 and c2 are both intended
to formalise a certain expression e. Sometimes, c1 and c2 are provably unique
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up to logical equivalence thanks to some rules of inference governing either
only c1 or only c2, and whether e should be governed by such rules consti-
tutes the object of disagreement between two parties. Given the uniqueness
of c1 and c2, one would expect that such cases be treated as instances of real
disagreements. But because the rules responsible for the uniqueness of c1
and c2 are at stake between the parties, it is impossible for them to charac-
terise e up to logical equivalence. And so by the Genuineness Criterion, one
is bound to accept that similar disagreements are merely verbal. The signif-
icance of what at first glance appeared to be a powerful philosophical tool,
we conclude, actually turns out to be very thin.
Consider the earlier proof of Theorem 4.1. This invoked R3 and R4 for
E!A. Now, whilst it is uncontroversial to assume that the allist’s use of ‘exists’
be obedient to R3, Williamson (1988) suggests that it is technically possible
for an allist to assume that ‘exists’ fails to obey R4.
For instance, the allist’s logic could be couched in a language with com-
plex monadic predicates, such as the language L̂ developed by Stalnaker
(1977). Let E!A
−
be the new allist’s existence predicate and let L̂
E!A− be like
L̂ except that it contains E!A
−
. L̂
E!A− is equipped with a variable binding
device ,̂ such that if A is any formula, then we can form a complex monadic
predicate x̂A, subject to the usual provisos about variable-binding.
For our purposes, let A be t = t and consider the complex monadic pred-
icate x̂(x = x). By EP, the allist can infer x̂(x = x)t ⊢ E!A− t. However,
as Williamson (1988: 126) points out, one might want to resist the inference,
often known as abstraction, from t = t to x̂(x = x)t. A reason offered by
Williamson is that abstraction fails in quotational contexts (‘Churchill’ = the
name of a British PM, but Churchill is not such such that ‘he’ = the name of a
British PM).
In any case, by rejecting abstraction the allist would not be able to infer
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E!A
−
t from t = t. If so, E!A
−
would not obey R4. Of course, by rejecting
abstraction the allist would thereby give up the equivalence between E!A
−
t
and t = t. Yet, Williamson (1988: 126) is nonetheless happy to concede that




But even if the allist resorted to a similar technique, and E!A
−
did not obey
R4, a collapse theorem could equally be proven for E!A
−
and E! - where E! is
the existence predicate of mid noneism. Indeed, let L2
C
be a logic containing
in its vocabulary both E! and E!A
−
.





(→) By R3 for E!A− , E!A− t ⊢L2C t = t, and by R4 for E!, t = t ⊢L2C E!t. By




(←) By EP for E!A− , E!t ⊢L2C E!
A
−




Moreover, the result can be generalised to any pair of monadic predicates
obeying R3, such that one of the two also obeys R4 (though not EP) and the
other EP (though not R4). Such predicates are unique up to logical equiva-
lence.
Indeed, let ξ and µ be any two such predicates; say, ξ obeys R3 and R4
and µ obeys EP and R3. Let now L3
C
be a logic containing both of them.
Theorem 4.3. For any term t, ⊢L3C µt ↔ ξt.
Proof.
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(→) By R3 for µ, µt ⊢L3C t = t. By R4 for ξ, t = t ⊢L3C ξt. Thus, by reiterated
applications of →I and →E, ⊢L3C µt → ξt.
(←) By EP for µ, ξt ⊢L3C µt, whence, directly by →I, ⊢L3C ξt → µt.
Now, the allist and the noneist disagree in two respects: about whether
‘exists’ obeys EP and about whether it obeys R4. By the Genuineness Cri-
terion, such disagreements are real just in case the parties can characterise
‘exists’ up to logical equivalence.
But they cannot do this. The only rule of inference that E!A
−
and E! both
obey is R3, and R3 is not strong enough to bring about this result. For in-
stance, if ξ and µ are any two monadic predicates exclusively obeying R3,
then ξ and µ cannot even be proven to collapse, let alone be characterised up
to logical equivalence. Therefore, we ought to conclude that those disagree-
ments are merely apparent. If so, the parties to these disputes could very
well be both correct.
But it seems quite clear that the proponent of the Genuineness Criterion
would want to say otherwise. For, with the usual proof-theoretic style of
argument she can show that it is actually impossible for the parties to be both
correct. Indeed, given Theorem 4.3, any two monadic predicates obeying
R3, such that one of them also obeys R4 and the other EP, are unique up to
logical equivalence. So in particular, E!A
−
and E! are in fact equivalent. This
means that actually, either the allist is wrong and E!A
−
also obeys R4; or else
the noneist is wrong and E! also obeys EP. It does not matter which party is
wrong. What matters is that either way, it is impossible for both parties to be
correct.
One would have to treat similar disagreements, where it is impossible
for both parties to be correct, as real instead of merely verbal. In fact, the
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whole attractiveness of the Genuineness Criterion was its vindicating this
plausible intuition.
But the impossibility of characterising ‘exists’ up to logical equivalence
remains. If the allist, though wrong as she may be, uses ‘exists’ as not obeying
R4, then, trivially, she could not agree with the noneist to characterise ‘exist’
as the only monadic predicate up to logical equivalence obeying, amongst
other rules, R4! Analogous considerations obviously apply to the noneist
with respect to EP.
So now, the Genuineness Criterion falls short of our expectations: since
the required characterisation of ‘exists’ up to logical equivalence is not avail-
able, the parties are engaging in merely verbal disputes.
It seems possible to offer a new version of the Genuineness Criterion ca-
pable of fixing the problems just brought to light. One natural way to do it is
by abandoning the condition that real disagreements require characterisability
of two logical constants up to logical equivalence. This condition had better
be replaced by the possibility of simply proving that such logical constants
are deductively equivalent. We will make use, and explain, this reformula-
tion of the Genuineness Criterion in the next chapter. There, we will use
it to defend the genuineness of another dispute criticised by Williamson as
turning on an equivocation of the terms of the question. This is a dispute
in modal metaphysics, between proponents of two conflicting views about a
specific kind of non-existents which we have not encountered in the previous
chapters. These are merely possible objects or, as they are often referred to,
possibilia: things that could have existed but, in fact, do not. The next, and
final, chapter is about them. Before coming to that, however, let us conclude
this chapter by summing up what we have claimed here.
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4.6 Conclusion
We started in §4.2 by presenting what we called proof-theoretic arguments.
These are a technique proposed by Williamson (1988), the main application
of which is to determine which logical disputes are real, and which merely
verbal. When two parties, in disagreement over the validity of a logical law
governing a certain expression, can characterise it up to logical equivalence
in terms of some shared rules of inference, their disagreement is real. For
only then can they be sure that they are not equivocating on the meaning
of the logical vocabulary. When they cannot provide such a characterisation,
their disagreement is most likely to be due to an equivocation, and we should
therefore consider it merely verbal. This induces a principled criterion to sin-
gle out real disagreements in logic, which we have called the Genuineness
Criterion: in a dispute over a logical expression, the parties are genuinely
disagreeing if, and only if, they can characterise this expression up to logical
equivalence. Deployed in the context of a dispute, between classical and in-
tuitionist logicians, over the validity of Double Negation, the Genuineness
Criterion has it that the parties are genuinely disagreeing.
By contrast, we saw in §4.3, in a dispute between two parties over the
validity of the Existence Principle (EP), Williamson interpreted the Genuine-
ness Criterion as giving the opposite verdict: the parties cannot characterise
‘exists’ up to logical equivalence, and are thus engaging in a merely verbal
dispute. A consequence is, for example, that an allist and a noneist, who are
typically in disagreement about the validity of EP, would simply be talking
past each other. In the rest of the chapter, we provided three reasons why
Williamson’s discussion fails to shed any important light on the status of
such disagreements between allists and noneists.
First, as we showed in §4.4.1-§4.4.2, there is a form of weak noneism, as we
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called it, on which EP is valid, as shown by the semantics we provided for it.
An allist and a proponent of such form of noneism can characterise ‘exists’
up to logical equivalence, thereby meeting the Genuineness Criterion.
Secondly, in §4.4.3 we showed that two parties can differ over the validity
of EP and yet characterise ‘exists’ up to logical equivalence, thereby refut-
ing Williamson’s assertions. We provided a semantics for another form of
noneism (mid noneism), on which EP was invalid. The proponent of mid
noneism and the allist, it turned out, could meet the Genuineness Criterion.
Thirdly, in §4.5, we showed why it is a mistake to rely on the Genuineness
Criterion as a tool to single out real disagreements in logic. The criterion, we
have shown, undershoots. There are logical disagreements which it would
have to do justice to, but it does not.
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Chapter 5
Actual Disputes, Logical Pluralism,
and Bayesianism
5.1 Introduction
Two chapters ago, we described the non-existent as a miscellaneous crowd,
comprising objects of many sorts. From purely fictional to mythological char-
acters, from objects of erroneous scientific theorising to abstracta of many
kinds. Some philosophers also add to this list past and future existents, ob-
jects that once were and are now no more, and objects that now are not but
one day will be, respectively. This chapter is, in part, about yet another kind
of objects in this list. These are possible existents or, as they are often called,
possibilia: things that could have existed, but in fact do not. Representatives
include the possible child that Wittgenstein could have fathered, the possible
knife that would have been assembled from a certain handle and a certain
blade, or the possible child that could have resulted from a sperm and an egg
that were never brought together.
This chapter considers two metaphysical theories about such merely pos-
sible objects, which often go by the name of actualism and possibilism; we
can call this the AP-distinction. On a rough characterisation, actualism is the
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view that necessarily, everything that could have been actual already is; pos-
sibilism is the negation of actualism (possibly, something could have been
actual but is not). Such theses, we could have equally well formulated by
using talk of existence instead of actuality, so that actualism would be view
that necessarily, everything that could have existed already does, and possi-
bilism would be the view that this is not the case. Although there is nothing
that one formulation of the AP-distinction tracks that the other does not, our
presentation hereafter will follow the more usual talk of actuality instead of
existence.
There seems to be an obvious connection between what is at stake with
the AP-distinction, and the content of the previous chapters: the protago-
nist, once again, is the non-existent, though this time of a more specific sort.
The rough characterisation of the AP-distinction given earlier should be suf-
ficient to clarify that the actualist, just like the allist from the previous chapter,
denies that some objects are not actual; the possibilist, just like the noneist,
denies what the actualist says. We have a disagreement.
Timothy Williamson has criticised this disagreement on several occasions
(2010, 2013c, 2016b). The AP-distinction would be “badly confused” (2010:
662), and even “hopelessly muddled”(2013c: 25). The implication, in sum, is
that “the apparent disagreement between actualism and possibilism is merely
verbal”(2013c: 306). Using the terminology of Williamson (2013b), his po-
sition can therefore be described as a form of logical pluralism about the
AP-distinction. This chapter considers, and rejects, two arguments that are
meant to support his view.
The first is to the extent that the conflict between the parties’ theses would
be merely apparent. Williamson (2013c: 305-308) finds support for this claim
in translation schemata proposed by Correia (2007), Forbes (1989: 31-33), Pol-
lock (1985: 130-132) and Fine (1977: 118-119), which purport to show that
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any pair of actualist and possibilist formulae would be true in exactly the
same models. Throughout §5.3, our focus will be on the most recent of those
translation schemata, that is, those proposed by Correia - which improved
on the work of the other authors, particularly Forbes (1989). We will show
that, in the framework where we will formulate the AP-distinction, Correia’s
translations break down. And therefore, Williamson could not resort to those
translation schemata to argue for the merely apparent nature of the conflict
between actualism and possibilism.
The second argument takes over from our previous discussion in Chapter
4, where we encountered Williamson’s Genuineness Criterion. According
to this criterion, real disputes about a logical expression were precisely those
where the parties could characterise that expression up to logical equivalence
in terms of some shared rules of inference. However, we also saw that the
Genuineness Criterion is too strong, and indicated a replacement for it. To
establish that they are genuinely disagreeing about a logical expression, two
logicians should only prove that they use it in deductively equivalent ways
- this point is also made in Williamson (2013b: 226). Notice that, as we saw
in Chapter 4, failure to provide similar proofs, for Williamson (1988), was
sufficient to deem a dispute equivocal, and actualists and possibilists do not
seem to be in a position to show that their uses of ‘is actual’ are deductively
equivalent. This may ground his Uniqueness Challenge for the AP-distinction:
unless parties to this distinction can show that their uses of ‘is actual’ are
deductively equivalent, he may say, one had better maintain that they equiv-
ocate the meaning of ‘is actual’. Logical pluralism about the AP-distinction
ensues.
In §5.4, we illustrate the Uniqueness Challenge precisely and then con-
sider six ramifications of the AP-distinction. In one of them, as we will
show, the Uniqueness Challenge can be met (§5.5). Given this result, we
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ask whether it is plausible to suppose that ‘is actual’ is being equivocated
in the remaining five ramifications. Williamson’s answer, we noted above,
is yes. More precisely, Williamson’s view, based on some remarks from his
(1988: 117), is formulated in probabilistic terms. That is, specifically: our
confidence in the hypothesis that an equivocation about ‘is actual’ is occur-
ring between the parties to those disputes should be (much) higher than in
the hypothesis that it is not. An equivocation of ‘is actual’, occurring be-
hind the parties’ backs, is thus for Williamson the likeliest scenario. No-
body, as far as we are aware of, has ever seriously attempted to determine
whether the evidence available, concerning those ramifications of the AP-
distinction, actually supports Williamson’s verdict. This task, we will carry
out in §5.6. At least as concerns four of those five ramifications, we will
argue from Bayesian grounds that, given the body of evidence we will con-
sider, not only do we lack, pace Williamson, the required level of confidence
to believe in his hypothesis about the equivocation of ‘is actual’; we actually
have good reason to believe that a similar hypothesis is false. To postpone
technical details, we will start by supposing that Williamson’s hypothesis
has a very strong prior probability - specifically, it is certain to be true be-
fore taking into account any relevant evidence. Then, after the evidence we
will have gathered in this chapter is introduced and taken into account, we
will aim to determine the hypothesis’ posterior probability, or its probability
given the evidence in question. To this end, will run two mental simulations
which, as indicated, yield a contrary verdict to Williamson’s own one about
the probability of the equivocation hypothesis. We take such results to indi-
cate that Williamson’s logical pluralism about those four ramifications of the
AP-distinction requires, at the very least, more job to be established - either
additional evidence not considered here, capable of overturning our find-
ings, or an argument showing a flaw in the way they were achieved. Until
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then, we are justified in maintaining that logical pluralism about almost the
entirety of the ramifications of the AP-distinction does not appear to be in a
very strong footing.
We should start, in any case, by presenting the AP-distinction in more de-
tail. To this end, we will follow the presentation of the AP-distinction given
by Menzel (2020), which we introduce in the next section.
5.2 AP-Distinction: The Subsistence Conception
Central to Menzel’s defence of the AP-distinction is what he labels the sub-
sistence conception thereof, on which actualism and possibilism amount to the
following two formulae respectively.
Act □∀x(♦E!x → E!x).
Pos ♦∃x(♦E!x &¬E!x).
The monadic predicate E! stands for ‘is actual’, so that actualism is the
claim that necessarily, every thing that could have been actual already is;
possibilism, that this is not the case. As Menzel (2020: 1982) notes, what
the AP-distinction on the subsistence conception amounts to should now be
clear: the parties disagree as to whether there could be merely possible ob-
jects (or possibilia)1.
One could attempt to cast the AP-distinction in other ways, such as by
letting ‘is actual’ be expressed by a combination of quantification, identity
and the operator @ (see Hazen (1976), Hodes (1984) and Stephanou (2005)).
But the job done by @ is purely adverbial: prefixed to a formula, @ shifts its
1Menzel takes great pains to show that versions of the subsistence conception avant la
lettre have existed since at least the late antiquity, both in the western and the eastern world.
In particular, for discussion of the Arabic contributions to the debate see Read (Forth.) and
Hodges (2020).
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world of evaluation to the world that happens to be actual. Actualism then
becomes trivial and possibilism inconsistent.
Act@ □∀x(♦∃y(x = y) → @∃y(y = x)).
Pos@ ♦∃x(@¬∃y(y = x)&♦∃y(y = x)).
So at this point, either the AP-distinction is wrong-headed, or else the
merely adverbial interpretation of the AP-distinction simply misses the point.
Menzel’s preferred option, the latter, is the one assumed throughout this
chapter.
We will couch both actualism and possibilism, understood as per Act and
Pos, in constant domain S5. Actualists tend to favour a variable domain in-
terpretation for their logic, so as to avoid the consequence that every thing is
a necessary existent. But as Menzel (2020: 1986) points out, there are well-
known ways available to the actualist, if not to avoid, at least to make this
outcome more acceptable (see Linsky and Zalta (1994, 1996)). Our chosen
framework for the debate, therefore, is legitimate.
Moreover, by relying on this framework we will be able to show that a
certain line of argument pressed by Williamson against the AP-distinction
does in fact break down. In the previous section, we noted that several trans-
lation schemata between actualist and possibilist languages have been pro-
posed in the literature. Such schemata have brought to light the presence
of recursively definable mappings, showing that it is possible to find one to
one correspondences between the theories’ logical entailments. This has in
turn been interpreted by Williamson (2013c: 305-308) as showing that the
contrast between actualism and possibilism, for instance over the validity of
Act, would in fact be merely apparent. As we will show in more detail in
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§5.3.1, Williamson’s idea here, that the presence of similar mappings sug-
gests the merely apparent nature of the contrast between actualism and pos-
sibilism, does appear to have some initial plausibility. But as the next section
shows, for Williamson’s argument to be conclusive, a number of contentious
assumptions need to be in place. Notably, Williamson needs to assume that
the AP-distinction is not formulated in constant domain S5, the framework
in which we are assuming that it is formulated - which, incidentally, also
happens to coincide with Williamson’s preferred modal logic. For here, as
we will show throughout §5.3.2-§5.3.3 by taking into account the translation
schemata proposed by Correia (2007), the mappings in question turn out not
to be available. Thus, insofar as the debate is formulated in constant domain
S5, Williamson’s argument could not even get off the ground. The strength
of this Williamsonian line of argument for the merely apparent character of
the disagreement between actualism and possibilism, therefore, appears to
be in fact very thin.
5.3 Reductions Between Actualism and Possibil-
ism
5.3.1 Williamson on Translations
We just noted that Williamson has interpreted the presence of entailment-
preserving mappings between actualism and possibilism as indicating the
merely apparent character of their disagreement. The consequence being, for
Williamson, that the disagreement in question would be not real, but merely
verbal. We also indicated that a similar line of argument incurs important
limitations, shown by the fact that the mappings in question do not succeed
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in the framework in which we are assuming that the debate between actual-
ism and possibilism is conducted. As we said, we will offer a proof of this
fact later in this section (§5.3.2-§5.3.3). In this sub-section, we want to quickly
outline what motivates Williamson’s thought in the first place.
To begin with, just as actualism and possibilism could be formulated in
constant domain S5, they could be equally formulated in variable domain
S5 - sometimes known as S5 on the Kripke semantics. In a similar setting,
the domain function is relativised to worlds, and what happens to be in the
domain of one world may well not be in the domain of another. On one
formulation of the AP-distinction, first due to Fine (1977) and subsequently
Pollock (1985), Forbes (1989) and Correia (2007), the theories would differ
in what range they assign to the quantifiers. On the actualist interpretation,
they range, at every world w, over an inner domain restricted so as to com-
prise exactly the things beloginging to domain of w - which may well form a
proper subset of the domain of another world. On the possibilist interpreta-
tion, by contrast, quantifiers are understood as ranging, at every world, over
an unrestricted outer domain.
Given this formulation of the AP-distinction, the authors just mentioned
have shown how to define, for each formula A in the actualist language, a
corresponding formula (A)Pos in the possibilist language; and for each for-
mula B in the possibilist language, a corresponding formula (B)Act in the
actualist language such that: the actualist accepts A just when the possibilist
accepts (A)Pos; and the possibilist accepts B just when the actualist accepts
(B)Act. Informally, the driving intuition is that possibilist quantification is
interpreted in actualist terms as quantification over what could have existed,
whilst actualist quantification is interpreted in possibilist terms as quantifi-
cation restricted to what in fact exists. Under this translation schema, it turns
out that, in S5 on the Kripke semantics, the mixed formulae A ↔ (A)Pos
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and B ↔ (B)Act are both logical truths; they are true at every world of every
model. As a consequence, the mappings ()Act and ()Pos are mutually inverse:
both A ↔ ((A)Pos)Act and B ↔ ((B)Act)Poss are logical truths of S5 on the
Kripke semantics. Thus, let LAct and LPos be the the actualist and possibilist
logics respectively. Under ()Act, for any possibilist formulae B1, . . . , Bn, B, we
have ⊨LPos B if, and only if, ⊨LAct (B)Act; whence B1, . . . , Bn ⊨LPos B if, and
only if, (B1)Act, . . . , (Bn)Act ⊨LAct (B)Act. Under ()Pos, for any actualist for-
mulae A1, . . . , An, A, we have ⊨LAct A if, and only if, ⊨LPos (A)Pos; whence
A1, . . . , An ⊨LAct A if, and only if, (A1)Pos, . . . , (An)Pos,⊨LPos (A)Pos.
Now, the mappings ()Act and ()Pos, Williamson (2013c: 306) notices, were
described by their proponents as translations. However, Williamson contin-
ues, translations are meant to preserve meaning. Thus, if ()Act and ()Pos have
this property, then the following case could be made for thinking that the
disagreement between actualism and possibilism is merely verbal. Suppose,
Williamson (2013c: 306) argues, that the actualist accepts A just when the
possibilist accepts (A)Pos, the possibilist accepts B just when the actualist ac-
cepts (B)Act, and the actualist accepts a sentence D the orthographic negation
of which, ¬D, the possibilist accepts. Prima facie, the actualist and the possi-
bilist seem to have incompatible beliefs - the former accepting D, whilst the
latter accepting its orthographic negation. However, since the actualist ac-
cepts D, the possibilist will accept (D)Pos. Thus, if ()Pos is a translation, the
possibilist accepts something synonymous with the actualist’s D. But then, if
the possibilist is consistent, in accepting ¬D, she will not accept something
contradicting what the actualist means by D. For otherwise, in virtue of the
synonymy between D and (D)Pos, ¬D would also contradict what (D)Pos
means, which by hypothesis the possibilist accepts. Likewise, if the possi-
bilist accepts ¬D, then by hypothesis the actualist accepts (¬D)Act. Thus, if
()Act is a translation, the actualist accepts something synonymous with the
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possibilist’s ¬D. But then, if the actualist is consistent, in accepting D, she
will not accept something contradicting what the possibilist means by ¬D.
For otherwise, in virtue of the synonymy between D and (D)Act, D would
also contradict what (¬D)Act means, which by hypothesis the possibilist ac-
cepts. Thus, Williamson (2013c: 307) concludes, “the apparent first-order
modal dispute between the actualist and the possibilist is an illusion”.
This argument rests on the assumption that ()Act and ()Pos are understood
as translations. But even if they were not understood in this way, Williamson
(2013c: 307) argues, a similar argument could be run on the (weaker) assump-
tion that ()Act and ()Pos preserve logical, as opposed to semantical, features.
Suppose that A ↔ (A)Pos and B ↔ (B)Act are true at every world w of any
model M - for A any actualist formula and B any possibilist formula. Like
before, the actualist accepts A just when the possibilist accepts (A)Pos; and
the possibilist accepts B just when the actualist accepts (B)Act. Now, suppose
that everything the actualist accepts is true at w in M, and that the possibilist
accepts B. The actualist will then accept (B)Act, which is therefore true at w
in M. But then, given that B ↔ (B)Act is also true at w, it follows that so is B.
And therefore, anything that the possibilist accepts is also true at w. Conse-
quently, Williamson concludes, possibilism follows model-theoretically from
actualism. And, by running an exactly symmetrical argument, the converse
implication could be established as well. The upshot being, that actualism
and possibilism are model-theoretically equivalent: nothing of what the actu-
alist accepts is not already accepted by the possibilist and, conversely, noth-
ing of what the possibilist accepts is not already accepted by the actualist.
The merely verbal character of their disagreement, once again, seems to en-
sue.
As we said, we grant Williamson that his reasons for thinking that the
disagreement between actualism and possibilism is merely verbal, as per the
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two arguments just illustrated, have a certain degree of plausibility. Notice
that in saying this, we are making an important concession to Williamson.
For, among other things, we are setting aside issues concerning the philo-
sophical adequacy of the translations ()Act and ()Pos. For example, one may
seriously question whether the actualist is really entitled not to take the pos-
sibilist at her word and treat her quantification as quantification over what
could have existed. Likewise for the possibilist: it not obvious that she is
entitled to treat actualist quantification as a form of restricted quantification.
Specifically, what such worries call into question is the philosophical value
of the non-homophonic character of ()Act and ()Pos. Attacking a translation
schema on the grounds of its own non-homophonic character is by no means
unheard of; quite the contrary, one need not go too far to find a move along
those lines. For instance, elaborating on some ideas by Lewis (1990), Wood-
ward (2013) has defended an entailment preserving, non-homophonic trans-
lation schema between noneism and allism - see also Berto and Schoonen
(2017) for further discussion. The adequacy of Woodward’s non-homophonic
account was rejected by Priest (2013), who even questioned the methodolog-
ical correctness itself of a non-homophonic translation. In fact, Priest (2011)
had already taken up the issue some years before in direct opposition to
Lewis (1990), who had defended a non-homophonic translation schema be-
tween allism and noneism by appealing to its bringing about mutual intel-
ligibility between the theories. In relation to the argument that mutual in-
telligibility between theories justifies a non-homophonic translation between
them, Priest’s gloss comes in the following terms:
The argument is flawed methodologically. There is absolutely no
reason why, in a dispute between noneists and Quineans, every-
thing said by one side must be translated into terms intelligible
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to the other. No one ever suggested that the notions of the Spe-
cial Theory of Relativity need to be translated into categories that
make sense in Newtonian Dynamics (or vice versa); no one ever
suggested that Marxian economics (with its labor theory of value)
need be translated into the categories of Keynesean economics (or
vice versa). Though there may be partial overlap, each side may
just have to learn a new language game (Priest (2011: 251)).
Priest is here rejecting the legitimacy itself of demanding that (at least
seemingly) rival theories have to be perforce mutually intelligible. Accord-
ingly, grounding a non-homophonic translation on the need of securing mu-
tual intelligibility is in itself methodologically flawed. As far as we can see,
worries à la Priest, about the adequacy of non-homophonic translations, could
be very easily carried over, mutatis mutandis, to the debate under considera-
tion in this chapter.
But as we said, we are raising those issues just to set them aside. Rather,
the rest of this section is dedicated to attack Williamson’s arguments from
another point of view. We will now show that, even if we were to bracket
concerns about the non-homophonic character of ()Act and ()Pos, there are
quite independent reasons why one should be very careful in attributing
them much insightfulness about the status of the disagreement between actu-
alism and possibilism. From now on, we will focus our attention on the most
recent formulation of those mappings, due to Correia (2007). As we will now
show, when actualism and possibilism are formulated in our selected frame-
work for the AP-distinction, constant domain S5, Correia’s translations fail.
And Williamson’s two arguments, accordingly, are immediately undercut.
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5.3.2 Some Definitions
We start by defining the key concepts resorted to in the remainder of this
section. First, some notational conventions. We will use bold capital letters
A, B, C... as metavariables for formulae; bold lower case letters a, b, c...x, y, z
as metavariables for terms, where a, b, c are used for individual constants,
x, y, z for variables and t for a generic term; lower case greek letters α, β, γ...
as metavariables for predicates, followed where needed by a superscript in-
dicating the arity of a predicate; italicised capital letters A, B, C... for predicate
letters, also possibly followed by an arity-indicating superscript; the monadic
predicate E!, always followed by a superscript, for the actuality predicate; ital-
icised lower case letters a, b, c...x, y, z for terms; the lower case greek letter τ,
always followed by a subscript, for translation functions.
Suppose L1 and L2 are two logics in languages ℓ1 and ℓ2 respectively. Call
a pair of translations τ1, τ2 between ℓ1 and ℓ2 a reduction just in case τ1 and τ2
are mutually inverse, in the following sense. That is, just in case (i) τ1 assigns
to each formula A of ℓ1 a formula A′ of ℓ2, and A and A′ are true in exactly
the same models; (ii) τ2 assigns to each formula B of ℓ2 a formula B′ of ℓ1,
and B and B′ are true in exactly the same models . If a reduction between L1
and L2 exists, we say that L1 and L2 are equally expressive, and indicate this
by L1 ∼= L2.
Let ℓA and ℓP be the languages of actualism and possibilism respectively.
They both contain: an infinite stock of individual variables x, y, z . . ., con-
stants a, b, c . . . and n-place predicates A, B, C . . .; the connectives ¬ and &;
the identity symbol =; the alethic necessity operator □. Moreover, ℓA and ℓP
both have a universal quantifier ∀A/∀P and an actuality predicate E!A/E!P.





of wffs of ℓA and ℓP are recursively defined below.
(ℓFor
A
) A ::= |ξn(a1, . . . , an)|¬A|A&B|tm = tn|∀AxA|E!At|□A
(ℓFor
P
) A ::= |ξn(a1, . . . , an)|¬A|A&B|tm = tn|∀PxA|E!Pt|□A
For simplicity, we will use A → B as an abbreviation for ¬(A&¬B), and so
on for the remaining connectives.
Let MA = 〈W, D, a, ν〉 be an actualist model, where: W and D are non-
empty sets, a is a member of W and ν is function such that ν(a) ∈ D, for
each individual constant a and ν(ξn, w) ⊆ Dn, for each n-place predicate ξ
and w ∈ W. Given a variable assignment g based on MA, the valuation
function ν is extended to a function νg whose domain is the union of the set
of variables and the set of constants of ℓA, being defined as follows: for any
term t, νg(t) = ν(t) if t is an individual constant, and νg(t) = g(t) if t is a
variable. Call LA the logic resulting from the class of MA-models for the
language ℓA.
Satisfaction relative to a model MA, a variable-assignment g based on
that model and a world w of the set of worlds of MA is defined as usual.
MA, g, w ⊨LA ξn(t1, . . . tn) iff 〈νg(t1), . . . , νg(tn)〉 ∈ ν(ξ, w).
MA, g, w ⊨LA ¬A iff MA, g, w ∕⊨LA A.
MA, g, w ⊨LA A&B iff MA, g, w ⊨LA A and MA, g, w ⊨LA B.
MA, g, w ⊨LA t1 = t2 iff νg(t1) = νg(t2).
MA, g, w ⊨LA ∀Ax A iff MA, g[o/x], w ⊨LA A for each o ∈ D.
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MA, g, w ⊨LA E!At iff νg(t) ∈ D.
MA, g, w ⊨LA □A iff MA, g, w′ ⊨LA A for every w′ ∈ W.
Truth in a model is defined as truth at a, the actual world.
It is worth pointing out a fact which will be invoked later. As the reader
can check, the formula □∀Ax(♦E!Ax → E!Ax) is a logical truth of LA. After
all, this formula expresses the thesis of actualism, captured in §5.2 by the for-
mula Act, in the language of LA. Logically equivalent to this formula is the
formula □∀Ax(E!Ax → □E!Ax), which says that what is actual is necessarily
so.
Another logical truth of LA is □∀AxE!Ax, which expresses the claim that
necessarily, every thing is actual. Together, □∀Ax(E!Ax → □E!Ax) and
□∀AxE!Ax entail that necessarily, every thing is necessarily actual: Fact 1.
⊨LA □∀Ax□E!Ax.
Possibilist models MP are defined very much in analogy to actualist mod-
els, thereby generating the logic LP - the logic resulting from the class of MP-
models for the language ℓP. The only, crucial, difference concerns the clause
for the actuality predicate, given below.
MP, g, w ⊨LP E!Pt iff νg(t) ∈ D and νg(t) ∈ ν(E!P, w).
In other words, according to possibilism, for something to be actual it is
not enough for it to be in the domain of the universal quantifier; the addi-
tional constraint is put that the thing in question falls under the range of the
actuality predicate, and there is no guarantee that this happens.
More precisely, we are assuming that, at each world w, the range of E!P is
a subset of D, possibly identical with it. The thesis of possibilism, expressed
in §5.2 by the formula Pos, corresponds to the claim that there may be some-
thing that could have been actual but is not. Such a claim, now represented
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by the formula ♦∃x(♦E!Px &¬E!Px), is not a tautology of LP - it fails for in-
stance in a model where at every world the extension of E!P and that of D
coincide. To obviate this, one could impose the stronger condition that, at
each world, the range of E!P be a proper subset of D. Since, however, Correia
does not consider this strengthened form of possibilism, there is no need for
us to do it either.
The next section is concerned with refuting Correia’s translation schemata.
Such schemata require that (pairs of) Vlach operators be added to the lan-
guages of actualism and possibilism. After explaining the kind of expansion
that these sentential operators could bring about, the vocabularies of LA and
LP are enriched with such operators. Semantically, the addition of Vlach op-
erators will result in an expansion of MA and MP-models. Correia’s trans-
lation schemata, at that point, are shown not to be a reduction between the
resulting logics.
5.3.3 Introducing Vlach Operators
Vlach operators ↑, ↓ were first introduced in alethic modal logic by Fine (1977)
as the analogues of the temporal operators for ‘once’ and ‘then’ due to Vlach
(1973) - see Meyer (2009) for a discussion of such operators in tense logic.
A simple use of the Vlach operators is described by Forbes (1989), who
first gave a reduction between actualism and possibilism exploiting their ex-
pressive power.
Typically, ↑ is suffixed to modal operators, whereas ↓ is prefixed to a sub-
formula within their scope. In the course of evaluating a formula, the opera-
tor ↑ stores a world introduced by a modal operator, and when it next comes
to evaluate a sub-formula prefixed by ↓, this is evaluated at the previously
stored world.
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For example, consider the sentence ‘there are two worlds such that what
is blue in one is red in the other’. Such a sentence can be rendered, in a
language containing Vlach operators, as follows:
♦ ↑ ♦∀x(Bx → ↓ Rx).
Here, the first world of evaluation introduced by a diamond is stored by
↑, and later retrieved by ↓ (despite the fact that, after ↑ occurred, a second
diamond introduced another world).
However, Forbes’ reduction between actualism and possibilism requires
a syntactic restriction on the Vlach operators, one effect of which is that ap-
parently legitimate formulae such as ♦ ↑ ♦∀x(Bx → ↓ Rx) cannot be taken
as wffs - see Forbes (1989: 31-33) . Correia (2007) avoids this artificial restric-
tion by resorting not to one but infinitely-many pairs of Vlach operators. As
this solution is meant to constitute an improvement on Forbes’ account, we
will follow Correia here.
Let us thus enrich ℓA and ℓP with infinitely-many pairs 〈↑n, ↓n〉 of Vlach
operators, one for each n ∈ N, and call the enriched languages ℓ





of wffs of ℓ






respectively, by adding the following clauses concerning the Vlach oper-
ators.
If A is a wff of either ℓ
A↑↓ or ℓP↑↓ , then so are ↑n A and ↓n A, where
n ∈ N.
Let o and o′ be occurrences of ↑n and o′′ an occurrence of ↓n, for some
n ∈ N. We say that o binds o′′ iff (i) o′′ is in the scope of o and (ii) if o′ occurs
in the scope of o, then o′′ is not in the scope of o′.
The classes of models for ℓ
A↑↓ and ℓP↑↓ are obtained by expanding the
definition of MA and MP-models respectively. First, let ∫ be an infinite tuple
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of w ∈ W, call it a store list. Then, let the store list ∫ n→w be the tuple which
results from replacing the n-th item of ∫ , indicated by ∫ (n), with w.
A model M↑↓ = 〈M, ∫ 〉 for ℓ
A↑↓ or ℓP↑↓ is a structure where M is an MA
or MP-model and ∫ a store list. Call MA↑↓ and MP↑↓ a model for ℓ
A↑↓ and
ℓ
P↑↓ respectively, and call LA
↑↓
and LP↑↓ the resulting logics.
Satisfaction relative to a model M↑↓, a variable assignment g based on
M↑↓, a store list ∫ and a world w is defined as usual. The only addition
concerns the clauses, given below, for the Vlach operators, where L↑↓ is either
LA↑↓ or LP↑↓ .
M↑↓g, ∫ , w ⊨L↑↓↑n A iff M, ∫ n→w, g, w ⊨L↑↓ A.
M↑↓g, ∫ , w ⊨L↑↓↓n A iff M, ∫ , g, ∫ (n) ⊨L↑↓ A.
Now for Correia’s translation. We need to consider two mappings: the
first, translating actualist into possibilist discourse, is the mapping τ1 : ℓA↑↓ 5−→
ℓ
P↑↓ from ℓA↑↓ to ℓP↑↓ :
1.a τ1(A) 5−→ A, if A is atomic.
1.b τ1(¬A) 5−→ ¬τ1(A).
1.c τ1(A&B) 5−→ τ1(A)&τ1(B).
1.d τ1(t1 = t2) 5−→ t1 = t2.
1.e τ1(∀AxA) 5−→ ∀Px(E!Px → τ1(A)).
1. f τ1(□A) 5−→ □τ1(A).
1.g τ1(↑n A) 5−→ ↑n τ1(A).
1.h τ1(↓n A) 5−→ ↓n τ1(A).
The reverse mapping τ2 : ℓP↑↓ 5−→ ℓA↑↓ from ℓP↑↓ to ℓA↑↓ is defined as
follows:
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2.a τ2(A) 5−→ A, if A is atomic.
2.b τ2(¬A) 5−→ ¬τ2(A).
2.c τ2(A&B) 5−→ τ2(A)&τ2(B).
2.d τ2(t1 = t2) 5−→ t1 = t2.
2.e τ2(∀PxA) 5−→ ↑n □∀Ax ↓n τ2(A), where n is the first m ∈ N such that
τ2(A) does not include free occurrences of ↓m.
2. f τ2(□A) 5−→ □τ2(A).
2.g τ2(↑n A) 5−→ ↑n τ2(A).
2.h τ2(↓n A) 5−→ ↓n τ2(A).
And we can, for clarity, augment τ1 and τ2 with the following two homo-
phonic clauses concerning E!A and E!P respectively.
1.i τ1(E!At) 5−→ E!Pt.
2.i τ2(E!Pt) 5−→ E!At.
Intuitively, the idea underpinning the translation is the following. Whilst
actualist universal quantification is interpreted in possibilist terms as quan-
tification restricted to actual things, possibilist universal quantification is in-
terpreted in actualist terms so as to include unrestrictedly every thing.
It is now shown that, under τ1 and τ2, LA
↑↓





Proof. We need to show that a formula and its translation are not true in
exactly the same models. Consider ♦ ↑n ♦∀Px((Cx ∨ ¬Cx) →↓n ¬EPx).
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This is an ℓ
P↑↓-formula which says that there are two worlds such that ev-
erything that is either C or otherwise at one of them, call this world w2, is
not actual at the other world, call it w1. This formula is true at a in an MP
↑↓
-
model, for instance, when something C at w2 is not actual at w1. It follows
that, MP↑↓ ⊨LP↑↓ ♦ ↑
n ♦∀Px((Cx ∨ ¬Cx) →↓n ¬EPx) for some MP↑↓ . By
reiterated applications of τ2, our ℓP↑↓-formula is eventually mapped to the
ℓ
A↑↓-formula ♦ ↑n ♦ ↑m □∀Ax ↓m x((Cx ∨ ¬Cx) →↓n ¬EAx). This for-
mula says that there are two worlds w1 and w2, such that everything at every
world that is C or otherwise at w2 fails to be actual at w1 - here, 〈↑m, ↓m〉 store
and retrieve w2, whereas 〈↑n, ↓n〉 store and retrieve w1. However, a similar
scenario is ruled out by Fact 1, establishing that necessarily, every thing is
necessarily actual. So, for every MA↑↓ , MA↑↓ ∕⊨LA↑↓ ♦ ↑
n ♦ ↑m □∀Ax ↓m
x((Cx ∨ ¬Cx) →↓n ¬EAx).
Thus, given τ1 and τ2, LA
↑↓
and LP↑↓ are not equally expressive.
As promised, we have shown that, in the constant domain S5 framework
in which we have formulated the AP-distinction, Correia’s mappings break
down. Of course, a reduction between LA↑↓ and LP↑↓ will probably be found
via different mappings. For instance, the homophonic clauses for ‘is actual’,
mapping E!A to E!P and E!P to E!A, could be replaced with non-homophonic
substitutes. And this in turn may well bring about the desired reduction.
One option here, explored for instance by Woodward (2013) elaborating on a
previous suggestion by Lewis (1990), comes in roughly the following terms.
On the one hand, the actualist’s E!A is mapped to the possibilist’s predicate
‘is a thing’ and, on the other hand, the possibilist’s E!P is mapped to the
actualist’s predicate ‘is concrete’.
But whilst finding some mappings capable of bringing about a reduction
between two logics is one thing, establishing their philosophical significance
5.3. Reductions Between Actualism and Possibilism 185
is another. Two sub-sections ago, we had already pointed out that the legit-
imacy of Woodward’s non-homophonic mappings was called into question
(by Priest (2013)). And so, whatever the merit of Woodward’s account, if
its underlying idea were imported into the AP-distinction, the resulting ac-
count will ipso facto face precisely the legitimacy issues which Priest origi-
nally pressed against Woodward. Thus, at the very least, this shifts the bur-
den of proof on Williamson. If he intends to argue for the merely verbal
character of our formulation of the AP-distinction along the lines of the two
arguments given in §5.3.1, he ought to carry out a twofold task. First, he
needs to find (non-homophonic) mappings which can in fact bring about a
reduction between actualism and possibilism. Secondly, he needs to show
that they can withstand well known arguments concerning the legitimacy it-
self of non-homophonic translations. Until then, we conclude, the arguments
outlined in §5.3.1 have little, if any, significance for our discussion.
This sub-section concludes our discussion of Correia’s mappings. From
now on, our focus will be on the logic of ‘is actual’. In general, actualists
and possibilists do not seem to have deductively equivalent uses of ‘is ac-
tual’. And as we have noted in the introduction to this chapter, according
to Williamson (1988, 2013b), this fact may be used to justify a form of logi-
cal pluralism about their disagreement. As we will explain shortly, being a
logical pluralist about a dispute corresponds for Williamson to the view that
the parties to such dispute are engaging in a merely verbal disagreement.
Whilst §5.5 and §5.6 are jointly dedicated to develop our objection against
Williamson’s logical pluralism about the AP-distinction, the next section is
dedicated to setting the stage for our argument. For, we need to explain
in more detail what Williamson’s case for logical pluralism about the AP-
distinction amounts to and, equally importantly, rests upon. So we now turn
to these matters, before getting into the details of our objection to Williamson.
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5.4 Equivocation and Logical Pluralism
5.4.1 The Uniqueness Challenge
The view put forward by Williamson (1988, 2013b) is pretty simple: logical
pluralism about a dispute is justified if this is known to turn on an equiv-
ocation. He takes the actualism/possibilism dispute to be a case in point,
whence his logical pluralism about this dispute (2010, 2013c, 2016b).
Being a logical pluralist about a dispute, as Williamson (2013b: 224) put it,
is tantamount to denying that this reflects a real disagreement; in this sense,
being a logical pluralist simpliciter would correspond to maintaining that no
logical dispute reflects a real disagreement. Distinguishing between logical
pluralism and logical pluralism about a dispute is important, in that a denier
of logical pluralism may well be a logical pluralist about a dispute. For exam-
ple, Williamson (2013b) rejected logical pluralism, but defended it about the
actualism/possibilism dispute (2010, 2013c, 2016b).
The motivation put forward by Williamson for the non-reality of the actu-
alism/possibilism disagreement is strongly reminiscent of what Steinberger
(2019) calls operational logical pluralism. On this view, logical disputes are re-
flective of merely verbal disagreements arising from object-language equivo-
cations about the meaning of logical constants (Carnap (1937), Morton (1973),
Haack (1978b), Quine (1970)). This is exactly what Williamson (2010, 2013c,
2016b) has argued at length about the actualism/possibilism dispute: it re-
flects a merely verbal disagreement arising from an equivocation of ‘is ac-
tual’.
In §5.3, we have seen that invoking Correia’s mappings is not a promising
strategy for thinking that the actualism/possibilism dispute is equivocal in
the sense just outlined. However, as we said, Williamson (1988, 2013b) has
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another option available to deem a logical dispute equivocal.
By ‘logical dispute’ here we mean a disagreement between two parties
about the validity of a logical law. To exclude that a logical dispute is equiv-
ocal, Williamson may demand that the logical constants used by the parties
to express the logical law in question be deductively equivalent; when this
demand cannot be met, we have ground to deem the dispute equivocal. We
call this the Uniqueness Challenge - the reference is to Belnap (1962), who had
argued that deductive equivalence of two logical constants is tantamount to
their being unique.
There are several putative logical laws, concerning ‘is actual’, which ac-
tualism and possibilism disagree about, at least provided they are presented
as per §5.3. An interesting example, which will play an important role in the
remainder of the chapter, is represented by what we call the Actuality Princi-
ple (AP). This says that having a property expressed by a monadic predicate
is sufficient for being actual:
AP ξt ⊢ E!t.
Given our presentation in §5.3, actualism and possibilism are not expected
to license deductively equivalent uses of ‘is actual’. Williamson could there-
fore invoke the Uniqueness Challenge and consider equivocal both a dis-
agreement about AP and in general any other disagreement actualists and
possibilists would incur. Two possible responses to this argument, however,
are in order.
5.4.2 Accepting the (Uniqueness) Challenge
First of all, one could argue with Read (2000) that Belnap’s thesis, which
Williamson re-elaborated to devise the Uniqueness Challenge, is too strin-
gent. Specifically, to claim that the lack of deductive equivalence for two
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logical constants entails their being different is too much. For two logical
constants to be unique, Read (2000: 126) argues, ‘[i]t is sufficient that in-
equivalence not be provable’. Thus, the parties’ inability to pass the Unique-
ness Challenge would not imply an equivocation of ‘is actual’; logical plural-
ism about their dispute would therefore be unwarranted. We now leave this
worry aside for the time being; we simply anticipate that our argument later
in §5.6 could be interpreted as providing reason for the correctness of Read’s
claim.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, one could argue that the Unique-
ness Challenge poses an illegitimate demand altogether. The reason is that
for the possibilist ‘is actual’ expresses a non-logical property, just like many
other predicates do (‘is happy’, ‘is friendly’ and so on). Then, how could
one expect actualists and possibilists to be able to show that their uses of ‘is
actual’ are deductively equivalent?
To illustrate this point further, let us consider the distinction, encountered
in Chapter 2, between blanket and non-blanket properties. A blanket prop-
erty is a property trivially possessed by any thing whatsoever; a non-blanket
property, accordingly, one that some things have and some things lack. For
the actualist, ‘is actual’ expresses a blanket property, reducible to a combina-
tion of the existential quantifier and identity: two logical constants. A similar
use of ‘is actual’ is governed by logical laws. All this does not apply to the
possibilist, according to whom actuality is a non-blanket property, enjoyed
by some things and lacked by others. Clearly then, one may observe, the pos-
sibilist’s use of ‘is actual’ is simply not suited to be characterised by means of
logical laws.
Of course, Williamson could turn the point on its head. The fact that
the possibilist takes ‘is actual’ as not expressing a blanket property does not
disqualify the Uniqueness Challenge; it rather confirms the equivocality of
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the actualism/possibilism dispute. We have thus reached a stalemate.
To make some progress, we want to highlight a fact that has gone largely
unnoticed. Even if ‘is actual’ is taken to express a non-blanket property, it
is still possible to maintain that there are logical laws governing it. This is
true in particular with respect to AP, the logical law introduced at the end
of §5.4.1. We will now present a non-standard form of possibilism which
licenses a use of ‘is actual’ governed by AP, despite taking it as expressing a
non-blanket property. Our interest in this form of possibilism is mainly due
to the fact that its use of ‘is actual’ is necessarily equivalent to the one licensed
by a form of actualism which takes ‘is actual’ to be governed by AP too.
Thus, these theories can pass Williamson’s Uniqueness Challenge. The form
of actualism involved here is often known as serious actualism; for uniformity,
we will accordingly call the new form of possibilism serious possibilism.
5.5 Serious Possibilism
Let us start by recalling what AP amounts to. Where E! expresses ‘is actual’
and ξ is a monadic predicate, AP is the schema: ξt ⊢ E!t. This principle
plays a key role in our discussion. For, two parties disagreeing over its valid-
ity will not exhibit deductively equivalent uses of ’is actual’, something not
happening to two parties agreeing over its validity, as shown in this section.
Thus, any two parties to the actualism/possibilism dispute license deduc-
tively equivalent uses of ‘is actual’ if, and only if, they take it to be governed
by AP.
As we noted earlier, a form of actualism has dispensed with AP. Dubbed
by Plantinga (1985: 316) frivolous actualism, this has been advocated for in-
stance by Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985). Likewise, we can speak of frivolous
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possibilism to denote standard forms of possibilism, which reject AP - see
§5.3.1.
This AP-centred taxonomy of the actualism/possibilism debate gives us
in total four theories: two forms of actualism (serious and frivolous), and
two forms of possibilism (ditto). Since there are six pairwise combinations
of those theories, there are correspondingly many ramifications the actual-
ism/possibilism may take. In this section, we will take into account the se-
rious actualism vs serious possibilism ramification; the remaining ones are
considered in §5.6.
Serious actualism has received large attention in the literature and rep-
resents a widely held view (Plantinga (1983, 1985), Forbes (1989), Bergmann
(1996), Stephanou (2002, 2007), Jacinto (2019)). In addition to AP, serious
actualism also accepts its generalisation to n-place predicates; we can call
this the Generalised Actuality Principle (GAP). Informally, GAP represents the
claim that things cannot relate to one another whilst failing to be actual.
For any n-place predicate θ with n ≥ 1, GAP corresponds to the follow-
ing schema, where as usual E! expresses ‘is actual’ and ti is any member of
{t1, . . . , tn}:
GAP θ(t1, . . . , tn) ⊢ E!ti.
Thus, serious actualism is adequately characterised as the conjunction of
the theses that things cannot relate to one another whilst not being actual and
that necessarily, everything that could have been actual already is - this last
claim was expressed in §5.2 by the formula Act. Let us assume that the logic
LA, outlined in §5.3.1, is sound for serious actualism. Given the S5 semantics
of LA, the following are adequate rules for □ - in fact, without loss of com-
pleteness, □I could even be slightly weakened, as shown by Humberstone
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(2016).
□E □A ⊢ A
□I X ⊢ A□A
provided each wff in X is fully modalised.
A formula is fully modalised just in case every atomic formula in it is
inside the scope of a modal operator.
We now present serious possibilism. We call its logic LP2 ; this is based
on a modal signature ℓP2 with an actuality predicate E!
P2 and is induced by
the class of MP2 = 〈W, DI , DO, a, σ〉 models where: W, DO (outer domain)
and DI (inner domain) are nonempty sets and DI ⊆ DO; a is a member of
W; σ is a function such that for each individual constant a, σ(a) ∈ DO and
σ(ξn, w) ⊆ Dn
O
, for each n-place predicate ξ and world w, with the proviso
that, at every w, DI(w) = σ(E!P2 , w).
Given a variable assignment g based on MP2 , the valuation function σ
is extended to a function σg whose domain is the union of the set of vari-
ables and the set of constants of ℓP2 , being defined as follows: for any term t,
σg(t) = σ(t) if t is an individual constant, and σg(t) = g(t) if t is a variable.
Satisfaction relative to a model MP2 , a variable-assignment g based on
that model and a world w of the set of worlds of MP2 is defined as follows.
MP2 , g, w ⊨LP2 ξ
n(t1, . . . tn)iff σg(t1), . . . , σg(tn) ∈ DI and〈σg(t1), . . . , σg(tn)〉
∈ σ(ξ, w).
MP2 , g, w ⊨LP2 ¬A iff M
P
2 , g, w ∕⊨LP2 A.
MP2 , g, w ⊨LP2 A&B iff M
P
2 , g, w ⊨LP2 A and M
P
2 , g, w ⊨LP2 B.
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MP2 , g, w ⊨LP2 t1 = t2 iff σ
g(t1) = σ
g(t2).
MP2 , g, w ⊨LP2 ∀
P
x A iff MP2 , g[o/x], w ⊨LP2 A for each o ∈ DO.
MP2 , g, w ⊨LP2 E!
P
t iff σg(t) ∈ DI(w).
MP2 , g, w ⊨LP2 □A iff M
P
2 , g, w ⊨LP2 A for every w
′ ∈ W.
The semantics of LP2 being that of S5 too, □E and □I are adequate rules of
inference for the system.
It is a consequence of serious possibilism that the thesis of actualism ex-
pressed by Act, captured in LP2 by the formula □∀x(♦E!P2 x → E!P2 x), fails to
express a logical truth, as the reader can check. Consequently, LP2 is compat-
ible with the thesis of possibilism, expressed by the formula Pos in §5.2: there
may be something that could have been actual but is not -♦∃x(♦E!P2 x &¬E!P2 x),
in the language of LP2 . On our previous characterisation in §5.3.1, possibilism
does not require Pos to be a logical truth, but only satisfiable. Since LP2 meets
this requirement, it is sound for possibilism.
The account of possibilia delivered by serious possibilism is certainly atyp-
ical. Sure enough, serious possibilism does not take ‘is actual’ to express a
blanket property, given that possibilia lack this property. However, the clause
for atomics of LP2 entails that a thing can fail to enjoy any property expressed
by a monadic predicate by simply falling outside the inner domain; specifi-
cally, under the set DO − DI , which is the one containing the possibilia. Thus,
not only are possibilia taken as lacking actuality, they lack any property ex-
pressed by any monadic predicate.
For this reason, AP is a principle of serious possibilism. Indeed, let ξ be
any monadic predicate and w any world. If t is one of the possibilia at w, then
the inference from ξt to E!P2t is trivial, given that ξt is false. On the other
hand, if t is actual at w, the inference stands.
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But serious possibilism rejects GAP as a principle of actuality. There is a
way in which things could relate to at least themselves whilst failing to be
actual, that is, being self-identical. Indeed, the clause for identity of LP2 is
standard, so that all things at each world - actual things, as well as possibilia
- are self-identical. Then, if t is amongst the possibilia at a world, t will fail to
be actual there whilst being self-identical, which corresponds to a counterex-
ample to GAP.
We now have a conflict between serious actualism and serious possibil-
ism over a putative principle of actuality, namely GAP. And obviously, these
theories also conflict over whether there are possibilia, and whether ‘is actual’
expresses a blanket property.
Logical pluralism about these conflicts is now ruled out as Williamson de-
mands, namely, by showing that the parties pass the Uniqueness Challenge.
In fact, not only can we show that the parties’ uses of ‘is actual’ are deduc-
tively equivalent: in the S5-logical framework we have been working with,
we can also strengthen the result to the extent that this is necessarily so.
Theorem 5.2. Let LP2
A
be a logic including two monadic predicates K and Λ
both obeying AP. Then, ⊢LP2A
□∀x (Kx ↔ Λx).
Proof.
1. By AP for Λ and the Deduction Theorem, ⊢LP2A
Kt → Λt.
2. By AP for K and the Deduction Theorem, ⊢LP2A
Λt → Kt.
3. From 1. and 2., by ↔I, ⊢LP2A
Λt ↔ Kt.
4. From 3., by ∀I, ⊢LP2A
∀x (Kx ↔ Λx).
5. From 5., by □I, ⊢LP2A
□∀x (Kx ↔ Λx).
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This means a rejection, by Williamson’s standards, of logical pluralism
about this specific ramification of the actualism/possibilism debate.
Throughout this chapter, we could appreciate the complexity of the actu-
alism/possibilism debate. This is partly due to the number of theories taking
part in the debate, partly to the number of issues at stake. In particular, we
have encountered five issues over which the theories manifest their disagree-
ments; these are listed in Table 5.1 below, together with each theory’s stance
towards them. We finally turn to the remaining five ramifications of the ac-
tualism/possibilism debate. An analysis of such ramifications in terms of
the Uniqueness Challenge justifies logical pluralism about them all, in that
they would all turn on equivocations of ‘is actual’ between the parties. More
specifically, as we mentioned at the end of §5.1, and as we will explain in
more detail in §5.6.1, Williamson’s view entails that our confidence in the hy-
pothesis that ‘is actual’ is being equivocated in those disputes should in fact
be higher than in the hypothesis that it is not. In the next section, we will sub-
ject this probabilistic claim of Williamson’s to critical scrutiny. In particular,
we are interested in determining whether Williamson’s verdict is supported
by the relevant evidence at our disposal, which we have collected in Table
5.1 below.
Our argument will take the following shape. We will start by granting
Williamson that the prior probability of his hypothesis about the equivoca-
tion of ‘is actual’ in the disputes under consideration, namely the probability
that this hypothesis is true absent any relevant evidence, is very strong - so
strong, in fact, to be certain. The data collected in Table 5.1 is then introduced,
in order to determine to what extent, if at all, it disconfirms Williamson’s hy-
pothesis. To this end, we will run two simulations, the main assumptions of
which will be described in more detail towards the end of §5.6.1. What they
both show, however, is that not only does the data at our disposal not ground
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Williamson’s hypothesis; it in fact gives us good reason to believe that such a
hypothesis is false. But recall that the hypothesis that ‘is actual’ was equivo-
cal in those disputes was what grounded logical pluralism about them in the
first place - recall, in particular, the Williamsonian account of logical plural-
ism about a dispute presented earlier in §5.4. Thus, we conclude, if we have
little reason to believe in the equivocation hypothesis of ‘is actual’, then we
equally seem to have little reason to believe in logical pluralism about about
the disputes considered in the next section. So to those disputes, we now
turn to.
5.6 A Bayesian Challenge
5.6.1 Setting the Stage
We will use this sub-section to set the stage for our two simulations, which
will occupy us throughout §5.6.2 and §5.6.3. The goal of this sub-section
is threefold. We will first of all present the evidence relative to the AP-
distinction made available throughout this chapter. Subsequently, we will
get into more detail about Williamson’s probabilistic view about an equivo-
cation occurring in each of the five ramifications of the AP-distinction listed
in Table 5.2 below. Then, we will conclude by spelling out the assumptions
our two simulations rest upon.
At the end of §5.5, we mentioned that there are five main issues at stake
in the actualism/possibilism debate, at least as understood in this chapter.
These issues are listed in Table 5.1 below, together with the position ex-
pressed by the theories to the debate over each one of them - a ✓ represents
acceptance of a thesis, a ✗ rejection thereof.
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Thesis Ser. Actualism Fri. Actualism Ser. Possibilism Fri. Possibilism
A. ‘Is actual’ is
governed by AP.
✓ ✗ ✓ ✗
B. ‘Is actual’ is
governed by GAP.




✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
D. ‘Is actual’ ex-
presses a blanket
property.
✓ ✓ ✗ ✗
E. There are possi-
bilia.
✗ ✗ ✓ ✓
TABLE 5.1: Varieties of Actualism and Possibilism
There are six pairwise combinations of the four theories listed in Table
5.1, each one resulting in a ramification of the actualism/possibilism debate.
Logical pluralism about one of them was rejected in §5.5. So now, let us di-
vide the remaining five ramifications into two groups, and call internal those
involving either two forms of actualism or two forms of possibilism; call the
remaining ramifications external. These ramifications are given an enumera-
tion in Table 5.2 below.
Dispute Number Internal Disputes External Disputes
1 Ser. Possibilism vs Fri. Possibilism
2 Ser. Actualism vs Fri. Actualism
3 Ser. Actualism vs Fri. Possibilism
4 Fri. Actualism vs Ser. Possibilism
5 Fri. Actualism vs Fri. Possibilism
Total Internal Disputes Total External Disputes
2 3
TABLE 5.2: Internal and External Disputes of the Actual-
ism/Possibilism Debate
The parties to any dispute in Table 5.2 disagree over whether ‘is actual’ is
governed by AP (thesis A in Table 5.1); a fact entailing their not using it in
deductively equivalent ways. In an attempt to invoke the Uniqueness Chal-
lenge, at this point Williamson might argue that logical pluralism about those
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five disputes is justified, relying on the claim that the parties equivocate on
‘is actual’ in each of those five ramifications of the AP-distinction. After all,
we know from the previous chapter that Williamson took logicians holding
seemingly incompatible beliefs, about a logical expression not being used by
them in deductively equivalent ways, as equivocating on its meaning.
We can draw a comparison with the dispute, encountered in the previous
chapter, between allists and noneists. As we know, not all forms of allism and
noneism share deductively equivalent uses of ‘exists’. A relevant example
here is the case of an allist and a noneist, whereby the latter uses ‘exists’
as obeying neither EP, nor the rules R3 nor R4 mentioned in §4.4.3. Thus,
to the question ‘are those theorists justified in believing that they are not
equivocating on the meaning of exists?’, Williamson’s answer comes in the
following terms (our italics):
They certainly do not have the reason that the two proponents of
EP had, for they cannot agree to define the ’existence’ predicate
as that which obeys EP. At the same time, they have a stronger rea-
son than any in the previous case to believe that they are equivocating
(Williamson (1988: 117)).
Williamson argues here that the confidence that the theorists in question
should have in thinking that they are equivocating is stronger than any other
reason which could lead them to think otherwise. Now, the parties to the
five ramifications of the AP-distinction listed in Table 5.2, as we know, hap-
pen to find themselves in exactly the same situation in which the theorists
referred to by Williamson in the passage above find themselves in. That is to
say, just as the latter, the former lack deductively equivalent uses of a logical
expression (‘is actual’) about which they hold seemingly inconsistent beliefs.
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Therefore, by applying Williamson’s reasoning to their case, we get the prob-
abilist claim we will critically examine in the remainder of this chapter: our
confidence in the hypothesis that ‘is actual’ is being equivocated in those dis-
putes should be higher than our confidence in the hypothesis that it is not.
At least with respect to four of the five disputes listed in Table 5.2, which
we will indicate vey shortly, we found that things do not obviously look as
per Williamson’s reasoning. Quite the contrary, we have found that, given
the evidence available, we seem to have quite a solid ground to think that
Williamson’s conclusion, applied to the four disputes in question, is false. In
other words, the four disputes we will take into consideration in the remain-
der of the section are likely to be characterised by no equivocation at all about
the meaning of ‘is actual’. If we are correct, then the crucial hypothesis sup-
porting logical pluralism about these disputes, namely the equivocation of ‘is
actual’, is in fact an improbable one. Of course, if this hypothesis is improb-
able given the evidence available, then we have no good reason to believe
it. But logical pluralism about those disputes, based on the Williamsonian ac-
count given in §5.4, was precisely grounded on the hypothesis of the equiv-
ocation of ‘is actual’. And so, we conclude, if we are unjustified to believe
such a hypothesis, then logical pluralism about these four disputes, given the
evidence available, appears to be unwarranted as well.
As already observed, every dispute listed in Table 5.2 is characterised by
a disagreement over whether ‘is actual’ obeys AP - represented as a disagree-
ment over thesis A in Table 5.1. Moreover, recall that, as we noted in §5.5, any
two parties to the actualism/possibilism dispute share deductively equiva-
lent uses of ‘is actual’ if, and only if, they both take it to be governed by AP.
Thus, in no dispute listed in Table 5.2 do the parties share deductively equiv-
alent uses of ‘is actual’. By Williamson’s argument above, in each of those
disputes, due to a disagreement over thesis A, the parties are likelier than not
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to equivocate on ‘is actual’. In order to find evidence against Williamson’s
claim, the question we need to address is the following. Given the data in
Table 5.1 concerning the four theses B, C, D and E, how likely is it to suppose
that an equivocation of ‘is actual’ is occurring? To determine this, as antici-
pated, we will carry out two simulations; one concerning internal dispute 1,
and the other internal dispute 2.
In §5.6.2, we will run our first simulation. This will aim to determine to
what extent we are entitled to believe that ‘is actual’ is being equivocated on
by the parties to internal dispute 1, namely, serious possibilism and frivolous
possibilism. As shown by Table 5.1, the parties to this dispute agree on each
of the four theses B-E. Thus, about this dispute, we ask: how likely is it to
suppose that the parties equivocate on ‘is actual’, given that they agree on
each of these theses? We will imagine two subjects, S1 and S2, asked to reg-
ister their beliefs about some subject matter in a four question questionnaire.
Their answers to the questionnaire will constitute our evidence. We will thus
suppose that S1 and S2, upon taking the questionnaire, end up with four
matching answers out of four, just like the parties to internal dispute 1 do
with respect to theses B-E in Table 5.1. The hypothesis whose probability we
want to determine in light of our evidence is that S1 and S2 equivocate the
subject matter of questionnaire. We will first measure how likely it is for S1
and S2 to give four matching answers if we assume that they equivocate on
the subject matter of the questionnaire. Then, prior to considering our evi-
dence, we will assume that the equivocation hypothesis is certain, just as we
are granting Williamson that his claim, that parties to internal dispute 1 are
equivocating on the meaning of ‘is actual’, is certain. Finally, after consider-
ing the evidence, a simple application of Bayes’ Theorem will reveal that the
likelihood of the hypothesis, that S1 and S2 are equivocating on the subject
matter of the questionnaire, is actually exactly 24%.
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In §5.6.3, the same kind of simulation is carried out, this time with the
goal of shedding some light on internal dispute 2. The parties to this dispute
are serious actualism and serious possibilism which, as shown in Table 5.1,
agree on theses C, D and E, but disagree over thesis B. Therefore, serious
actualism and serious possibilism agree on three of the theses listed in Table
5.1, and disagree on one. We will thus imagine two subjects, S3 and S4, asked
to register their beliefs about some subject matter in a four question question-
naire, and ending up with three matching answers. By following the same
reasoning applied in the first simulation, the result we have obtained is that
S3 and S4 are only just more than 44% likely to equivocate the content of the
questionnaire.
Our two simulations contribute to the present debate by giving us an in-
dication of the extent to which we are entitled to believe Williamson’s hy-
pothesis that ‘is actual’ is equivocated in internal disputes 1 and 2. To give
a better taste of the kind of reasoning we will deploy later on in this section,
we can now elaborate a bit on the previous paragraph and consider, for def-
initeness, internal dispute 1 (serious vs frivolous possibilism). First of all,
although he never resorted to a similar label, Graham Priest has expressed
views which are very much in the vicinity of frivolous possibilism - see in
particular Priest (2016b). We can thus take Priest as a representative of the
view. We can, on the other hand, consider us as representatives of serious
possibilism. So suppose that what we called subjects S1 and S2 in the previ-
ous paragraph are in fact Priest and us, respectively. Thus, based on Table
5.1, Priest and us disagree over a thesis concerning the expression ‘is actual’,
namely, thesis A in that table: Priest takes ‘is actual’ as not obeying AP; we
do. Our disagreement is by hypothesis due, according to the Williamsonian
line of argument illustrated above, to our equivocating on the meaning of ‘is
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actual’. We would mean, in other words, different things by that same ex-
pression. Determining to what extent we are entitled to believe Williamson’s
hypothesis about our disagreement with Priest is, as we said, the goal that
our simulation in §5.6.2 aims to achieve. So how will we attempt to carry
out such a task? Our idea is that detecting an equivocation between two
speakers about the meaning of a term is just the kind of activity that can be
carried out by testing their willingness to accept, or reject, whether certain
statements apply to the term in question. Our driving intuition, as we will
explain more extendedly later on in §5.6.2, is that an equivocation about the
meaning of a term decreases, rather than not, the probability that two sub-
jects agree on whether a certain statement applies to it. Thus, if we consider
again Table 5.1, we will see, in addition to thesis A, four other theses about
the expression ‘is actual’, namely, theses B-E2. So imagine Priest and us took
a questionnaire in which we were asked to register our beliefs about theses
B-E. And suppose that, upon taking the questionnaire, for each thesis among
B-E individually taken, Priest and us always agreed as to whether it applies
to ‘is actual’ - just as per Table 5.1. This, as far as we can see, makes it harder
to believe that the hypothesis that Priest and us equivocate on ‘is actual’ is
true. So much harder, we will argue in §5.6.2, that we should only be 24%
confident in believing such a hypothesis - being this the value we have ob-
tained for its posterior probability. Precisely the same kind of reasoning, but
this time with different data, will be at work in §5.6.3, discussing the equiv-
ocation hypothesis of ‘is actual’ in internal dispute 2 (between serious and
frivolous actualism).
Now, up to this point we have described the kind of simulations we will
2Thesis C (‘Everything that could have been actual already is’) may not look as being
directly about ‘is actual’ itself, but rather about the property it denotes. But nothing prevents
us to reformulate thesis D in the following terms: Everything of which ‘could have been
actual’ can be truthfully predicated is already something of which ‘is actual’ can be truthfully
predicated. Analogous considerations apply to thesis E.
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carry out about internal disputes 1 and 2, and have specified the level of
confidence we should attribute to the equivocation hypothesis of ‘is actual’ in
them. From there, we will make two further claims, this time about external
disputes 3 and 4. The first claim, which we will make at the end of §5.6.2 is
that the hypothesis that ‘is actual’ is equivocated on in external dispute 3 is
just as likely as in internal dispute 1. The second claim, which we will make
at the end of §5.6.3 is that the hypothesis that ‘is actual’ is equivocated on in
external dispute 4 is just as likely as in internal dispute 2. Our arguments for
these claims share exactly the same, following form.
In the case of external dispute 3, the argument goes as follows. Recall,
the parties to external dispute 3, as shown in Table 5.2, are serious actualism
and frivolous possibilism. First of all, given our results from §5.5, we have
a principled refutation, by Williamson’s standards, that ‘is actual’ is equivo-
cated on by serious actualists and serious possibilists. In other words, what
the former mean by ‘is actual’ is just what the latter mean. Given our first
simulation (about internal dispute 1) our confidence in the hypothesis that
‘is actual’ is equivocated on by serious and frivolous possibilists should be
24%. Therefore, since what serious possibilists mean by ‘is actual’ is equiva-
lent to what serious actualists mean, our confidence in an equivocation of ‘is
actual’ between serious actualists and frivolous possibilists should be exactly
analogous to the confidence in an equivocation of ‘is actual’ between serious
possibilists and frivolous possibilists. That is, 24%.
In the case of external dispute 4, the argument goes as follows. Recall, the
parties to external dispute 4, as shown in Table 5.2, are serious possibilism
and frivolous actualism. Again, our results from §5.5 established that seri-
ous actualists and serious possibilists mean by ‘is actual’ equivalent things.
Given our second simulation (about internal dispute 2) our confidence in the
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hypothesis that ‘is actual’ is equivocated on by serious and frivolous actual-
ists should be just more than 44%. Since what serious possibilists mean by
‘is actual’ is equivalent to what serious actualists mean, our confidence in
an equivocation of ‘is actual’ between frivolous actualists and serious possi-
bilists should be exactly analogous to the confidence in an equivocation of ‘is
actual’ between serious actualists and frivolous actualists. That is, just above
44%.
This means that, by the end of this section, we will have managed to pro-
vide evidence against logical pluralism about five of the six ramifications of
the actualism/possibilism debate considered in this chapter. Before turning
to our simulations, let us highlight the main characteristics of our question-
naire and our assumptions about it.
Our questionnaire contains four statements about a certain subject matter.
As in Table 5.1, there are only two possible answers for each statement: ✓
(acceptance of the statement) and ✗ (rejection thereof). If the subjects give
matching answers about the same statement (two ✓s or two ✗s), then call
this event an agreement; a disagreement being the event that an agreement does
not occur.
We make three assumptions. First, a subject’s acceptance and rejection of
a statement have equal probability (50% each). This captures the intuition
that, for each statement, the two answers are equally plausible. A neutral
observer of the actualism/possibilism debate will make that assumption too.
Secondly, we take one subject’s answers to the questionnaire as indepen-
dent events, with no influence on each other. One could question this as-
sumption on the grounds that, in the internal disputes, the parties’ accep-
tances and rejections of theses A–E in Table 5.1 are related. However, this
point is irrelevant for our goal. In principle, accepting or rejecting any of
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these theses does not dictate which other theses one could or could not ac-
cept3. Of course some combinations will result in extravagant theories, but it
would be a mistake to rule ahead of enquiry that some form of justification
for them could not in principle be found - or in any case, this would be a
substantive claim. Thus, acceptances and rejections of theses A–E are better
thought of as independent events, as are acceptances and rejections in our
questionnaire.
Finally, we assume that the subjects take the questionnaire independently
of one another, so that either subject’s answers have no impact on the other’s.
5.6.2 Simulation 1
We compare here the case of serious and frivolous possibilism, the parties to
internal dispute 1, to the case of subjects S1 and S2. Let h1, our hypothesis,
stand for the proposition that S1 and S2 equivocate the content of the ques-
tionnaire; and let e1, our evidence, stand for the proposition that, upon taking
the questionnaire, S1 and S2 end up with four agreements (so, no disagree-
ments). What we want to determine with Bayes’ Theorem is Pr(h1|e1): the
conditional probability that our hypothesis occurs given the evidence avail-
able. This requires us to assign a value to Pr(e1), Pr(e1|h1) and Pr(h1). How-
ever, we said earlier that, prior to considering any evidence, we take h1 to
be certain. Therefore, we can already set Pr(h1) = 1. We are thus left with
determining Pr(e1) and Pr(e1|h1).
Let us start with Pr(e1), the probability that S1 and S2 end up with four
agreements. Since all events are independent, we can directly compute Pr(e1)
3This seems to be the case even for theses C and E. An acceptance of the former is surely
more frequently accompanied by a rejection of the latter. But as Menzel (2020: 1984) notes
this need not be so; a theory could in principle rule out non-actual but possible objects,
whilst allowing for non-actual but impossible ones. In such a theory, it seems that one could
accommodate both thesis C and E.
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by elevating to the fourth the the probability that an agreement obtains about
a random statement.
First, let S✓1 and S
✗
1 stand for the propositions that S1 answers with a ✓and
that S1 answers with an ✗ respectively; similarly for S2. Consider a random
statement of the questionnaire; we said that each subject is equally likely to
answer with a ✓ or an ✗. Hence,




2 ) = Pr(S
✗
2) = 0.5 (50%).
Since the subjects’ answers are independent, the probability of obtaining
two ✓s is
Pr(S✓1 )× Pr(S✓2 ) = 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.25 (25%).
Likewise, the probability of obtaining two ✗s is
Pr(S✗1)× Pr(S
✗
2) = 0.5 × 0.5 = 0.25 (25%).
Adding these two values gives us the probability of an agreement about the
statement. Thus,
Pr(1 Agr) = (Pr(S✓1 )× Pr(S✓2 )) + (Pr(S✗1)× Pr(S
✗
1)) = 0.5 (50%).
Since an agreement and a disagreement exhaust all the possible events,
the probability of a disagreement about a random statement is the comple-
ment of the probability of an agreement. Thus, we can set
Pr(1 Dis) = 1 − Pr(1 Agr) = 0.5 (50%).
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The value of Pr(e1) is now computed in formula (1) below.
Pr(e1) = Pr(1 Agr)4 = 0.54 = 0.0625 (6.25%) (5.1)
This means that S1 and S2 are 6.25% likely to end up with four agreements
in the questionnaire.
Now we need to determine Pr(e1|h1), the probability that S1 and S2 end
up with four agreements given that they equivocate the content of the ques-
tionnaire.
Finding an objective value for Pr(e1|h1) is a difficult task, perhaps an im-
possible one. Nonetheless, we can help ourselves to some general principles
and exploit them to arrive at a satisfactory approximation. For instance, it
should be pretty obvious that Pr(e1|h1) < Pr(e1). For, knowing that S1 and
S2 equivocate the subject matter of the questionnaire should certainly de-
crease the probability that they end up with no disagreements at all. Assum-
ing an equivocation, we would in fact expect to see disagreements, rather
than agreements, occurring with a higher frequency.
For example, in a normal conversation between Person 1 and Person 2
about banks, the event that Person 1 and Person 2 agree on every respect
may well happen. However, if we knew that Person 1 took bank as a financial
institution and Person 2 as one side of a river, we would reasonably expect
the probability of this event occurring to be surely lower.
To make sense of this intuition, the principle we assume is that an equiv-
ocation has two correlated effects on our questionnaire. On the one hand,
an equivocation decreases the probability of an agreement occurring about a
random statement, whilst increasing the probability of a disagreement.
So, let Pr(1 Agr|h1) be the probability of obtaining an agreement about
a random statement given that S1 and S2 equivocate its content, and Pr(1
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Dis|h1) the probability of obtaining a disagreement under the same condi-
tions.
Since Pr(1 Agr)= Pr(1 Dis)= 0.5, we can set Pr(1 Agr|h1) < 0.5, and
therefore Pr(1 Dis|h1) > 0.5.
A reasonable value for Pr(1 Agr|h1) and Pr(1 Dis|h1) is in order:
Pr(1 Agr|h1) = 0.35 (35%);
Pr(1 Dis|h1) = 0.65 (65%).
This way, we are assuming that an equivocation decreases by 30% the
probability of S1 and S2 ending up with an agreement about a random state-
ment, whilst increasing by the same amount the probability of a disagree-
ment. It is thus more difficult, but far from impossible, for S1 and S2 to obtain
an agreement; at the same time it is easier, but far from certain, for them to
obtain a disagreement.
The value of Pr(e1|h1), computed in formula (2) below, is then obtained
by elevating to the fourth the probability of obtaining an agreement about a
random statement, given an equivocation of the content of questionnaire.
Pr(e1|h1) = Pr(1 Agr|h1)4 = 0.354 =≈ 0.0150 (≈ 1.5%). (5.2)
Assuming that S1 and S2 equivocate the content of the questionnaire, they
are 1.5% likely to end up with four agreements.
We are now in a position to apply Bayes’ Theorem and calculate Pr(h1|e1),
the probability of our hypothesis, given the evidence available.







= 0.24 (24%). (5.3)
If S1 and S2 end up with four agreements, they are 24% likely to be equiv-
ocating the content our questionnaire. This entails that the evidence available
heavily disconfirms the equivocation hypothesis. At this point, we should set
our degree of confidence in such a hypothesis to 24 %, which is the value of
Pr(h1|e1) - or at least, this is a standard move in Bayesian Confirmation The-
ory. Hence, in light of the evidence, the equivocation hypothesis is by far
unlikelier than not.
If our simulation succeeds in informing internal dispute 1 of the actual-
ism/possibilism debate, then we should set our degree of confidence in the
hypothesis of ‘is actual’ being equivocated therein to the same value. Then,
not only is the resulting degree of confidence clearly insufficient to justify a
belief in the hypothesis; given the evidence available, we have strong reason
to disbelieve such a hypothesis. The equivocation of ‘is actual’ was the only
ground for logical pluralism about this dispute. If this hypothesis is unlikelier
than not, so is logical pluralism about this dispute.
This result immediately impacts on the probability that logical pluralism
is true about external dispute 3 of the actualism/possibilism debate, involving
frivolous possibilism vs serious actualism. As a corollary of our findings in
this simulation, we can derive that our degree of confidence in ‘is actual’
being equivocated in this ramification of the actualism/possibilism debate
should too be set to 24 %.
Our argument for this claim is in order. Given our result from §5.5, we
have a principled refutation that serious possibilism and serious actualism
equivocate ‘is actual’. Thus, a theory’s probability to equivocate ‘is actual’
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with serious possibilism must be analogous to the probability of equivocat-
ing it with serious actualism. Given our result in this section, frivolous possi-
bilism is 24% likely to equivocate ‘is actual’ with serious possibilism. Hence,
it must also be 24% likely to equivocate ‘is actual’ with serious actualism.
Therefore, we should set our level of confidence in ‘is actual’ being equivo-
cated in external dispute 3 to 24 %. Placing such a low level of confidence in
the equivocation of ‘is actual’ in external dispute 3 entails that our confidence
should be higher in logical pluralism being false about this dispute.
We now turn to our second simulation, where the parties to internal dis-
pute 2, serious and frivolous actualism, are compared to subjects S3 and S4,
obtaining three agreements in our four question questionnaire.
5.6.3 Simulation 2
The simulation to be carried out here is exactly analogous to the previous one,
so most of the key data used there carry over here. Let h2 be the hypothesis
that S3 and S4 equivocate the subject matter of the questionnaire. Again, the
probability of this hypothesis prior to considering any evidence is certain; so
we set Pr(h2) = 1.
Let e2, our evidence, stand for the proposition that S3 and S4 obtain one
disagreement and three agreements. Since our evidence is different than be-
fore, we need to calculate its probability in a different way, even though the
result will not vary. Like before, Pr(1 Agr) = Pr(1 Dis) = 0.5. Thus, Pr(e2) is
the result of multiplying Pr(1 Dis) by the cube of Pr(1 Agr):
Pr(e2) = 0.54 = 0.0625 (6.25%). (5.4)
Now for Pr(e2|h2), the probability that our new evidence occurs given
the equivocation hypothesis of S3 and S4. We still assume that knowing that
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S3 and S4 equivocate the content of the questionnaire makes them 30% less
likely to obtain an agreement about a random statement, and 30% likelier to
obtain a disagreement. So, we set Pr(1 Agr|h2) = 0.35 and Pr(1 Dis|h2) =
0.65. Then, Pr(e2|h2) is calculated by multiplying Pr(1 Dis|h2) by the cube of
Pr(1 Agr|h2):
Pr(e2|h2) = 0.65 × 0.353 =≈ 0.0279 (≈ 2.79%). (5.5)
We calculate Pr(h2|e2) in formula (6) below, corresponding to the prob-





= 0.4464 (44.64%). (5.6)
As promised, S3 and S4 are thus shown to be 44.64 % likely to equivocate
the subject matter of the questionnaire. Given the analogy between these
subjects and the parties to internal dispute 2 (serious and frivolous actual-
ism), we should conclude that the latter are 44.64 % likely to equivocate ‘is
actual’.
This result has a direct bearing on external dispute 4, involving frivolous
actualism and serious possibilism. For, knowing that frivolous actualism is
44.64 % likely to equivocate ‘is actual’ with serious actualism, and knowing
(from §5.5) that serious actualism and serious possibilism mean the same by
‘is actual’, frivolous actualism must also be 44.64 % likely to equivocate ‘is
actual’ with serious possibilism.
This was the last result to show. To complete the picture, we would have
to examine the case of external dispute 5, involving the frivolous versions of
actualism and possibilism . Given the results obtained so far, it is reasonable
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to suppose that the equivocation hypothesis be likelier to be false here as
well. However, we leave a more precise analysis of the case for future work.
Before taking stock of what has been shown in this chapter, a few words
are needed on what this section has claimed, and illustrate a possible line of
response by Williamson to the arguments here presented.
The two simulations carried out in the past two sub-sections, as we have
seen, showed us that Williamson’s verdict about the equivocation hypothesis
of ‘is actual’, about internal disputes 1 and 2, does not obviously withstand
the evidence available, which we had collected in Table 5.1 in §5.6.1. Then,
by invoking our results from §5.5, we extended this conclusion to external
disputes 3 and 4 as well. We take such results to indicate that Williamson’s
logical pluralism about those four ramifications of the AP-distinction is by no
means obvious. In light of the probabilistic nature of the arguments proposed
in this section, Williamson’s rebuttal could come in at least two forms. On the
one hand, Williamson may protest that we have failed to consider all the ev-
idence necessary to carry out simulations of the sort proposed here. And,
nothing in principle prevents that, if this line were successfully pressed, the
new evidence could overturn our findings and show that the equivocation
hypothesis of ‘is actual’ is in fact likelier than not. Alternatively, Williamson
may point to a flaw in the way our findings were achieved. Perhaps a method-
ological case could be made for thinking that the probabilistic reasoning de-
ployed in this section is of little significance given the abstract character of
the notion around which the AP-distinction is centred, actuality. But whilst
such lines of response are entirely legitimate, a case for them still has to be
made. To our opponent, the challenge is therefore to undertake this task.
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5.7 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to reject two reasons meant to provide support
for the non-reality of the disagreement between actualism and possibilism, a
view defended by Williamson (2010, 2013c, 2016b). First of all, we followed
Menzel (2020) in his presentation of the disagreement. This was important,
in that as we saw, there are other ways to express the distinction between
actualism and possibilism, but we set those aside. We then refuted a transla-
tion schema by Correia (2007), invoked by Williamson (2013c: §7.1) to show
that actualism and possibilism do not really express contradictory claims.
We subsequently turned to the claim that logical pluralism about the actual-
ism/possibilism dispute is justified by the fact that the parties equivocate ‘is
actual’, due to their not using it in deductively equivalent ways. We consid-
ered six ramifications of the actualism/possibilism debate. By Williamson’s
standards, one of those ramifications is certainly not characterised by an
equivocal disagreement. As for four of the remaining five ramifications, we
have shown that we have strong reason to disbelieve an equivocation of ‘is
actual’. Having finally indicated two ways in which a rebuttal to our ar-




In this final part of our work, we want to draw some conclusions, summing
up the issues that we have encountered and the claims we have made along
the way. This will also be the occasion to highlight possible future devel-
opments of the present research, and indicate connections that we could not
explore in the present context.
Our starting point was an empirical datum, the fact that agents engage
in many sorts of cognitive activities; they think and imagine, for example.
And when they think or imagine, they often think or imagine some thing, an
object. We have always struggled to see the cogency of the view that the thing
in question, on pain of irrationality, should be tacitly understood as being an
existent. Thoughts of this sort prompted the present research.
We started in Chapter 1 by presenting the methodological account as-
sumed in our work: anti-exceptionalism about logic. The picture of logic
delivered by this methodology is that of a scientific discipline, much more
concerned with empirical data than one would normally think. Research
on what actually constitute the data of logic has attracted the attention of
many commentators in recent years, and certainly our attention as well. It
is certainly a topic we will explore in future research in the next years. The
anti-exceptionalist account of theory choice played a crucial role at the end
of the first part of our Chapter 3, where we argued that the noneist system
N R represented the most rational choice to make in revising logic in light of
de re intentionality.
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Intentionality, principally de re, was introduced in this work in Chapter
2. There we argued that classical logic on it Quinean parsing theory fails to
account for the data of intentionality, and ought to be revised. We there pre-
sented a first candidate system for logical revision: the system P , expression
of the positive school of the free logic tradition. It certainly delivered an ac-
count of reasoning more adequate to the data of intentionality than that of
classical logic, but not the best possible.
Indeed, we went on in Chapter 3 to present another revisionary pro-
gramme, that of noneism. Noneism, as Routley would probably say, made
the transition towards a fully liberated logic possible. The system N R, char-
acterised by quantifiers interpreted neutrally and an ‘exists’ predicate not
definable in terms of those and identity, was the logic that scored compar-
atively best, in terms of cost-benefit, amongst those considered. Chapter 3
was also the occasion to say something about the non-existent from a meta-
physical point view. We there considered the issue of the ontological depen-
dency of the non-existent on the existent. We spent much time discussing
the distinction between realist and anti-realist noneism. As we have no-
ticed, our preferred logic, N R, naturally invites a realist interpretation. Re-
alist noneism, probably because of its invoking notions such as those mental
pointing and primitive intentionality, unfortunately does not have a great
reputation amongst contemporary metaphysicians. We argued in Chapter 3,
however, that the predictions made by our realist logic N R are just as com-
monsensical as those made by a negative free logic implementing anti-realist
principles. We hope that our arguments could contribute to make the view
more appealing. Exploring the possible applications of realist noneism will
also be a topic for future research.
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we addressed the topic of the reality of a
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logical disagreement between friends of non-existent objects and their de-
tractors. Typically, philosophers who claim that disputes about existence are
merely verbal tend to be classical logicians. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, for
example, the arguments we confronted have been all put forward by Timo-
thy Williamson, possibly the most prominent advocate of classical logic.
In Chapter 4, we saw Williamson claiming that a dispute about the va-
lidity of the Existence Principle is merely verbal, and presented three reasons
against his view. Chapter 5, was concerned with Williamson’s dissatisfaction
towards a distinction which have always find very clear, namely, between
philosophers saying that there are no merely possible objects (actualists), and
philosophers denying this view (possibilists). Also in that case the arguments
presented were three. Such arguments were of very different natures: some
of them were formulated proof-theoretically, some of them considered map-
pings, some of them offered probabilistic analyses.
There is something which these arguments have in common: that they all
aim to show that disagreements are to be taken seriously and not dismissed
as mere talking past each other. We think that the general thesis we have
accepted here, that some things do not exist, is to be taken seriously as well.
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